CITATION : 2014 WAIRC 00199 CORAM : COMMISSIONER S J KENNER HEARD : WEDNESDAY, 11 DECEMBER 2013 DELIVERED : WEDNESDAY, 12 MARCH 2014 FILE NO. : APA 3 OF 2013 BETWEEN : KEVIN COSMO GUGLIOTTA Appellant AND DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF TRAINING AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT Respondent Catchwords : Industrial law (WA) – Vocational education and training – Appeal against the decision of the chief executive of the respondent to cancel the training contract – Allegation of serious misconduct – Trust and confidence had broken down – Application made by the employer to the respondent to terminate the training contract – Not able to train the apprentice adequately – Appeal by way of rehearing not de novo – Distinction between cancellation of the training contract by the respondent and termination by the employer – Termination not open to the employer – Appellant not denied procedural fairness – Appeal dismissed Legislation : Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) ss 27(1)(u), 49, 49(4)(a) Industrial Training Act 1975 (WA) s 37C Vocational Education and Training Act 1996 (WA) ss 4(a), 4(g), 53, 60A, 60E(1), 60E(1)(a)(i), 60F, 60F(5), 60F(8), 60F(9), 60G, 60G(4), 60H, Pt 7, Div 2 Industrial Relations Commission Regulations 2005 (WA) reg 101 Vocational Education and Training (General) Regulations 2009 (WA) regs 44, 44(a), 44(b), 44(c), 49(4), 49(8), 51, 51(1), 53, 53(2) Result : Appeal dismissed Representation: Appellant : In person Respondent : Mr R Andretich of counsel Case(s) referred to in reasons: Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194 Galofaro v Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Appeals Commission [2005] VSC 356 Hambledon Nominees Pty Ltd as Trustee for The Hooper Family Trust trading as “Coastal Motor Sales” (employer) v Gary Shane Hancock (apprentice) and Lorna Hancock (guardian) (1983) 63 WAIG 628 Lackovic v Insurance Commission (WA) (2006) 31 WAR 460 94 W.A.I.G. WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 395 Milentis v The Honourable Minister for Education (1987) 67 WAIG 1124 Nicotra v L & A Electrical (2002) 82 WAIG 3096 P.M. and R.T. Sarich t/a Cape Bouvard Farm v Peter Thomas Cornock (apprentice) (1992) 72 WAIG 1710 Reasons for Decision 1 Mr Gugliotta was employed by Path Transit on 17 September 2012 as a bus driver. He also was party to a training contract with the employer, under which Mr Gugliotta was seeking to complete a Certificate III in Driving Operations in a Road Transport Traineeship. The training contract was registered under the Vocational Education and Training Act 1996. The traineeship had a nominal term of three years. 2 As a consequence of an allegation of serious misconduct in the workplace on 8 August 2013, Mr Gugliotta’s training contract was ultimately suspended on 23 August 2013. There was an assertion made by Mr Gugliotta, that his employer had unlawfully terminated his employment sometime earlier. Ultimately, an application was made by Path Transit to the Department to terminate the contract in accordance with regs 49(8) and 51 of the Vocational Education and Training (General) Regulations 2009. The grounds cited in support of the application to terminate Mr Gugliotta’s training contract, were his misconduct in the workplace in August 2013, and also a prior record of poor work performance. The application to terminate the training contract was opposed by Mr Gugliotta. The Department attempted to informally mediate a resolution of the issues in dispute however, the employer declined to take part. 3 After considering all of the circumstances of the application to terminate the training contract, and the response of Mr Gugliotta, including the failure to mediate a resolution, the Department determined that the best course of action was the cancellation of the registration of the training contract under s 60F(5) of the Act and reg 44(b) of the Regulations. By this provision, the chief executive officer of the Department may cancel the registration of a training contract, if the conclusion is reached that the employer is no longer able to adequately train the apprentice. I should note at this point, that “apprentice”, for the purposes of Part 7 of the VET Act, means the person named in a training contract, irrespective of whether they are described as an apprentice, trainee or something else: s 60A. 4 By letter of 20 September 2013, the Department informed Mr Gugliotta that as a result of an irretrievable breakdown of the relationship between Path Transit and Mr Gugliotta, the Department had reached the view that the employer would not be able to train Mr Gugliotta adequately. The registration of the training contract was cancelled effective 20 September 2013. 5 Mr Gugliotta has now commenced this appeal against the chief executive’s decision to cancel the registration of the training contract. Whilst the Department’s letter of 20 September 2013, advising Mr Gugliotta of the cancellation, referred to his right to appeal the decision to the Industrial Relations Commission under s 60G(4) of the VET Act, given that the registration of the training contract was cancelled by the Department and not terminated by the employer, with the approval of the chief executive, the appeal is brought under s 60F(8) of the VET Act. Contentions of the parties 6 Mr Gugliotta’s notice of appeal attaches a single paragraph statement, as his grounds of appeal. In it, Mr Gugliotta alleges that Path Transit actually terminated his training contract unlawfully on or about 15 August 2013, and then subsequently, falsified a document on 23 August 2013, to say that the training contract was suspended. Mr Gugliotta further alleges that Path Transit has engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct in relation to this material. He also contended that CCTV footage of the workplace on and around the date of the alleged serious misconduct, contradicts the assertions of Path Transit. 7 Mr Gugliotta further asserted in his appeal notice, that as a consequence of these matters, the termination of the training contract was unlawful. He also contended that the chief executive’s decision to cancel the training contract, on the ground that the working relationship between himself and Path Transit had become untenable, involved a denial of procedural fairness. This was said to be because he was not given the opportunity to present all of the evidence at a meeting with the Department, with Path Transit being present. 8 For the Department it was submitted that the training contract was cancelled because the essential element of trust and confidence, equally necessary for both the employment and the training contract, between Mr Gugliotta and his employer, Path Transit, had evaporated. Given the nature of the training contract and the obligation on Path Transit to provide training to Mr Gugliotta, in view of the total breakdown in the relationship between the parties, as evidenced by Mr Gugliotta’s allegations of fraud and misleading and deceptive conduct by Path Transit, the Department had no real option but to cancel the training contract. 9 Further, given that the training contract was not terminated by approval of the chief executive, it was not necessary, and, on the facts, not possible, to determine the truth or otherwise, of the misconduct allegations. Rather, based on the application by Path Transit, Mr Gugliotta’s response and the investigation undertaken by the Department, the Department submitted that it was clear that the training objectives of the training contract could no longer be met in this case. The statutory scheme 10 By its long title, the VET Act concerns itself with the establishment of a vocational education and training system for the State and amongst other things, is established “to provide for the training of people, such as apprentices, under training contracts with employers”. By its objects in s 4(a), the legislation has, as a main object “to establish a State training system for the effective and efficient provision of vocational education and training to meet the immediate and future needs of industry and the community”. Further, by s 4(g), it is also a main object, “to provide for people, such as apprentices, to be trained for some occupations under training contracts with employers.” 11 Part 7 of the VET Act, deals with obtaining vocational education and training qualifications and provides, amongst other matters, for the making of training contracts by employers and employees. Under s 60E(1), a training contract may be made which requires an employer to employ the trainee under the training contract; to train the employee; to permit the employee to be trained under the training contract and to be assessed. The employee party to the training contract is required to agree to meet his or her obligations under the training contract and to be trained and assessed in accordance with its terms. 396 WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 94 W.A.I.G. 12 Under s 60F, provision is made for training contracts to be registered by the Department. A training contract comes into effect on and from registration. By s 60F(5) the Department may cancel the registration of a training contract “for any reason prescribed by the regulations”. Regulation 44 provides, that for the purposes of s 60F(5) of the VET Act, the chief executive may cancel the registration of a training contract for a number of reasons including, in (b), if “the chief executive is satisfied the employer is not able to train the apprentice adequately …” 13 By s 60G, once outside of the probationary period, and other than by consent of the apprentice, an employer party to a training contract may terminate it. This can only be with the approval of the chief executive of the Department, which must be given if, amongst other things, the chief executive is satisfied that the apprentice has engaged in serious misconduct. An appeal lies to the Commission from a decision by the Department to approve the termination of a training contract. 14 Therefore, from these provisions of Part 7 of the VET Act, there is a clear distinction between action of the chief executive of the Department to cancel the registration of a training contract on the one hand, and the approval of a proposed termination of a training contract by an employer, on the other. One thing they both have in common however, is, that if a training contract ceases to have effect for either reason, the employment of the apprentice under the training contract also ceases: s 60H. Whilst it is not necessary to finally decide the matter for the purposes of this appeal, it is strongly arguable that employment that ceases as a consequence of the cessation of a training contract does so by operation of law and not at the initiative of either the employer or the employee. 15 From the objects and purposes of the statutory scheme set out above, in my view, when the Commission comes to consider an appeal of the present kind, it must always be kept at the forefront of its consideration, that it is training and vocational education and the achievement of these objects, which is the focus of an inquiry into the cessation of a training contract, in any particular case. Nature of the appeal 16 By s 60F(8) an appeal lies to the Commission by a person who is “dissatisfied by a decision made by the chief executive under this section”. The relevant decision concerned is the decision to cancel the registration of a training contract, for any reason prescribed in the Regulations. The terms of ss 60F(8) and (9) provide as follows: 60F. Registration of training contracts …… (8) A person who is dissatisfied by a decision made by the chief executive under this section may appeal against it to the Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission. (9) On an appeal made under subsection (8) against a decision, the Commission must rehear the matter and may confirm the decision or set it aside and either substitute a decision the chief executive could make or order the chief executive to decide the matter again. 17 The first point to be noted in relation to s 60F(9) is on an appeal of the present kind, the Commission is required to “rehear the matter”. It is then empowered to do a number of things, including confirming the original decision, or setting it aside and making another decision that could have been made by the chief executive officer at first instance. The Commission may also order the chief executive officer to re-decide the matter. There is no indication in s 60F(9) that the Commission must “rehear” the matter on the basis of the materials before the chief executive when he or she made the relevant decision the subject of the appeal. This is in contrast with, for example, s 49 of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 dealing with appeals to the Full Bench of the Commission. Under s 49(4)(a), an appeal is required to be heard and determined on the evidence and matters raised in the proceedings at first instance. No such limitation is apparent in s 60F(9) of the VET Act. Regulation 101 of the Industrial Relations Commission Regulations 2005 sets out the procedural requirements in relation to an appeal. 18 This raises the question as to nature of an appeal under s 60F(9). The fact that the Parliament has used the words “must rehear” in s 60F(9) is significant, but not decisive. Under the former s 37C of the then Industrial Training Act 1975, a person party to an apprenticeship or traineeship agreement could appeal to the Industrial Commission from a range of decisions of the then Director of Industrial Training. The provision in question simply said the person aggrieved “may appeal to the Commission”. There was a difference of view as to whether this meant an appeal to the Commission was to be conducted on the same basis as appeals under s 49 of the Act, or whether there was greater capacity for the Commission to rehear the matter and receive fresh evidence as part of hearing the appeal: Hambledon Nominees Pty Ltd as Trustee for The Hooper Family Trust trading as “Coastal Motor Sales” (employer) v Gary Shane Hancock (apprentice) and Lorna Hancock (guardian) (1983) 63 WAIG 628; Nicotra v L & A Electrical (2002) 82 WAIG 3096; cf P.M. and R.T. Sarich t/a Cape Bouvard Farm v Peter Thomas Cornock (apprentice) (1992) 72 WAIG 1710. 19 The issue of appeal provisions in statutes was the subject of consideration by the Full Bench of the Commission in Milentis v The Honourable Minister for Education (1987) 67 WAIG 1124. In that matter, on a referral of a matter of law under s 27(1)(u) of the Act, the Full Bench was called upon to determine the nature of an appeal by a teacher to the then Government School Teachers Tribunal, a constituent body of the Commission under the Act. In dealing with the nature of a statutory right of appeal, the Full Bench said at 1125 as follows: A right of appeal is peculiarly a statutory right and the nature and extent of that right is dependent on the language of the particular statute. As Windeyer J. observed in Da Costa v. Cockburn Salvage and Trading Pty Ltd (1971) 124 CLR 192 at 202:- the word "appeal" has itself more than one sense for modern law: e.g. ex parte Australian Sporting Club Ltd; re Dash (1947) 47 SR (NSW) 238. It is therefore probably helpful at the outset to try and understand and distinguish various types of appeal and the following passage from Mason J. in Builders Licensing Board v. Sperway Constructions (Syd) Pty Ltd (1976) 135 CLR 616 at 619 is illuminating:- 94 W.A.I.G. WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 397 An appeal is not a common law proceeding. It is a remedy given by statute [Victorian Stevedoring and General Contracting Co Pty Ltd and Meakes v. Dignan (1931) 46 CLR 73 at 108; Commissioner for Railways (NSW) v. Cavanough (1935) 53 CLR 220 at 225]. Upon an appeal stricto sensu the question considered is whether the judgment complained of was right when given [Ponnamma v. Arumogam (1905) AC 383 at 388], that is whether the order appealed from was right on the material which the lower court had before it. An appeal stricto sensu is to be distinguished from an appeal by way of rehearing of which the most notable example has been the appeal to the English Court of Appeal provided for by the Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873, sections 18-19 and the Rules of Procedure contained in the Schedule to the Act of 1875. It was provided that the appeal should be by way of rehearing and that the court should have power to take fresh evidence and draw inferences of fact (see O 58, rr. 1, 4). The appeal had its origin in the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeal in Chancery established by 14 and 15 Vict clause 83 to rehear cases determined in Chancery. This appeal by way of rehearing involves rehearing of the cause at the date of the appeal, that is "by trial over again on the evidence used in the Court below; but there is special power to receive further evidence" [In re Chennell; Jones v. Chennell (1978) 8 Ch D 492 at 505]. On such an appeal the rights of the parties must be determined by reference to the circumstances as they then exist and by reference to the law as it then exists; the appellate court may give such judgment as ought to be given if the case at that time came before the court of first instance. But this appeal by way of rehearing did not call for a fresh hearing or hearing de novo; the court does not hear the witnesses again. See generally the Victorian Stevedoring Case (1931) 46 CLR at 107-109; Da Costa v. Cockburn Salvage & Trading Pty Ltd (1970) 124 CLR 192 at 208. It was observed by Viscount Sankey L.C. in Powell v. Streatham Manor Nursing Home (1935) AC 243 at 249, that "There are different meanings to be attached to the word 'rehearing'". The appeal to Quarter Sessions in New South Wales is frequently described as a rehearing although the Justices Act 1902, as amended, contains no specific provision to that effect. In truth the appeal to Quarter Sessions is most aptly described as a hearing de novo because, even if it be the defendant who appeals, the informant or complainant starts again and has to make out his case and call his witnesses. The appeal to Quarter Sessions is the outcome of historical development and its only utility for present purposes is that it provides an illustration of what is in truth a hearing de novo, although, as I have said, it is frequently described as a rehearing. 20 Thus, appeals can be characterised as appeals in the strict sense; appeals by way of rehearing; and appeals by way of hearing de novo. Part of the consideration for the nature of the appeal, is the type of decision from which the appeal is brought. Where, for example, the appeal is from a purely administrative decision, in which there is no provision for a hearing, no right to representation, and the decision-maker is not required to publish reasons for decision, or maintain a record of proceedings, then it may be inferred that the appeal is to be by way of a hearing de novo: Galofaro v Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Appeals Commission [2005] VSC 356. 21 The procedure for applications to the chief executive under Part 7 Div 2 of the VET Act is set out in reg 53 of the Regulations. Under this provision, the chief executive may inform himself or herself as they see fit. The parties must be given the opportunity to make submissions and provide evidence. A hearing may be permitted, but is not required. A party may be represented. The decision and reasons for it are required to be given by the chief executive to the parties. 22 Given the statutory provisions to which I have referred and the relevant principles, I consider that an appeal to the Commission from a decision of the chief executive is to be by way of a rehearing, not a hearing de novo. Such an appeal would normally be based on the evidence and other materials before the chief executive. However, it seems to me that as with appeals by way of rehearing generally, further evidence may be admitted in the appeal. There would however, need to be a case made as to why further evidence should be admitted. 23 As with appeals in a strict sense, an appeal by way of a rehearing still requires the appellant to demonstrate error: Coal and Allied Operations Pty Limited v Australian Industrial Relations Commission (2000) 203 CLR 194. So much is also clear by reference to the powers of the Commission on the determination of an appeal. The Commission is empowered, on the determination of an appeal, to “confirm” or to “set aside” a decision. Such a decision necessarily requires a conclusion to be reached, that the chief executive’s decision was either correct or in error, in some material respect. Relevant principles in relation to an appeal by way of rehearing were set out by Buss JA in Lackovic v Insurance Commission (WA) (2006) 31 WAR 460 at 477-8. 24 On the basis of these conclusions as to the nature of an appeal under the VET Act, for the purposes of reg 44 of the Regulations, in my opinion, the “satisfaction” of the chief executive as to the various matters set out in pars (a) to (c) is to be considered objectively. Consideration 25 The first issue raised by Mr Gugliotta was that he was not given the notice of the suspension of the training contract by his employer, as required by reg 49(4) of the Regulations. Mr Gugliotta received a copy of the notice from Ms Ho of the Department, on or about 3 September 2013. A copy of the suspension notice, dated 23 August 2013, addressed to Mr Gugliotta, was exhibit A1. According to an email from Path Transit to Ms Ho of 17 September 2013, contained in the Department’s bundle of documents at exhibit R1, Path Transit initially decided to terminate Mr Gugliotta’s employment as a result of misconduct on 8 August 2013 and a subsequent disciplinary review by the employer on 13 August. Subsequently, Path Transit took advice in relation to their obligations under the VET Act, which led to Mr Gugliotta being suspended instead. 26 Subsequently, on 22 August 2013, Path Transit applied to the Department to terminate the training contract under reg 51(1) of the regulations. A copy of the application to terminate and the grounds and documents in support of it, are set out at p 4-15 in exhibit R1. By letter of 3 September 2013, the Department provided Mr Gugliotta with a copy of the employer’s application to 398 WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 94 W.A.I.G. terminate the training contract. Mr Gugliotta was invited to respond to the application to terminate the training contract. On 13 September 2013, by his then solicitor, Mr Gugliotta provided a detailed submission in response to Path Transit’s application. A copy of Mr Gugliotta’s response is at pp 19-23 of exhibit R1. In it, Mr Gugliotta asserts that the chief executive had no jurisdiction to terminate the training contract because by letter of 15 August 2013, Path Transit had earlier purported to terminate Mr Gugliotta’s employment. Mr Gugliotta was not suspended as alleged by Path Transit. In his response, Mr Gugliotta alleges that the letter of 23 August 2013 from Path Transit to him, regarding the suspension of the training contract, was a fabrication. 27 As to the incident on 8 August 2013, in which Mr Gugliotta is said to have harassed and verbally attacked a co-employee, Mr Gugliotta contended that the documents provided by Path Transit, from interviews with other employees, including the employee said to be harassed, were inconsistent with CCTV footage of the area at the time. It was also contended that the report of the other employee, confronted by Mr Gugliotta in the workplace, contains exaggerations and was also inconsistent with the CCTV footage. The previous work performance relied upon by Path Transit, in terms of Mr Gugliotta’s poor driving record and requirements to undergo retraining and assessments, were also said by him to be an exaggeration. It was also submitted by Mr Gugliotta that these matters may have been added to his work record, after his alleged dismissal. 28 The complaint of unlawfulness by Mr Gugliotta in his submissions cannot succeed. This is because, whilst a suspension of a training contract by an employer, is a precondition to an application to the chief executive for approval of the termination of a training contract under reg 49 of the Regulations, in this case, the chief executive did not rely on her power to approve the termination of the training contract under s 60G of the VET Act. In this case, the chief executive exercised her power under s 60F(5) of the VET Act, to cancel the registration of the training contract. A cancellation under this power, in reliance on a ground set out in reg 44 of the Regulations, is not dependent on the existence of a valid suspension of a training contract under reg 49. As noted earlier in these reasons, the power of the chief executive to cancel the registration of and the power to approve termination of a training contract, and the requirements for the same, are separate and distinct. 29 Even if this is not so, any purported termination of employment by the employer, outside of the probationary period, without compliance with the requirements set out in reg 49, would arguably be unlawful and of no effect. This is because a training contract and a contract of employment for an apprentice are inextricably linked. The VET Act and the Regulations, provide a comprehensive scheme for the regulation of training contracts, and the employment which accompanies them. By s 60E(1)(a)(i), an employer “agrees” under the training contract, that the person concerned “will be employed while he or she fulfils the requirements of the contract ….” It is difficult to see how an employer can unilaterally terminate an apprentice’s employment, without compliance with the statutory scheme set out in the VET Act and Regulations. 30 Mr Gugliotta next argued that because there was no mediation between himself and Path Transit, the chief executive was in error in proceeding to cancel the contract. It is to be pointed out at this stage, that there was no dispute by the Department that mediation did not take place. Mediation was proposed by the ApprentiCentre, to take place on 23 August 2013, in order to try to resolve the issues in dispute. However, Path Transit did not agree to participate in the mediation. As a part of this submission, Mr Gugliotta made the general assertion that he was denied the opportunity to be heard by the Department, in relation to Path Transit’s application to terminate the training contract. In this respect, Mr Gugliotta submitted that the chief executive simply accepted what Path Transit had to say on these issues, and he was not given a proper opportunity to be heard. 31 In considering this submission, the first point to note is that there is no obligation on the chief executive under reg 53 of the Regulations, to mediate a dispute such as the present. The chief executive is required to give the opportunity for parties to be heard by submissions and evidence. As already noted above, there is no requirement on the chief executive to hold a hearing. Whilst there is also no requirement to mediate such a dispute, informal mediation is a useful tool in dispute resolution and it would be sensible for such a process to occur, in an attempt to resolve a dispute under a training contract. However, despite it not being a statutory requirement, and therefore no basis for an allegation of error by the chief executive, mediation is, by its nature, voluntary. A party cannot be forced to take part in mediation. There is therefore no merit in this complaint by Mr Gugliotta. 32 As to the general submission made by Mr Gugliotta that he was not given an opportunity to be heard, this is not correct. By reg 53(2) of the Regulations, the chief executive may inform himself or herself as he or she sees fit. Mr Gugliotta had the assistance from a solicitor, who made a detailed written submission to the chief executive on Mr Gugliotta’s behalf. Documents were also provided. Ms Ho, who gave evidence on behalf of the Department as to how Mr Gugliotta’s case was dealt with by the Department, enquired into Path Transit’s application to terminate the training contract. Ms Ho obtained information from the parties, including the CCTV footage and viewed it. 33 The submissions of the parties, supporting documents, and a report by Ms Ho, were all provided to the chief executive. Ms Ho’s testimony was that she considered the material provided by both Path Transit and Mr Gugliotta, in connection with the application to terminate the training contract. Ms Ho also said the CCTV footage was not of much assistance in resolving the allegations. It was Ms Ho’s testimony that whilst she considered that the Path Transit case to terminate the training contract was reasonably strong, she could not come to any concluded view in relation to the conduct complained of, because so much of it was disputed by Mr Gugliotta. 34 Importantly however, Ms Ho said that from considering all of the material, and liaising with the parties, it became clear to her that the employment relationship between Mr Gugliotta and Path Transit had completely broken down. She said this informed her view that the training objectives of the training contract were seriously jeopardised. It was on this basis that Ms Ho recommended to the chief executive that she cancel the registration of the training contract. 35 Given the material before the Commission on this appeal, it has not been established by Mr Gugliotta that the conclusion reached by the chief executive, that it would be appropriate to cancel the registration of the training contract, was in error and not one reasonably open to her. The trust and confidence between Mr Gugliotta and Path Transit had clearly broken down to the point where it is difficult to see how Path Transit could continue to discharge its obligations under the training contract, to provide training for Mr Gugliotta. It is also difficult to see, how the objective of the legislation would be able to be met in this case. Not only had the employer lost all confidence in the apprentice, also, Mr Gugliotta had accused Path Transit of 94 W.A.I.G. WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 399 fraudulent conduct and made specific allegations in that regard, against a senior manager of the company, to whom Mr Gugliotta was ultimately responsible. The manager was accused of fabricating documents given to the Department. 36 These are serious allegations in and of themselves. However, they also speak volumes as to the breakdown in relations between the parties. Having regard to these matters, and all of the material before the chief executive at the time she made her decision, the decision to cancel the registration of the training contract between Mr Gugliotta and Path Transit under s 60F(5) of the VET Act must be confirmed. The appeal is therefore dismissed. 2014 WAIRC 00201 APPEAL RE TERMINATION OF TRAINING CONTRACT WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION PARTIES KEVIN COSMO GUGLIOTTA APPELLANT -v- DIRECTOR GENERAL, DEPARTMENT OF TRAINING AND WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT RESPONDENT CORAM COMMISSIONER S J KENNER DATE WEDNESDAY, 12 MARCH 2014 FILE NO/S APA 3 OF 2013 CITATION NO. 2014 WAIRC 00201 Result Appeal dismissed Representation Appellant In person Respondent Mr R Andretich of counsel Order HAVING heard Mr Gugliotta in person and Mr R Andretich of counsel on behalf of the respondent the Commission, pursuant to the powers conferred on it under the Vocational Education and Training Act 1996 hereby orders – (1) THAT the name of the respondent be amended by deleting the name “Director General, Department of Training and Workplace Development” and inserting in lieu thereof the name “Director General, Department of Training and Workforce Development”. (2) THAT the appeal be and is hereby dismissed. (Sgd.) S J KENNER, [L.S.] Commissioner. ROAD FREIGHT TRANSPORT INDUSTRY TRIBUNAL—Matters Dealt With— 2013 WAIRC 01073 REFERRAL OF DISPUTE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION PARTIES TOM JAKOVICH APPLICANT -v- NDK PTY LTD RESPONDENT CORAM COMMISSIONER S J KENNER DATE THURSDAY, 19 DECEMBER 2013 FILE NO. RFT 11 OF 2013 CITATION NO. 2013 WAIRC 01073 Result Direction issued Representation Applicant Mr A Dzieciol of counsel Respondent Ms S McLeod of counsel 400 WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 94 W.A.I.G. Direction HAVING heard Mr A Dzieciol of counsel on behalf of the applicant and Ms S McLeod of counsel on behalf of the respondent the Commission, pursuant to the powers conferred on it under the Industrial Relations Act, 1979 hereby directs – (1) THAT the applicant and respondent file and serve an outline of submissions and any list of authorities upon which they intend to rely no later than 3 days prior to the date of hearing. (2) THAT the parties have liberty to apply on short notice. (Sgd.) S J KENNER, [L.S.] Commissioner. 2014 WAIRC 00051 REFERRAL OF DISPUTE IN THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION SITTING AS THE ROAD FREIGHT TRANSPORT INDUSTRY TRIBUNAL PARTIES TREADSTONE HAULAGE PTY LTD APPLICANT -v- NDK PTY LTD RESPONDENT CORAM COMMISSIONER S J KENNER DATE FRIDAY, 31 JANUARY 2014 FILE NO/S RFT 11 OF 2013 CITATION NO. 2014 WAIRC 00051 Result Order issued Representation Applicant Mr A Dzieciol of counsel Respondent Mr M Cox of counsel Order HAVING heard Mr A Dzieciol of counsel on behalf of the applicant and Mr M Cox of counsel on behalf of the respondent and by consent the Commission, pursuant to the powers conferred on it under the Industrial Relations Act, 1979 hereby orders – (1) THAT the name of the applicant on the notice of application be amended by deleting the name “Tom Jakovich” and inserting in lieu thereof the name “Treadstone Haulage Pty Ltd”. (2) THAT the application be and is hereby dismissed. (Sgd.) S J KENNER, [L.S.] Commissioner. 2013 WAIRC 00431 REFERRAL OF DISPUTE IN THE WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION SITTING AS THE ROAD FREIGHT TRANSPORT INDUSTRY TRIBUNAL PARTIES TRANSPORT WORKERS UNION OF AUSTRALIA INDUSTRIAL UNION OF WORKERS, WESTERN AUSTRALIAN BRANCH APPLICANT -v- LN PRICE AND PARTNERS PTY LTD TRADING AS BUSSELTON FREIGHT SERVICES RESPONDENT CORAM COMMISSIONER S J KENNER DATE TUESDAY, 16 JULY 2013 FILE NO/S RFT 12 OF 2012 CITATION NO. 2013 WAIRC 00431 94 W.A.I.G. WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 401 Result Application discontinued Representation Applicant Mr A Dzieciol Respondent Mr S Kemp and Mr A Price Order WHEREAS the applicant filed a notice of discontinuance, the Commission, pursuant to the powers conferred on it under the Industrial Relations Act 1979, hereby orders – THAT the application be and is hereby discontinued. (Sgd.) S J KENNER, [L.S.] Commissioner. NOTICES—Application for General Order— 2014 WAIRC 00290 WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION 111 St Georges Terrace, Perth Submissions for the 2014 WA Minimum Wage The WAIRC is required to set the minimum wage to apply to employers and employees covered by the WA industrial relations system. It must do this before 1 July each year. The current minimum wage for an adult employee of $645.90 per week was set in June 2013 to apply from 1 July 2013. The WAIRC invites interested persons or organisations to make a submission to the Commission on what minimum wage should be set in 2014. The Commission will hear oral submissions commencing on Wednesday, 28 May 2014. The proceedings are open to the public and will be webcast. Any person who wishes to make an oral submission at that time should notify the Registrar of the Commission stating the basis of their interest. This must be done by Friday, 9 May 2014. Written submissions are also welcomed. Any person or organisation who wishes to make a written submission should do so in writing or by email by Friday, 9 May 2014. Please note that copies of written submissions may be made available to other persons and may be displayed on the Commission’s website. Further particulars may be obtained from the Registry of the WAIRC and from the Commission’s website at www.wairc.wa.gov.au. All correspondence should be addressed to the Registrar at the above address or by email to registrar@wairc.wa.gov.au quoting Matter number 1 of 2014. DATED at Perth this 9th day of April 2014. (Sgd.) S BASTIAN, [L.S.] Registrar.