The nature of the relevant issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained, requiring careful weighing of testimony, close examination of proved facts as a basis of inference, and a comfortable satisfaction that the tribunal has reached both a correct and just conclusion.

In cases involving serious allegations and grave consequences, while the standard of proof remains balance of probabilities, the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is attained and satisfaction should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences.

Where emails are used to advise an employee of their dismissal, there is a presumption that an employee will have had a reasonable opportunity to become aware of their dismissal if it is received in their inbox at their usual email address.

Where denial of natural justice affects a party's entitlement to make submissions on an issue of fact, particularly whether evidence of a particular witness should be accepted, it is difficult for an appellate court to conclude that compliance with natural justice could have made no difference.

Where an issue concerns acceptance or rejection of witness testimony at trial, the trial judge has an inestimable advantage over the appellate court in seeing and assessing the witnesses. The appellate court cannot satisfactorily conclude that denial of opportunity to address this issue could make no possible difference.

An appellate court entrusted with jurisdiction to entertain an appeal by way of rehearing from a trial judge's decision on questions of fact must set aside a challenged finding of fact which is shown to be wrong, but where the finding is based substantially on the trial judge's assessment of witness credibility from oral testimony, allowance must be made for the advantage the trial judge enjoyed in seeing and hearing the witnesses.

The significance of the trial judge's observational advantage varies according to the class of case and individual circumstances. If the finding is affected by identified error of principle or demonstrated mistake about relevant facts, the advantage may be of little significance. If unaffected by such error, the appellate court must assess the extent to which the finding was based on conclusions about credibility drawn from observation of demeanour as distinct from consideration of the content of evidence.

Even where a finding of fact is based significantly on the trial judge's observation of witness demeanour, the appellate court cannot excuse itself from weighing conflicting evidence and drawing its own inferences and conclusions, but the appellate duty in such cases cannot be explained by any short exhaustive formula.

Where an appeal turns on a question of fact involving witness credibility, the appellate court must reconsider the materials with the advantage that the trial judge had in seeing and hearing the witnesses, carefully weighing the trial judge's judgment, but not shrinking from overruling it if the court comes to the conclusion that it is wrong. However, there may be circumstances apart from demeanour which show whether a statement is credible, and these may warrant differing from the judge even on credibility questions involving witnesses not seen by the appellate court.

A finding of fact by a trial judge based on the credibility of a witness is not to be set aside because an appellate court thinks that the probabilities of the case are against—even strongly against—that finding. If the trial judge's finding depends to any substantial degree on witness credibility, the finding must stand unless it can be shown that the trial judge has failed to use or palpably misused the observational advantage, or has acted on evidence inconsistent with facts incontrovertibly established by the evidence or which is glaringly improbable.

In civil proceedings involving serious allegations, a proper degree of satisfaction is required having regard to the seriousness of the allegations; the nature of the issue necessarily affects the process by which reasonable satisfaction is obtained.

Care needs to be taken in applying the Briginshaw principle and it would be wrong to apply a standard of proof higher than the balance of probabilities.