1 Fair Work Act 2009 s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy Mr Bill Kospetas v S P Jain School of Global Management Pty Ltd (U2026/923) COMMISSIONER RIORDAN SYDNEY, 30 JUNE 2026 Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – jurisdictional objection – applicant not dismissed [1] On 21 January 2026, Mr Bill Kospetas (the Applicant) filed an application with the Fair Work Commission (the Commission) under s.394 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the FW Act), alleging that he was unfairly dismissed by S P Jain School of Global Management Pty Ltd (the Respondent) on 31 December 2025. [2] In its Form F3 – Employer response to an unfair dismissal application, the Respondent raised a jurisdictional objection to the application on the grounds that the Applicant was not dismissed, rather, his fixed-term contract of employment concluded upon its expiry. [3] Section 385 of the FW Act provides that:- “A person has been unfairly dismissed if the FWC is satisfied that: (a) the person has been dismissed; and (b) the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable; and (c) the dismissal was not consistent with the Small Business Fair Dismissal Code; and (d) the dismissal was not a case of genuine redundancy…” [4] Section 386 of the FW Act provides the meaning of ‘dismissed’ as follows: “(1) A person has been dismissed if: (a) the person’s employment with his or her employer has been terminated on the employer’s initiative; or [2026] FWC 2103 DECISION [2026] FWC 2103 2 (b) the person has resigned from his or her employment, but was forced to do so because of conduct, or a course of conduct, engaged in by his or her employer. (2) However, a person has not been dismissed if: (a) the person was employed under a contract of employment for a specified period of time, for a specified task, or for the duration of a specified season, and the employment has terminated at the end of the period, on completion of the task, or at the end of the season;…” (My emphasis) [5] The Applicant was employed under a Contract of Employment dated 1 January 2025, which provided that it commenced on 01/01/2025, had a contract term of ‘1 Year (Renewable on a yearly basis)’ and had a stated contract end date of 31/12/2025. [6] The Respondent sent correspondence to the Applicant on 14 January 2025 with subject line – ‘Facilities Manager – Employment offer outline’, stating: “Dear Bill, After detailed deliberations with Management, we would like to offer to you, 1. A fixed one-year term ‘Employment’ which is renewable on completion of one year from the ‘Date of Execution’ of the agreement. 2. You will receive all SP Jain Australia employee benefits as availed by SPJ Australia employees. 3. Annual Salary of A$120,000 + Superannuation + Incentives 4. 10% Incentive will be paid on SPJ Campus operation cost savings, new revenue creation from renting classrooms, our office for boardroom for meetings, additional car parking leasing etc. Say, if you get additional Car parking spots leased for say an ‘Annual Rent’ of A$60,000., We will pay you 10% of this A$60,000 as an Incentive. That’s A$6,000 to be paid pro-rata, as we receive the monthly car parking lease payments during its ‘annual commitment period’ 5. This Incentive is capped at A$30,000/Employment period of 1 year. Whilst we have evaluated the current market salary trend for your role, we have majorly factored in your 10+ year tenure with SP Jain and look forward to working with you. Warm regards, Rohit Choksi” (My emphasis) [7] On 19 December 2025, the Respondent wrote to the Applicant providing him with a further contract of employment:- [2026] FWC 2103 3 “Hello Bill, Please find the contract attached, I was planning to meet you and discuss this further, but I am aware you have been on sick leave, please take care. Thanks. Regards, Kajal” [8] This further contract of employment provided: “This is a fixed-term employment contract for a period of one (1) year. • Start Date: 1 January 2026 • End Date: 31 December 2026 This contract will automatically expire on the end date unless extended or renewed in writing by both parties.” [9] The Applicant wrote to the Respondent on 22 December 2025, to advise that the further offer of employment was rejected: “Hi Kajal, I reject the offer of the new Employment Contract. I also consider that my current Fixed Term Contract does not meet the fixed term contract rules and that, as a result, it does not automatically come to an end on 31/12/2025. I confirm that I am currently on personal leave and will not be performing duties until I am fit for work. Regards, Bill” [10] The Respondent wrote to the Applicant on 31 December 2025, advising that his employment had ceased as follows:- “Subject: End of Fixed-Term Employment Contract Hello Bill, I hope you are well. As you have chosen not to accept the new contract, and your current fixed-term employment contract concludes today, we confirm that today will be your last working day with S P Jain in accordance with the contract end date and the new offered contract has been rescinded. [2026] FWC 2103 4 We kindly request that you please arrange to return all company property, including building access cards, keys, laptop, company car, all car keys, and any other items in your possession. Please let us know when you will be able to visit the campus to return these items and complete the handover. As you have not responded to previous leave emails, we have to utilized the remaining leave balance for your ongoing leaves, payroll for this month has already been processed. We also require handover of all digital access passwords and security keys to enable us to change the same as a part of your handover obligations. (Prior to release of your final settlement dues) Any remaining leave balance and final entitlements owing to you will be calculated and processed in your final pay after the full handover. Thank you for your contribution during your time with us, and we wish you all the best for the future. Kind Regards, Kajal Valecha Human Resource and Admin Manager” [11] In accordance with Directions issued on 24 March 2026, the Respondent filed its jurisdictional materials on 16 April 2026, the Applicant filed his jurisdictional materials on 8 May 2026, and the Respondent filed materials in reply on 15 May 2026. Whilst the matter was originally scheduled for a Jurisdictional Hearing on 21 May 2026, further to an exchange with the parties ahead of the hearing date, by consent of the parties, the jurisdictional objection is now being determined on the papers. This Decision deals only with the jurisdictional question of whether or not the Applicant has been dismissed by the Respondent in accordance with s.386(2)(a) of the FW Act. Respondent’s Submissions [12] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s application should be dismissed as there was no dismissal, rather, the Applicant’s employment ceased at the end of a 1-year fixed-term contract that expired by effluxion of time on 31 December 2025. [13] Further, the Respondent submitted that the fixed-term contract does not breach ss.333A, 333B or 333E of the FW Act because: “(a) it is only 1 year. (b) it has a clear end date; and (c) there were no successive contracts or anti-avoidance conduct.” [2026] FWC 2103 5 [14] The Respondent noted that the Applicant’s prior ‘5+ years’ of service with the company were as an independent contractor via the Applicant’s own company, BPMG Consulting Pty. Ltd. The Respondent outlined the Applicant’s ‘phases of service’ with the Respondent business as follows: “Phase A – Employee (6 Mar 2014 – 6 Dec 2019) • The Applicant resigned voluntarily on 8 Nov 2019… • Full and final settlement paid (annual leave + bonus). • He left the payroll and the required role was advertised ... Phase B – Independent Contractor via BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd (1 Nov 2019 – 31 Dec 2024) • For (sic) successive Consulting Agreements … all Business to Business relationships. • Invoiced monthly + GST through his company. • BPMG had two directors (Bill and Maria Kospetas), employed others (Dean Tsitsos 19 months, George Kospetas 5 months), and issued 97 invoices to other customers … • First invoice to SP Jain was Invoice #11 proving 10 prior clients … • Sydney Metro reimbursed the invoices … • Bill negotiated payment terms, right to do other work, right to use staff, and no full- time devotion … • During the COVID-19 pandemic, all SP Jain employees were required to accept a 20% reduction in salary. In contrast, the Applicant, operating as an independent contractor through BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd, continued to invoice and receive his full contracted rate without any reduction (Evidence B-8). This demonstrates that the Applicant bore the commercial risks and rewards of running his own business, rather than being treated as an employee. It is powerful evidence that the contracting arrangement was genuine and not a sham as assumed by the Applicant’s Lawyer. • This is the classic business-to-business relationship upheld in ZG Operations Australia Pty Ltd v Jamsek [2022] HCA 2 and CFMMEU v Personnel Contracting [2022] HCA 1. Phase C – Employee again (1 Jan 2025 – 31 Dec 2025) • 1-year fixed-term employment contract… • Clear wording: “Contract Term 1 Year (Renewable on a yearly basis)” and “Contract end date 31/12/2025”. • The Applicant signed it on 30 Jan 2025 … • Emails prove he knew the end date … • He requested extension on 12 Dec 2025 confirming he knew it was ending. On 22 December 2025, after being reminded that his contract had ended, the Applicant instructed the external security door access company to lock the front glass doors of the campus. This prevented normal access for staff and students, who were forced to use the cafeteria side entrance. He also refused to provide handover of security codes, passwords or building management software despite repeated requests. These unauthorised actions caused significant disruption and heavy financial loss to the Respondent ...” [15] The Respondent submitted that both parties knew the exact end date of the 1-year fixed- term contract. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s conduct on 22 December 2025, [2026] FWC 2103 6 including locking the doors and refusing handover, confirmed that he knew the employment relationship had come to an end. Therefore, the Respondent submitted that there was no dismissal and the application must be dismissed for want of jurisdiction.1 [16] As to ss.333A–333E of the FW Act, the Respondent further submitted as follows: “• s 333A: The contract is only 1 year, not more than 2 years. The bracketed words “(Renewable on a yearly basis)” do not create a binding option that takes the total beyond 2 years. Renewal was entirely discretionary and did not occur. • s 333B: The contract expressly states the end date on page 2. • s 333E: No anti-avoidance as this was the first employment contract after 5 years of genuine contracting. No “rolling” contracts. • The Applicant’s lawyer’s argument fails on the face of the contract and the evidence.” Applicant’s Submissions [17] The Applicant submitted that he initially commenced employment with the Respondent on 8 March 2014, and was later engaged on a series of contracts “purport[ing] to be independent contractor agreements”. [18] The Applicant submitted that when he was re-employed from 1 January 2025, his contract provided that it was renewable on a yearly basis as follows: “(a) a contract term of “1 Year (Renewable on a yearly basis)” with a “Contract end date” of 31/12/2025; and (b) a term providing for resignation and termination or in the case of the Respondent, by way of payment in lieu of notice (i.e. prior to the Contract end date).” [19] The Applicant submitted that on 3 February 2025, the parties agreed to waive the probation period. [20] The Applicant submitted that on 19 December 2025, the Respondent offered him a new contract containing a contract term of 1 year and an option to renew the contract in writing by both parties. However, the Applicant rejected the offer of a new contract. [21] The Applicant asserted that he was dismissed by the Respondent on 31 December 2025, by way of an email from Kajal Valecha (as extracted at paragraph [10] of this decision). Legal Principles [22] The Applicant submitted that a contract will not be for a specified period of time if the contract gives either party an unqualified right to terminate the contract on notice or with payment in lieu of notice.2 [23] The Applicant cited the decision in White v Sydney College of English Pty Ltd [2010] FWA 7644, in which Commissioner Thatcher found that the employment contract contained an [2026] FWC 2103 7 unqualified right to terminate the employee's employment and was not a contract for a specified time. [24] The Applicant submitted that s.333E(1) of the FW Act sets out the limitations on fixed term contracts, which came into effect on 6 December 2023:- “Limitations (1) A person contravenes this subsection if: (a) the person enters into a contract of employment with an employee; and (b) the contract includes a term that provides the contract will terminate at the end of an identifiable period (whether or not the contract also includes other terms that provide for circumstances in which it may be terminated before the end of that period); and (c) the employee is not a casual employee of the employer for whom the period referred to in paragraph (b) is identified by reference to the completion of the shift of work to which the contract relates; and (d) subsection (2), (3) or (4) applies. Note 1: This subsection is a civil remedy provision (see Part 4 - 1). Note 2: A contract referred to in this subsection includes (and is not limited to) a contract of employment for a specified period of time, for a specified task or for the duration of a specified season.” [25] The Applicant noted that s.333E(3) provides as follows in relation to ‘renewable contracts’:- “Renewable contracts (3) This subsection applies if: (a) the sum of the identifiable period and any other period for which the contract may be extended or renewed is greater than 2 years; or (b) the contract provides for an option or right to extend or renew the contract more than once.” [26] The Applicant submitted that s.333G sets out the effect of entering into a prohibited fixed term contract:- “Effect of entering prohibited fixed term contract (1) If a person enters into a contract of employment with an employee in contravention of subsection 333E(1): (a) the term of the contract that provides that the contract will terminate at the end of an identifiable period is taken to have no effect; and (b) the contravention is taken not to affect the validity of any other term of the contract. [2026] FWC 2103 8 Note 1: One effect of subsection (1) of this section is that Division 11 of Part 2 – 2 (notice of termination and redundancy pay) may apply to the employee because the employee is not covered by paragraph 123(1)(a) (which deals with the application of that Division). Note 2: Another effect of subsection (1) of this section is that Part 3 - 2 (unfair dismissal) may apply to the employee because the employee is not covered by paragraph 386(2)(a) (which affects the meaning of dismissed).” Applicant’s Contract of Employment [27] Applying the sections of the FW Act outlined above, the Applicant submitted that he was employed under a contract of employment for a specified term for the period of 1 January 2025 to 31 December 2025. The Applicant noted that clause 18.2 of the Employment Contract relevantly provides: “18.2 Except where your employment is terminated for reasons of serious misconduct, either S P Jain or you may terminate your employment by giving the period of notice set out in Item 11 at clause 1.1 (or any greater period by applicable legislation).” [28] The Applicant submitted that the notice period is set out at Item 12 of clause 1.1 and specifies a notice period in accordance with the National Employment Standards. [29] The Applicant submitted that clause 18.2 of the Employment Contract provides a broad or unconditional right of termination during the term, and prevents the Employment Contract from being a ‘contract for a specified period of time’ for the purposes of s. 386 of the FW Act. [30] The Applicant submitted that the ordinary meaning of the words “1 Year (Renewable on a yearly basis)” as contained in his Employment Contract, is that the contract was not for a limited fixed term and contemplated yearly renewals. Therefore, the Applicant submitted that his Employment Contract, on its face, provided for an option or right to extend or renew the Contract more than once, in contravention of s.333E(3)(b) of the FW Act. [31] The Applicant submitted that the new contract which was offered to him similarly provided an option for the contract to be “renewed in writing by both parties”, which demonstrated “at least one documented renewal attempt and option for further renewals”. [32] The Applicant submitted that in circumstances where he had worked with the Respondent since 2014 with no interruptions and the Respondent had offered him a further renewable contract, it is reasonably arguable that the parties contemplated successive yearly renewals and the word “yearly” provided an option to renew the Employment Contract more than once. [33] The Applicant submitted, as a result, he was not employed under a fixed-term contract, rather, he was employed under a renewable Contract, or in the alternative, the Contract was ongoing by operation of law for the following reasons. [2026] FWC 2103 9 [34] The Applicant submitted that, contrary to the requirements of s.333K of the FW Act, the Respondent did not provide him with a copy of the ‘Fixed Term Contract Information Statement’. [35] Further, the Applicant submitted that the Respondent contravened the limitations under s.333E(1) of the FW Act, because: “(a) the Respondent entered into a contract of employment with the Applicant on 1 January 2025; (b) the contract includes a term that provides the contract will terminate at the end of an identifiable period being 31 December 2025; (c) the Applicant was not a casual employee; and (d) the Contract was a renewable contract such that subsection 3 applies.” [36] The Applicant submitted that the effect of entering into a contract of employment with an employee in contravention of s.333E(1) of the FW Act is that the end of the identifiable period, being 31 December 2025, is taken to have no effect, in accordance with s.333G(1)(a). [37] The Applicant submitted that the Respondent, by incorrectly asserting that the contract ended by effluxion of time and confirming with the Applicant that the Employment Contract ended on 31 December 2025, repudiated the Contract and effectively dismissed the Applicant on that date. [38] For these reasons, the Applicant submitted that he has a right to bring his unfair dismissal claim, and that his employment was terminated at the employer’s initiative pursuant to s.386(1)(a) of the FW Act. Respondent’s Submissions in Reply [39] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant has materially mischaracterised both the factual history of the relationship between the parties, and the legal operation of the fixed-term contract provisions introduced into the Act. The Respondent denied any breach of the FW Act and submitted that the application is fundamentally misconceived. [40] The Respondent submitted that the relevant facts are as follows: “(a) From approximately November 2019 to September 2024, services were provided through BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd, an independent consulting business entity operated by the Applicant. (b) In 2025, the Applicant was engaged under a genuine fixed-term employment contract with a clearly defined commencement and expiry date. (c) That fixed-term contract expired by effluxion of time on 31 December 2025. [2026] FWC 2103 10 (d) The Applicant was not dismissed within the meaning of section 386 of the Act.” [41] The Respondent relied on its earlier submissions that prior to 2025, the Applicant was a contractor and operated through BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd, a registered corporate entity with its own ABN and GST registration, multiple directors, independent invoicing arrangements, and engaged additional personnel whose services were supplied to the Respondent. [42] The Respondent maintained that in the period prior to 2025, invoices were issued by BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd, not by the Applicant personally, payments were made to BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd, and BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd supplied labour and project-management services as a consulting business. [43] The Respondent submitted that, on the evidence before the Commission, BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd was operating as an independent consulting entity and not as a disguised employment structure. [44] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant had previously expressed dissatisfaction with not being treated as an employee during this contractor phase, which further confirms that the parties understood the arrangement to be a contractor relationship. Therefore, the 2025 employment contract represented a deliberate transition into a separate employment arrangement. 2025 Fixed-Term Employment Contract [45] The Respondent maintained that in 2025, it provided the Applicant with a fixed-term employment opportunity under a written employment agreement. The Respondent maintained that the Employment Contract expressly provided a defined commencement date, and a defined termination date of 31 December 2025. The Respondent submitted that the employment agreement was “plainly a fixed-term contract within the meaning of section 333B of the Act”. [46] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s submissions incorrectly assume that merely because a contract is fixed-term, a contravention of s.333E automatically arises. However, the Respondent submitted that is legally incorrect. The Respondent submitted that there has been no contravention of sections 333A, 333B or 333E of the FW Act. In summary, the Respondent submitted that s.333A of the FW Act is an objects provision only, and does not create any operative prohibition, cause of action, or enforceable entitlement. Similarly, the Respondent submitted that s.333B of the FW Act is definitional only. The Respondent submitted that the 2025 employment agreement constituted a fixed-term contract within the definition provided in s.333B, however, s.333B itself imposes no prohibition and establishes no contravention. As to s.333E, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s reliance on that section is misplaced. The Respondent submitted that s.333E concerns prohibited fixed-term arrangements involving: “(a) Consecutive fixed-term contracts; (b) Extensions beyond statutory limits; or (c) Arrangements creating impermissible rolling fixed-term employment structures.” [2026] FWC 2103 11 [47] The Respondent submitted that none of those circumstances exist here. [48] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant entered into one fixed-term employment contract only. It submitted that contract expired on its stated end date, and no automatic renewal occurred. The Respondent submitted that no second contract was executed, no extension beyond the original term occurred, and no rolling fixed-term arrangement was created. [49] Relevantly, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant himself acknowledged throughout the relevant period that the contract had a finite expiry date; and any continuation required a further agreement. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s own communications seeking clarification regarding possible extension demonstrate that there was no expectation of automatic continuation. [50] Further, the Respondent submitted that it did in fact discuss a possible further fixed- term engagement with the Applicant. However, the Applicant did not accept the proposed continuation arrangement. [51] The Respondent submitted that the employment relationship therefore concluded solely because the agreed fixed-term expired, and no further agreement was entered into. The Respondent submitted that, on the facts before the Commission, the Applicant’s employment contract was entirely inconsistent with: “(a) rolling employment; (b) automatic renewal; (c) indefinite employment disguised as fixed-term employment; or (d) any attempt to circumvent the Act.” No entitlement to ongoing employment [52] Further, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s submissions improperly conflated the possibility of future renewal of the employment contract, with an enforceable entitlement to ongoing employment. The Respondent submitted, however, these concepts are legally distinct. The Respondent relied upon the following legal principles: “• A fixed-term contract containing a defined expiry date may conclude by ordinary effluxion of time without constituting dismissal. • The mere possibility of future renewal does not create automatic continuation, indefinite employment, or guaranteed renewal. • The characterisation of legal relationships is determined objectively by reference to the contractual rights and obligations between the parties. [2026] FWC 2103 12 • Distinct contractor and employment relationships are capable of existing sequentially between the same parties. • Continuation beyond an agreed fixed term requires a further agreement where no automatic renewal mechanism exists.” [53] The Respondent relied on the principles as discussed in Khayam v Navitas English Pty Ltd [2017] FWCFB 5162, concerning the distinction between termination at the initiative of the employer and the ordinary expiration of a finite contractual term. The Respondent submitted that the present matter concerns a fixed-term agreement with a clearly identified expiry date, after which no further agreement was entered into between the parties. The Respondent submitted that “[a] finite contract capable of future renewal remains a finite contract unless and until a further agreement is actually entered into”. It maintained that the Applicant’s employment contract was a finite contract with a defined end date, capable only of continuation through further agreement, and no further agreement was reached. No dismissal within the meaning of s.386 [54] The Respondent maintained that the employment relationship ended due to the ordinary expiry of a finite contract, and that the Respondent did not terminate the Applicant’s employment prior to the expiry date, nor did the Respondent engage in conduct amounting to repudiation or forced termination. [55] The Respondent submitted that it is well-established that expiry of a genuine fixed-term contract by effluxion of time does not constitute dismissal at the initiative of the employer. The Respondent submitted that the Applicant has improperly attempted to recharacterize the ordinary expiry of a finite contract as dismissal, despite the Applicant’s own repeated acknowledgment that the contract was finite in duration. [56] The Respondent submitted that the Applicant’s current position is inconsistent with the historical conduct of the parties. It submitted that for approximately five years, prior to the 2025 employment agreement, the Applicant operated through BPMG Consulting Pty Ltd as an external consulting provider. The Applicant invoiced through that business structure and supplied services through that entity. Therefore, the Respondent submitted that the Applicant cannot now selectively ignore the commercial structure that existed throughout that period while simultaneously asserting that the 2025 finite employment arrangement created an unlawful rolling employment structure. [57] The Respondent submitted that the evidence before the Commission demonstrates that there was a distinct contractor phase, followed by a distinct finite employment phase. [58] The Respondent submitted that it acted transparently and lawfully throughout both arrangements. [59] For all of the above reasons, the Respondent maintained that the 2025 employment agreement was a genuine fixed-term employment contract, with a clearly defined expiry date. It submitted that there was no dismissal within the meaning of s.386 of the FW Act, and therefore, the Applicant’s application must be dismissed. [2026] FWC 2103 13 Consideration [60] I have taken into account all of the submissions and evidence that have been provided by the parties. [61] I note the actions of the Applicant on 22 December 2025. Not only did the Applicant reject the Respondent’s offer of a new fixed-term contract, but he also locked the front doors of the campus and refused to handover relevant company goods and information. This is unusual and inappropriate behaviour for any employee, let alone one that believes that he has an ongoing permanent employment relationship. I have taken this into account. [62] Based on the submissions of the parties, I am satisfied and find, that the contract signed in January 2025 was a fixed-term contract, with an agreed expiry date of 31 December 2025. I have taken this into account. [63] I do not accept that this contract is some form of sham employment relationship. Obviously, there would be a problem if the Respondent was attempting to renew the contract for a third year or if there was some sort of automatic rollover provision. However, neither scenario is evident in this circumstance. The Respondent had simply offered a new fixed-term contract for the second year. Secondly, there was no automatic rollover provision, hence, the provision by the Respondent of a new contract. I am satisfied and find that the proposed new contract does not breach the FW Act. I have taken this into account. [64] In relation to fixed-term contracts, I refer to the decision of Justices Snaden, Meagher and Needham in Alouani-Roby v National Rugby League Ltd [2024] FCAFC 161, in which it was explained that: “[70] …fixed-term employment contracts are not available as a concocted vehicle through which an employer might illegitimately avoid subjection to the FW Act’s unfair dismissal provisions. On the contrary, there is much to commend the suggestion that the Act will only inoculate fixed-term employment contract from the application of those provisions in circumstances where their use is appropriate and adapted to particular employment scenarios. So much is consistent with the recent introduction (after Mr Alouani-Roby’s employment terminated) of Div 5 of Pt 2-9 of the FW Act, which imposes substantial limitations upon the use of fixed-term employment contracts.” I have taken this into account. Conclusion [65] For the reasons and findings above, I am satisfied and find that the Applicant’s contract was a legitimate fixed-term contract which expired due to the effluxion of time on 31 December 2025. [66] The Respondent’s jurisdictional objection is upheld. [67] The Applicant’s unfair dismissal application is therefore dismissed. [2026] FWC 2103 14 [68] I so Order. COMMISSIONER Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <PR810775> 1 Khayam v Navitas English Pty Ltd [2017] FWCFB 5162; Judd v Sydney International Container Terminal [2024] FWC 1234). 2 Andersen v Umbakumba Community Council (1994) 126 ALR 121, 125‒126 (von Doussa J); Peters v City of Stirling [2008] AIRC 1157 (Williams C, 29 July 2008).