[2026] FWC 554 The attached document replaces the document previously issued with the above code on 20 February 2026 Appearances at the end of the decision have been amended to include the Respondent’s Counsel. Associate to Commissioner Thornton Dated 2 March 2026 1 Fair Work Act 2009 s.394 - Application for unfair dismissal remedy Mr Peter Rennick v Victorian WorkCover Authority (U2025/11363) COMMISSIONER THORNTON ADELAIDE, 20 FEBRUARY 2026 Application for an unfair dismissal remedy – whether there was a valid reason related to capacity to perform inherent requirements of the applicant’s substantive role at the date of dismissal – valid reason found – other factors in section 387 considered – dismissal otherwise not unfair – application dismissed. [1] Mr Peter Rennick (the Applicant) was a workplace health and safety inspector for the Victorian WorkCover Authority, operating as WorkSafe Victoria (the Respondent), for twenty six years until his dismissal on 8 July 2025. It is not in dispute that Mr Rennick suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) that incapacitated him for work at various times from approximately late 2022. [2] The Respondent says it dismissed Mr Rennick because, considering the medical evidence obtained regarding his capacity for work, he was unable to meet the inherent requirements of his substantive role as an inspector, and was permanently unable to return to his position1. Mr Rennick accepts that “on 8 July 2025, the Applicant did not have capacity to perform the inherent requirements of his role as an inspector”2. However, he says it was a failure of the Respondent to engage him in rehabilitation and return-to-work processes which caused his mental capacity to diminish to the extent that he no longer had the capacity to perform his role.3 [3] Mr Rennick asserts his dismissal was unfair because his inability to perform the inherent requirements of his job were caused by the Respondent’s failure to commence early intervention rehabilitation to assist in his return to work. Specifically, he emphasised that the incapacity the Respondent relied on to dismiss him was attributable to their lack of action in discussing or providing a plan for Mr Rennick to return to work. He also argues that the Respondent had other options apart from dismissal which included re-deployment into another suitable role or an extension to his period of leave without pay. Mr Rennick asserts that the Respondent’s approach to his injury and incapacity was “a specific course of conduct that … focused solely on terminating [him] and not assisting [him] to RTW [Return to Work] or undertaking alternative duties.”4 [2026] FWC 554 DECISION [2026] FWC 554 2 [4] Mr Rennick filed an application for an unfair dismissal remedy. The matter proceeded to a hearing on 2 October 2025. The Applicant represented himself in the proceeding and gave evidence on his own behalf. Mr Simon Brown, a colleague of the Applicant, provided a witness statement for the Applicant, but the Respondent did not require him for cross examination. The Respondent, with permission, was represented by Counsel. Ms Moore, Director Regional Operations North, Ms Barker, Executive Director People and Culture and Ms Ruiz, People and Culture Business Partner all gave evidence for the Respondent. [5] There is no dispute that Mr Rennick was a person protected from unfair dismissal or that he was not dismissed from his employment at the initiative of the Respondent. [6] For the reasons set out in this decision, I have determined that Mr Rennick’s dismissal is not harsh, unjust or unreasonable considering the matters I am required to consider under section 387 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act). [7] At the time the Respondent terminated Mr Rennick’s employment, it had a valid reason for dismissal. The Respondent relied on medical evidence to form its view that Mr Rennick had a current, and likely, permanent incapacity to perform the inherent requirements of his role. Mr Rennick agrees that he was unable to meet the inherent requirements of his substantive role as at the date of his dismissal. There was no obligation for the Respondent to consider options for redeployment into another role or to consider whether the Applicant had capacity for any other role other than his substantive role. Mr Rennick’s total incapacity for work at the time of his dismissal, and a lengthy period preceding his dismissal, was inconsistent with any assertion that the Respondent should have considered other roles for him to perform. Mr Rennick was told of the reason for his termination prior to his dismissal and was given an opportunity to respond to the reasons for his proposed termination. Mr Rennick was allowed to bring a support person to each discussion regarding his dismissal. Background facts [8] The history of Mr Rennick’s injury and incapacity is largely agreed. However, in setting it out below, I note that there was a dispute between the parties about whether Mr Rennick’s diagnosis of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) was caused by reasonable management action, as asserted by the Respondent, or exposure to a number of traumatic workplace accidents and deaths5 as asserted by Mr Rennick. This dispute is outside the scope of this decision and is a matter for dispute resolution within the relevant workers’ compensation jurisdiction. [9] Mr Rennick says that he started feeling “unable to cope at work or home around November 2022.” He took some leave from work and returned a few weeks later.6 [10] In June 2023, a process was undertaken where some disciplinary matters relating to Mr Rennick’s conduct were raised with him, leading to Mr Rennick being issued with a written warning7. Following being issued the warning, Mr Rennick took sick leave for a month and returned to work on 31 July 2023.8 When he returned, the Respondent raised another complaint about his conduct with him. Mr Rennick sought help from Dr Keenan, his General Practitioner, who determined that Mr Rennick needed to take further leave from work. Mr Rennick took a subsequent period of extended leave from 31 August 2023 onwards.9 [2026] FWC 554 3 [11] On 15 November 2023, Mr Rennick again attempted to return to work. On the day of his return, he was told by the Acting Director of the North region and his immediate supervisor, Mr Brown, to not attend his place of work as another complaint was made about his conduct at work. Mr Rennick sought additional medical assistance from Dr Keenan who deemed him unfit for work until January 2024. Mr Rennick says that in January 2024, he was “starting to feel a little better” and he made an appointment with Dr Keenan to “discuss returning to work”.10 [12] However, before he could return, Mr Rennick had a motorbike accident on his farm in February 2024. Mr Rennick says that while he was not injured, he began having flashbacks to an incident he previously investigated in his role of workplace inspector, where a person had died at the scene from a motorbike accident. From that point Mr Rennick says he “couldn’t stop thinking about [the accident] and other fatalities [he] had been to” and he had “horrific dreams” interrupting his sleep, resulting in Mr Rennick “suffering severe depression and anxiety.” 11 [13] Mr Rennick did not again attempt to return to work after 15 November 2023. He began treatment with Mr Barassi, a psychologist and was formally diagnosed with complex PTSD on 29 April 2024. He then lodged a workers compensation claim and consulted with independent medical examiners as part of the investigation process. I address the medical evidence which emerged from that process below. [14] The Respondent says that “efforts to find out more about Mr Rennick’s condition and facilitate his return to work began in January 2024.”12 Mr Rennick strenuously denies the Respondent’s position, stating he had consistently raised complaints about the Respondent’s lack of engagement with him regarding returning to work at any point since his motorbike accident. Ms Ruiz and Ms Moore gave evidence about the conversations and correspondence they had with Mr Rennick in 2024 and 2025. Ms Ruiz gave detailed evidence about the internal communications between employees of the Respondent following Mr Rennick’s accident, his possible return to work and management of his employment between January 2024 up to his termination in July 2025. [15] On 16 June 2025, the Respondent wrote to Mr Rennick advising him of their “proposed action” to terminate his employment.13 The Respondent relied on two medical reports, one from Mr Neil Barassi, the Applicant’s treating psychologist, dated 14 October 2024 and the other report dated 20 May 2025 from Dr Timothy Doyle, independent medical examiner and psychiatrist. The Respondent asserts the medical reports provide support to their view that Mr Rennick was “unable to meet the inherent requirements of [his] role” and was “permanently unable to return to [his] position.” Mr Rennick was offered a week to provide a response to the proposed termination and “present any mitigating circumstances”.14 [16] Mr Rennick responded on 23 June 202515. He asserted he escalated proceedings regarding his workers compensation claim being rejected, and confirmed the claim remained “active and unresolved”. He also raised a concern that the Respondent had not undertaken an investigation into his reported “workplace exposures” nor their connection to his PTSD. Mr Rennick raised what he described as the “absence of meaningful inquiry into return-to-work options or contributing factors” as a “significant barrier to [his] recovery.”16 Mr Rennick claimed that Dr Doyle’s report had been selectively relied on to support a decision to terminate [2026] FWC 554 4 his employment and ignored findings that “indicate potential capacity for modified duties and a staged return to work”.17 [17] The Respondent sent a letter to Mr Rennick on 8 July 2025 replying to his concerns and noted its view that Mr Rennick had “not provided any further information or mitigating circumstances which shows sufficient cause as to why your employment should not be terminated”.18 The Respondent then confirmed the termination of Mr Rennick’s employment because he was “unfit for [his] substantive position” and had an “inability to meet the inherent requirements of [his] substantive position as Inspector.”19 Medical Evidence [18] The following medical reports in evidence are set out below: • Dr PJ Kennan, General Practitioner, dated 12 March 2024, 31 July 2024 and 8 November 2024; • Dr K O’Daly, Consultant Psychiatrist, dated 10 June 2024; • Mr N Barassi, Psychologist, dated 19 July 2024 and 14 October 2024; • Dr T Doyle, Consultant Psychologist, dated 15 May 2025. [19] Several of the medical reports were obtained as required for Mr Rennick’s workers’ compensation claim. They provide a history of the development of his injury. Mr Rennick did not dispute any of the medical evidence and none of the doctors were further required to give evidence in this matter. [20] On 12 March 2024, Dr Kennan provided a short report advising the Respondent that Mr Rennick was unable to return to work until he had a full psychiatric assessment.20 He reported Mr Rennick having stress related to work that was causing sleeplessness, loss of appetite, poor concentration, rumination of thought and recurring flashbacks.21 In his subsequent report of 31 July 2024, Dr Keenan noted that Mr Rennick first presented with anxiety symptoms on 8 November 2022.22 In February 2024, Dr Keenan explained Mr Rennick experienced flashbacks of “incidents of death, suicide and severe injuries he had seen throughout his work duties” following his a motorbike accident and confirmed the diagnosis of “significant post-traumatic stress disorder purely related to his work both as [previously] a police officer and work safety officer”.23 Dr Keenan opined that Mr Rennick “has no capacity for pre employment duties or other duties. He requires ongoing medication and continued psychological therapy with counselling and cognitive behaviours therapy.”24 [21] Dr O’Daly, Consultant Psychiatrist, saw Mr Rennick as an independent medical examiner as part of his workers compensation claim. He produced a report dated 10 June 2024, outlining a history of Mr Rennick’s injury which was consistent with Mr Rennick’s evidence in this matter. .25 Dr O’Daly considered the appropriate diagnosis of Mr Rennick’s condition was “adjustment disorder with some post-traumatic stress symptoms” of a persistent and moderate severity which deteriorated since he ceased work.26 Dr O’Daly suggested that Mr Rennick continue with his psychological treatment with Mr Barassi and be reviewed in two months’ time. Dr O’Daly noted that Mr Rennick had “no current work capacity, either at his pre-injury duties at his usual or at a different workplace”. 27 [2026] FWC 554 5 [22] In his report of 19 July 2024, Mr Barassi, Psychologist, confirmed Mr Rennick’s “elevated level of PTSD” and his belief that Mr Rennick could “return to his pre-injury employment providing there was a return-to-work plan that was reviewed on an ongoing basis”.28 The plan, in his view, would require a limit on hours worked with a gradual increase and support from another inspector in his transition back to work. In the last part of the report headed ‘Any other relevant information or comments’, Mr Barassi wrote: “[Mr Rennick] may be experiencing complex PTSD symptomology, that will need ongoing psychological support as I currently do not believe he has capacity to return to his duties as a WorkSafe Officer. I do, however, believe [Mr Rennick] will have the ability to return to work providing he is supported to return safely back to the workplace.”29 [23] Mr Barassi provided the Respondent with an additional report on 14 October 2024 where he restated a number of views addressed in his earlier report of July 2024. He added: “[W]hile I harbour reservations about Mr Rennick’s confidence and capacity to return to his current employer, I am of the opinion that, with appropriate accommodations, he could attempt to resume his pre-injury role if a well-devised return-to-work plan is in place.’ He expresses hope that ‘with the right support, Mr Rennick could safely transition back to his preinjury role’ but ‘[a]t this stage I do not believe that Mr Rennick is ready or has the capacity to engage in employment tasks and may not be suitable for at least another 6 to 12 months.” [24] On 8 November 2024, Dr Kennan provided a short report to the Respondent.30 The Respondent noted in their request for the report that Mr Rennick had been absent from work since November 2023. Dr Keenan opined that Mr Rennick was ‘unable to work at present’ and it was “unclear when he will be able to return to work”. He noted that Mr Rennick was “under treatment with medication” and engaging in “psychological therapies” to assist in recovery from his illness. Dr Kennan also stated that Mr Rennick did not have capacity to participate and engage in employment related processes and it “is unclear as to when” he would have any such capacity. 31 [25] Dr Doyle’s report of 15 May 202532 followed the independent medical examination arranged by the Respondent33 and was very detailed as to the history of Mr Rennick’s injury. Dr Doyle recorded in his report that he had spoken to Dr Keenan with Mr Rennick’s consent. Dr Doyle noted that Dr Keenan “confirmed his opinion regarding the diagnosis of PTSD and saw Mr Rennick as unfit for work currently and quite probably unfit permanently for his previous role due to the likelihood of re-traumatization through re-exposure to potentially traumatic material even if largely removed from the inspector’s roll (sic) and reviewing administrative paperwork.”34 [26] In his report, Dr Doyle sets out: (a) Mr Rennick presents with symptoms of PTSD, a major depressive disorder and a historical adjustment disorder. (b) He partially disagrees with Dr O’Daly’s assessment in that he considers Mr Rennick’s primary disorder is PTSD and was of the view that Mr Rennick’s PTSD symptoms met the full criteria for a diagnosis of PTSD, as well as a comorbid depressive disorder. [2026] FWC 554 6 (c) Mr Rennick was experiencing multiple symptoms of PTSD that had not yet been successfully addressed and which he expected to persist in the same manner for the foreseeable future. (d) Mr Rennick was also experiencing pronounced symptoms of a major depressive disorder which, at that time, had not been successfully treated , which were also expected to persist for the foreseeable future. (e) Mr Rennick was unable to return to work “at this point” as he was “fundamentally unfit for his role due to the impact of mental illness.” (f) As Mr Rennick’s condition is “fundamentally related to his experiences at work”, he is “highly likely to be unable to cope with similar circumstances at work,” and is “permanently unfit for his previous role.” Specifically, because: i. There is a “high risk of the worsening of his illness or recurrence” if he returns to work and “is again exposed to potentially traumatic experiences which are part” of his role; ii. He is vulnerable to significant or serious psychological decline from exposure to an inspector’s routine experiences of attending to serious accidents and fatalities; and iii. He has ongoing and intrusive experiences of PTSD. (g) With ongoing treatment Mr Rennick’s depression may lift which may enable Mr Rennick to return to a different role, however, that was not the case at the time the report was prepared. (h) Without successfully addressing his symptoms, Mr Rennick may be permanently unfit for all work. His temporary unfitness for all work “might prove over time to be permanently unfit for all work given the severity and entrenched nature of the psychological disorder he is experiencing.” [27] The Respondent predominantly relied on the reports of Dr Keenan of November 2024 and Dr Doyle of May 2025 in its decision to terminate Mr Rennick’s employment in July 2025. Whether the dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable [28] The criteria for determining harshness is set out in section 387 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) (the Act): “387 Criteria for considering harshness etc. In considering whether it is satisfied that a dismissal was harsh, unjust or unreasonable, the FWC must take into account: (a) whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to the person’s capacity or conduct (including its effect on the safety and welfare of other employees); and (b) whether the person was notified of that reason; and (c) whether the person was given an opportunity to respond to any reason related to the capacity or conduct of the person; and (d) any unreasonable refusal by the employer to allow the person to have a support person present to assist at any discussions relating to dismissal; and (e) if the dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance by the person—whether the person had been warned about that unsatisfactory performance before the dismissal; and [2026] FWC 554 7 (f) the degree to which the size of the employer’s enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and (g) the degree to which the absence of dedicated human resource management specialists or expertise in the enterprise would be likely to impact on the procedures followed in effecting the dismissal; and (h) any other matters that the FWC considers relevant.” [29] There is no suggestion that Mr Rennick’s dismissal related to unsatisfactory performance, so section 387(e) is not relevant to this matter. There is also no dispute that the Respondent is a sizable employer with human resources expertise and consequently sections 387(f) and (g) have no bearing on this decision. Whether there was a valid reason for the dismissal related to Mr Rennick’s capacity or conduct [30] The Applicant submitted that there was no valid reason for his dismissal, despite his acceptance that he “did not have the capacity to perform the inherent requirements of his role as an inspector” at the date of dismissal.35 Mr Rennick says that the Respondent’s failure to follow the medical advice of his treating practitioners about options to return to work meant that the Respondent did not engage in meaningful discussions about returning Mr Rennick to work and “engineered a situation in which the Applicant would never be able to return to work, as he was deprived of the opportunity to attempt to resume his pre-injury role under a properly devised return-to-work plan.”36 [31] The Respondent submitted that terminating Mr Rennick’s employment because he could not meet the inherent requirements of his role, was a valid reason because it was “sound, defensible or well founded” and was not “capricious, fanciful, spiteful or prejudiced.”37 [32] The Respondent also submitted Mr Rennick’s concession that he could not meet the inherent requirements of his role at the time of dismissal was “dispositive of the question of whether there was a valid reason for [his] dismissal”.38 The Respondent reiterated in its submissions that the medical evidence before the Commission consistently confirmed that at all relevant times, Mr Rennick was incapacitated from work. [33] The Respondent submits that the following principles are relevant for the Commission to determine whether there was a valid reason for Mr Rennick’s termination from employment: (a) An inability to perform the inherent requirements of a position will generally provide a valid reason for dismissal, but not invariably so if the dismissal is unlawful for another reason;39 (b) When an employer relies on an employee’s incapacity to perform the inherent requirements of their role in dismissing the employee, it is the employee's substantive position or role that must be considered and not modified or restricted duties or a temporary, alternative position;40 and (c) In a dismissal related to an employee’s capacity, in determining whether there is a valid reason, the Commission must consider and make findings as to whether, at the time of dismissal, the applicant suffered from the alleged incapacity. Those findings must be made on the relevant medical and other evidence before the Commission.41 [2026] FWC 554 8 [34] I concur with the Respondent’s summary of the relevant principles necessary to determine whether there was a valid reason for dismissal in a case where the Respondent relies on the applicant’s inability to meet the inherent requirements of their role as the valid reason. [35] I find that Mr Rennick’s incapacity to perform the inherent requirements of his job is a valid reason for his dismissal from employment. The medical evidence confirms a total incapacity for work at the date of dismissal.42 There are no other identified reasons, for example, in relation to his workers’ compensation claim for PTSD, why Mr Rennick’s termination was otherwise unlawful. Mr Rennick conceded his incapacity for the inherent requirements of his role, which is consistent with the medical evidence. There is discussion in the medical reports about the likelihood of re-traumatisation through ongoing exposure to traumatic injuries and deaths, such as indirect risk when reviewing administrative paperwork, without directly inspecting any such incidents. There is no submission or evidence before me that exposure to injuries and deaths in the course of inspections and investigations is not an inherent requirement of Mr Rennick’s substantive role as an inspector. [36] In his oral evidence, Mr Rennick conceded that, in his view, he believed he is permanently incapacitated for his role as an inspector. In cross-examination, Counsel for the Respondent asked Mr Rennick to refer to the report of Dr Doyle and asked him: “Mr Rennick, you’d agree with me that says you are permanently unfit for your role?” Mr Rennick responded: “Yeah, I’d agree with that one hundred per cent.” Counsel then referred to a fitness for work summary in Dr Doyle’s report and asked Mr Rennick: “It also says Mr Rennick that you are permanently unfit for your role as an inspector at WorkSafe. You would agree with that?” Mr Rennick responds “Yes,” and Counsel again stated: “And you agree with that conclusion?” and Mr Rennick responded: “Oh yeah.”43 [37] Despite Mr Rennick’s submissions that the Respondent should have engaged in efforts to rehabilitate or facilitate a return to work from when he was first incapacitated, there is no evidence that Mr Rennick had capacity to engage in pre-injury duties at work or in rehabilitation from at least November 2023. Mr Rennick agreed in cross examination that the certificates of capacity submitted to the Respondent and prepared by Dr Keenan, under a section titled ‘Treatment Plan’, it stated: “including injury management, strategies to increase capacity for work, address to return to work barriers and/or prevent the recurrence/ aggravation of injury’”. Mr Rennick agreed that these were left blank in the certificates he submitted.44 Further, Mr Rennick acknowledged that the sections addressing the estimated timeframe to return to work were also left blank and the certificates noted he had no capacity for employment. In my view, this absence of medical evidence would have been a significant inhibitor to the Respondent engaging in any form of rehabilitation. [38] Mr Rennick had attempted and failed to return on a number of occasions between July and November 2023. The medical evidence shows a continual decline in Mr Rennick’s PTSD corresponding with an increase in symptoms and incapacity over the relevant period. Mr Rennick’s diagnosis of moderately severe or significant PTSD from April 2024 had not changed and his total incapacity for work was reinforced in each medical report. [39] The medical evidence from the majority of the practitioners was consistent that Mr Rennick was unfit for his role as an inspector with the Respondent and his inability to return to his pre-injury role as an inspector was permanent. This was not only the opinion of independent [2026] FWC 554 9 medical examiners, but also the opinion of his treating general practitioner. Mr Barassi was more hopeful in his prognosis and opined that Mr Rennick may be able to return to work provided there was adequate adjustments of reduced hours and lighter duties and adequate support but was still of the view that it would not be for 6 to 12 months as of October 2024. It appears that despite that assessment, at the time of his dismissal, which was approximately 9 months’ after the report was authored, Mr Rennick had not regained any capacity for rehabilitation or work. [40] The prognosis of Mr Rennick’s medical condition from each of the practitioners was guarded. They each left open the possibility that Mr Rennick may return to work at a later time but also had expressed concern that Mr Rennick’s symptoms of mental illness may lead to permanent incapacity for any form of employment. [41] I accept that Mr Rennick did not have capacity for any work from at least November 2023 and had remained incapacitated to not only perform his role but perform any work at all at the time of the dismissal. [42] I do not agree with Mr Rennick’s submission that the Respondent had “engineered a situation in which the Applicant would never be able to return to work, as he was deprived of the opportunity to attempt to resume his pre-injury role under a properly devised return-to- work plan.” This submission is inconsistent with the medical evidence that Mr Rennick did not have capacity to engage in work duties, rehabilitation or other employment-related tasks for any sustained periods of time from when he commenced numerous episodes of leave in July 2023. Mr Rennick, in fact, had no capacity for any kind of work or rehabilitation from the time he was certified as totally unfit for work from November 2023 until his dismissal in July 2025. [43] Mr Rennick’s submissions that he should have been re-deployed into an alternative role, assuming he regained capacity for some work, does not assist in determining whether Mr Rennick had the capacity to perform the inherent requirements of his position at the time his employment was terminated. It is only necessary that I consider his capacity to perform the inherent requirements of his role as an inspector. [44] Commissioner Wilson said in the matter of Rowe v V/Line Pty Ltd: “The question of whether Mr Rowe might have been able to perform some other role is not strictly required to be addressed, for the reason it is the substantive position or role of the employee that must be considered’.45 This approach is applicable to this case. It is not necessary to address the submission of Mr Rennick that redeployment should have been considered to preserve his employment because he did not have capacity for any work for a significant period before, and at the time of his dismissal. It is also not relevant to whether there was a valid reason relating to Mr Rennick’s capacity at the time of his dismissal. [45] In this case, it was Mr Rennick’s incapacity to perform his role as an inspector for a significant period prior to, and at the date of his dismissal that provided the valid reason for his termination. The valid reason for dismissal is also reinforced by the medical evidence that found a likelihood of a permanent incapacity for his substantive role. Mr Rennick conceded in his evidence that it is also his view he is permanently incapacitated for his substantive role. Whether Mr Rennick was notified of the reason [2026] FWC 554 10 [46] Mr Rennick was notified of the reason for his dismissal. It was set out for him in the letter from the Respondent sent in advance of the dismissal on 16 June 2025. Mr Rennick was also provided with the medical evidence the Respondent relied on to determine that he could not meet the inherent requirements of his role. In particular, the medical report of Dr Doyle was also provided to Mr Rennick by email on 28 May 2025.46 Ms Moore further provided evidence that a meeting was arranged with Mr Rennick to discuss the medical report of Dr Doyle and his ongoing employment with the Respondent which was scheduled on 16 June 2025 to accommodate Mr Rennick to attend with his support person.47 Whether Mr Rennick was afforded an opportunity to respond to the reason [47] Instead of submitting that he was not given an opportunity to respond to the reason, Mr Rennick submits that he was not afforded sufficient time to respond to the letter proposing his termination of 16 June 2025. The letter makes clear that Mr Rennick had one week to respond to the proposal and submit any mitigating circumstances. Mr Rennick says that this was unreasonable given his PTSD and its effects on his mental capacity, his reliance on his support person, his remote living arrangement and reduced financial means. Mr Rennick also submits that clause 21.8 the Victorian WorkCover Authority Enterprise Agreement 2024 – 2028 (the Agreement) provides an indicative time frame for an employee to respond to consultation of 21 days.48 [48] I am sympathetic to Mr Rennick’s submission in this regard. His particular circumstances should have been considered in determining a reasonable timeframe in which he could respond to a proposal with such significance to him. Considering his condition alone, Mr Rennick should have been offered to additional time to make a considered response. [49] I am not persuaded that clause 21.8 of the Agreement is applicable in this matter since it applies to employee engagement and consultation in circumstances where the Respondent has proposed to introduce “changes in workplace structure, technology (including the introduction of artificial intelligence) and existing work practices that are likely to have a significant impact on employees.”49 [50] However, it is clear that Mr Rennick was afforded an opportunity to respond to the proposal to terminate his employment and the reasons for the proposed termination. I note that Mr Rennick did not give any evidence that he requested additional time from the Respondent to provide his response, which was likely an option that was available to him. I also note that despite the timeframe restrictions, he managed to provide a detailed written response to the Respondent.50 [51] I also note the Respondent’s witnesses provided detailed evidence of the steps taken and documents created which clearly showed Mr Rennick’s response was considered within the decision-making process prior to terminating his employment.51 Was there any unreasonable refusal by the Respondent to allow Mr Rennick to have a support person present in any discussions about his dismissal? [52] Mr Rennick does not assert that there was any unreasonable refusal to allow him to have a support person present in discussions about his dismissal. As referenced earlier, the meeting [2026] FWC 554 11 scheduled to put the proposal of termination to Mr Rennick was scheduled to accommodate his son attending as his support person. Any other matters of relevance [53] Mr Rennick submits that a matter of relevance in my determination is that the Respondent is Victoria’s regulator of workplace health and safety and its workplace injury insurer. Mr Rennick says that the Respondent “has the expertise to undertake proactive return to work discussions and consider alternative duties.”52 As discussed earlier, Mr Rennick has strenuously submitted that his incapacity for work at the time of his dismissal can be significantly attributed to the failure of the Respondent to engage in early intervention rehabilitation. The Respondent denies that it failed to proactively engage with Mr Rennick and in fact, made efforts to do so “over an extended period.”53 [54] Again, for the reasons previously set out, this is not a relevant matter to my consideration of whether there was a valid reason for the termination of Mr Rennick’s employment at the time of the dismissal. It is not necessary, nor appropriate, for me to comment on what the Respondent should or should not have done with respect to any rehabilitation or return to work processes for the management of what Mr Rennick says is a work-related injury. It is not relevant to whether there was a valid reason for his termination in July 2025. [55] Mr Rennick also argues that I should consider in determining that his dismissal was harsh, unjust and unreasonable that the Respondent should have exercised alternatives to dismissal. In particular, Mr Rennick says that the Respondent should have extended his existing leave without pay for up to two years in accordance with an option available to it under the Enterprise Agreement. Mr Rennick had been on a period of leave without pay from 10 January 2025 when his employment was terminated in July 2025. [56] Even if this option was available to the Respondent, I find that the Respondent’s decision to terminate Mr Rennick’s employment instead of extending his leave without pay did not make the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable. I make this finding because the medical evidence of Mr Barassi, Dr Keenan and Dr Doyle consistently stated Mr Rennick was wholly incapacitated to return to his substantive role. Dr Keenan had expressed a view that Mr Rennick was “quite probably” unfit for his role as an inspector on a permanent basis and Dr Doyle was unequivocal in his opinion that Mr Rennick was totally and permanently incapacitated for his substantive role. [57] Extending Mr Rennick's leave without pay would have been of no utility in these circumstances. The medical evidence of current and permanent incapacity for work as an inspector provided the Respondent with a valid reason to terminate Mr Rennick’s employment, instead of considering extending his leave without pay. [58] Mr Rennick alternatively submits that the Respondent should have considered re- deployment of him into an alternative role to “preserve his employment”.54 He says that he was “willing to accept redeployment even if it involved a position with a lower classification or reduced remuneration.”55 At the time of his dismissal in July 2025, Mr Rennick had not been at work since 31 August 2023.56 As of 8 July 2025, he remained totally unfit for work. A WorkSafe Certificate of Capacity submitted into evidence noted Mr Rennick had no capacity for employment between 19 June to 16 July 2025, and a subsequent certificate similarly [2026] FWC 554 12 certified him as totally unfit for employment from 18 July to 14 August 2025.57 Mr Rennick did not have capacity for any work, even the Respondent were minded to find him suitable duties or an alternative role. The medical opinions considered in this decision were guarded as to whether Mr Rennick would ever regain capacity for any work, especially considering his medical condition and the likelihood of reaggravation. [59] In these circumstances, I am not persuaded that re-deployment was appropriate in any event. The Respondent not offering re-deployment in this case does not otherwise render the dismissal harsh, unjust or unreasonable. Conclusion [60] Mr Rennick’s prolonged incapacity to perform his substantive role as an inspector for the Respondent, and the likely permanence of that incapacity, supported by medical evidence, provided the Respondent with a valid reason for the termination of Mr Rennick’s employment. The other factors relevant to this matter that I am obliged to consider under to section 387 of the Act also do not persuade me that the termination of Mr Rennick’s employment was harsh, unjust or unreasonable. [61] Consequently, Mr Rennick’s application for an unfair dismissal remedy is dismissed. An order confirming the dismissal of this matter will be published concurrently with this decision. 58 COMMISSIONER Appearances: P Rennick, Applicant on his own behalf. A Thomas instructed by A Frydenberg and E Purdue of Lander & Rogers with permission, on behalf of the Victorian WorkCover Authority. Hearing details: Adelaide 2025 [2026] FWC 554 13 3 October. Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <PR796979> 1 Letter from Respondent to Applicant dated 16 June 2025; Annexure 8 to the Statement of the Applicant. 2 Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 6. 3 Ibid. 4 Form F2 application, paragraph 2.1. 5 See the detailed list in the statement of the Applicant at paragraph 11. 6 Statement of the Applicant at paragraphs 24 – 26. 7 Annexure 8 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure LR-3 to the Statement of Ms Ruiz. 8 Statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraph 14. 9 Statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraph 17. 10 Statement of the Applicant at paragraph 34. 11 Statement of the Applicant at paragraphs 35-36. 12 Statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraph 19. 13 Annexure PR-8 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure JB-2 to the Statement of Ms Barker. 14 Annexure PR-8 to the Statement of the Applicant. 15 Annexure PR-9 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure JB-3 to the Statement of Ms Barker. 16 Annexure PR-9 to the Statement of the Applicant. 17 Annexure PR-9 to the Statement of the Applicant. 18 Annexure PR-11 to the Statement of the Applicant. 19 Annexure PR-11 to the Statement of the Applicant. 20 Annexure JR-1 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure LR-5 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz. 21 Ibid. 22 Annexure JR-2 to the Statement of the Applicant. 23 Ibid. 24 Annexure JR-2 to the Statement of the Applicant. 25 Annexure JR-4 to the Statement of the Applicant. 26 Annexure JR-4 to the Statement of the Applicant. 27 Ibid. 28 Annexure JR-5 to the Statement of the Applicant. 29 Annexure JR-5 to the Statement of the Applicant. 30 Annexure LR-22 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz. 31 Annexure LR-22 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz. 32 Annexure JR-7 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure LR-26 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz. 33 Annexure JR-7 to the Statement of the Applicant; Witness statement of Ms Moore at paragraph 9; Annexure LR-25 to the Statement of Ms Ruiz. 34 Annexure JR-7 to the Statement of the Applicant; Annexure LR-25 to the Statement of Ms Ruiz. 35 Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 17. [2026] FWC 554 14 36 Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 48. 37 Selvachandran v Peteron Plastics Pty Ltd (1995) 62 IR 371 at 373. 38 Submissions of the Respondent at paragraph 19. 39 J Boag and Son Brewing Pty Ltd v Button [2010] FWAFB 4022 at [29]. 40 J Boag and Son Brewing Pty Ltd v Button [2010] FWAFB 4022 at [22]. 41 CSL Ltd T/A CSL Behring v Papaioannou [2018] FWCFB 1005 at [77]. 42 See: medical certificate of 17 June 2025 confirming no capacity for employment from 19 June 2025 to 16 July 2025. 43 Audio recording of hearing Part 1 2:11:15 - 2:12:25. 44 Audio recording of hearing Part 1 1:47:18 - 1:50:22. 45 Rowe v V/Line Pty Ltd [2014] FWC 1437 at [56]. 46 Letter from Respondent to Applicant dated 16 June 2025. 47 Statement of Ms Moore at paragraphs 15 and 16. 48 Submissions of the Applicant at paragraphs 56 – 61. 49 Application by Victorian Workcover Authority Trading AS Worksafe Victoria [2025] FWCA 1081 (‘the Agreement’). 50 See submission of Respondent at paragraph 34. 51 Statement of Ms Barker at paragraphs 6 – 23; Annexures JB-1 and JB-4; Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraphs 68 – 78; Annexures LR-27 and LR-30. 52 Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 66. 53 Submissions of the Respondent at paragraph 38. 54 Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 77. 55 Submissions of the Applicant at paragraph 77 56 See statement of Ms Ruiz at paragraph 17. I note the evidence of an attempted return to work in November 2023, that was not sustained for more than a day. 57 Annexure LR-5 to the Witness Statement of Ms Ruiz. 58 PR796980.