1 Fair Work Act 2009 s.604—Appeal of decision Kapil Narwal v Scape Australia Management Pty Ltd (C2026/4562) DEPUTY PRESIDENT COLMAN DEPUTY PRESIDENT FAROUQUE COMMISSIONER CIRKOVIC MELBOURNE, 21 MAY 2026 Appeal against decision [2026] FWC 820 of Commissioner Yilmaz at Melbourne on 13 March 2026 in matter number C2026/1393 – permission to appeal refused. [1] Kapil Narwal has lodged an appeal under s 604 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (Act) against a decision of Commissioner Yilmaz issued on 13 March 2026 ([2026] FWC 820). The decision refused to grant Mr Narwal an extension of time to file his application under s 365 of the Act, which had been lodged 179 days after the 21-day period prescribed by s 366. Mr Narwal requires the Commission’s permission in order to appeal. The matter was listed before us in respect of permission to appeal only. [2] In her decision, the Commissioner took into account the mandatory considerations in ss 366(2)(a) to (e) and concluded, among other things, that Mr Narwal’s reasons for the delay, which included his pursuit of an internal review, financial stress, and unawareness of the 21- day filing requirement, did not weigh in favour of an extension of time, and that neither did the merits of his unfair dismissal application. The Commissioner concluded that she was not satisfied that there were exceptional circumstances, and, as such satisfaction is a precondition for the granting of an extension of time, she dismissed Mr Narwal’s application. [3] In his notice of appeal, Mr Narwal contended that the Commissioner failed to consider the cumulative effect of relevant factors and that she failed properly to weigh his pursuit of internal processes, his emotional and financial hardship, his lack of awareness of the statutory time limit, and various other matters. He further contended that the Commissioner’s conclusion that his application lacked merit was premature. In his written and oral submissions Mr Narwal elaborated on these grounds and raised subsidiary and additional grounds of appeal, including that the Commissioner gave insufficient weight to his status as a self-represented litigant, that she formed a view of the merits without an evidentiary hearing, and that she erred in her assessment of the merits by placing excessive reliance on one incident. [4] In deciding whether to grant permission to appeal, a Full Bench will review the appeal grounds to consider whether they raise an arguable case of appealable error. However, it is unnecessary and inappropriate to conduct a detailed examination of the appeal grounds (see [2026] FWCFB 116 DECISION [2026] FWCFB 116 2 Trustee for the MTGI Trust v Johnston [2016] FCAFC 140 at [82]). We have reviewed each of the appeal grounds in the notice of appeal and considered Mr Narwal’s submissions. We do not consider that Mr Narwal has presented an arguable case of appealable error in the Commissioner’s decision. In particular, the weight that was to be given to the various matters referred to by Mr Narwal was within the Commissioner’s discretion and we perceive no arguable basis to contend that the discretion miscarried. Further, Mr Narwal appears to misunderstand the role of the Commission in considering the merits of an application as part of an extension of time application, which is not to conduct an evidentiary hearing or reach any final view on the matter, but to consider the apparent merits in the context of an interlocutory application. To the extent that Mr Narwal’s submissions criticise the conduct of the respondent, they do not speak to any error in the decision. [5] Mr Narwal has not presented an arguable case of appealable error. In any event, the presence of an arguable error is not necessarily a sufficient basis on which to grant permission to appeal. The Commission must grant permission to appeal if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so (s 604(2)), but we are not so satisfied. Nor do we consider that permission to appeal should be granted on general discretionary grounds. In particular, the decision does not manifest an injustice and is not subject to sufficient doubt to warrant reconsideration. Finally, an additional reason to refuse permission in this case is that the appeal appears to lack any utility. Although the matter was not raised before the Commissioner, it seems clear that Mr Narwal’s s 365 application was barred by s 725 because he had made an earlier unfair dismissal application that was dismissed on the merits (see ss 725, 727 and 729, and Qantas Airways Limited v Lawless [2014] FWCFB 3582 at [26]). [6] Permission to appeal is refused. DEPUTY PRESIDENT Appearances: K. Narwal for himself P. Willink of counsel for the respondent Hearing details: 2026 Melbourne 19 May Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <PR810228>