WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION. Industrial Relations Act 1979. The Coal Miners' Industrial Union of Workers of Western Australia (Applicant) and Western Collieries Limited (Respondent). No. 153 of 1995. BEFORE THE FULL BENCH HIS HONOUR THE PRESIDENT P J SHARKEY. CHIEF COMMISSIONER W S COLEMAN. COMMISSIONER P E SCOTT. 10 August 1995. Reasons for Decision. THE PRESIDENT: This is an application by the applicant organisation to review a decision of the Coal Industry Tribu- nal of Western Australia (hereinafter referred to as "the Tribu- nal"), made on 27 February 1995. The application is properly made pursuant to s.18 of the Coal Industry Tribunal of Western Australia Act 1992 (here- inafter referred to as "the Coal Act"). By that Act, the Full Bench "may permit any decision or settlement given or ef- fected by the Tribunal to be reviewed by the Full Bench...". The Full Bench determined that it would decide the ques- tion of whether it would permit the decision to be reviewed after it had heard the full arguments in relation to this applica- tion. The decision sought to be reviewed was one whereby the Tribunal decided that clause 26 of the Coal Mining Industry (Miners) Award 1990 (hereinafter referred to as "the award") did not have application in relation to the matter currently before the Tribunal; that is the contracts then currently associ- ated with the development of the Premier Mine, and ordered that the parties confer with a view to reaching agreement in relation to the use of contractors within the industry. The formal decision of the Tribunal read as follows (see page 11 of the appeal book (hereinafter referred to as "AB:)):— "1) That clause 26 of the Coal Mining Industry (Min- ers) Award 1990 does not have application in rela- tion to the matter currently before the Tribunal; that is the contracts associated with the development of the Premier Mine. That the parties confer with a view to reaching agree- ment in relation to the use of contractors, within the industry." The grounds of review were as follows (see pages 1-2 (AB)):— " 1. The Acting Chairman of the Tribunal ought to have disqualified himself on the ground that there was a " ili Coal Mining Industry (Miners) Award 1990 (the Award) did not apply to the letting out of work to contractor/s who would themselves employ labour. 3. The Tribunal erred in holding that Clause 26 of the Award applied only to employment of the Respond- ent's employees on piecework. 4. The Tribunal erred in holding that Clause 26 of the Award did not apply to the matter before the Tribu- nal, that is, the contracts associated with the devel- opment of the Premier Mine. 5. The Tribunal purported to judicially declare the true meaning and effect and proper construction of the Award and to give effect to its declaration v/hen it did not have jurisdiction to do so. 6. In purporting to judicially declare the true meaning and effect and proper construction of the Award the Tribunal failed to have regard to the custom and prac- tice which had developed between the parties relat- ing to the use of independent contractors. 7. In purporting to judicially declare the true meaning and effect and proper construction of the Award the Tribunal had regard to the current industrial envi- ronment when such a consideration is irrelevant to the task of ascertaining the true meaning and effect and proper construction of the Award." BACKGROUND The background to this matter is as follows. The Tribunal is constituted by and under the Coal Act. On 17 February 1995, the Tribunal sat at Mineral House, Plain Street, Perth, to hear an aprplication by the apphcant organisation of employees. That application concerned contracts which the respondent, West- em Collieries Limited, intended to enter into with contractors for the clearing and removal of soil and boxcut at the Premier Mine site. The respondent sought to have the proposed con- tractors comply with a number of conditions, which, in the apphcant organisation's view, would prevent its members be- ing priced out of the industry. The conditions sought were not acceptable to Western Collieries Limited. At the hearing, the Tribunal consisted of a Deputy Chair- person, Mr P Zorzi, and four members. An employer's repre- sentative and an employee's representative appeared in the proceedings. The Deputy Chairperson, at the commencement of proceedings, announced:— "... my role as the deputy chairman of the tribunal is a part-time role and I have other employment. Currently I am employed on a contract basis with a contractor, a con- tractor that although they are not bidding on this work at Western Collieries does from time to time bid for work in the coal industry. I have some concern that there may be seen to be a matter of bias on this matter." The Deputy Chairperson then invited submissions, which he heard, from Mr Wood for the respondent at first instance and from Mr Bull for the applicant at first instance. Western Collieries Limited. Mr Wood submitted that the Deputy Chair- person should disqualify himself because the outcome "of the application by Western Collieries, and now joined by Griffin Coal, in relation to clause 26 could in fact lead to an interest of the company that you are currently working for in the fu- ture". Mr Wood submitted that he disqualify himself on the ground of bias. Mr Bull submitted that no such bias existed. The Tribunal decided that no such bias existed and proceeded to hear and determine the matter. Further, the Tribunal decided questions of merit. Because the representatives of the companies and the union were evenly divided in the matter, the decision of the Deputy Chairperson became the decision of the Tribunal. ISSUES AND CONCLUSIONS review was an allegation that the Tribunal had erred in its interpretation of clause 26 of the award. Clause 26.—Con- tract Work of the award reads, and read at the time when the decision was made, as follows:— "No work may be performed by contract unless the con- tract be approved by the Delegate Board of the Union, and every such contract shall contain, or be deemed to contain, a covenant that the employee shall receive at least the minimum wage provided by this award for the par- ticular class of work to which the contract relates. If the Delegate Board of the Union refuses to approve of the contract, the matter may be referred for determina- tion to the Tribunal." The Tribunal examined the history of the matter and effec- tively decided that the clause required that that is what the clause meant. I deal first with the question of whether there was ostensible bias on the part of the Deputy Chairperson. I say that because it was not the applicant's case that the Deputy Chairperson was actually biased. The Deputy Chairperson himself prop- erly raised the question of bias and invited submissions. It is quite plain that the applicant objected to his sitting to hear and determine the application on the basis of bias and invited him to disqualify himself (see pages 16-18 (AB)). The Deputy Chairperson advised the parties, in the terms to which I have referred above, as to his connection with a con- tractor who from time to time bid for work in the coal indus- try. Having heard submissions, the Deputy Chairperson decided that he should not disqualify himself from hearing and deter- mining the matter. This was because he decided that the argu- ments would be predominantly over the applicability of clause 26 of the award, not over whether contractors should be used or not. In addition he said:— "The contractor to whom I am currently contracted is not a party to this matter and will not be involved in this particular bit, and I think it is drawing a long bow to say that I am biased because he may in the future..." A number of authorities were cited to the Tribunal and to us. These included then there had to be more than a remote or speculative possi- bility. Some emphasis was laid on the constitution of the Tribunal. We were taken to Re Polites and Another; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and Others (op cit) at page 87 where Brennan, Gaudron and McHugh JJ said:— "The prior involvement of a Deputy President with asso- ciations or with governments who are frequently parties to proceedings before the Commission cannot be suffi- cient by itself to amount to a disqualification from sitting in a particular case; nor can the prior acquisition of "skills and experience" amount to such a disqualification." In that case, Their Honours observed that the test in Livesey v NSW Bar Association (op cit) cannot be pressed too far when the qualifications for membership are such that the mem- bers are likely to have some prior knowledge of the circum- stances which give rise to the issues for determination or to have formed an attitude about the way in which such issues should be determined or the Tribunal's powers exercised. Qualification for membership cannot disqualify a member from sitting. I respectfully agree. It was submitted that it was a requirement that the Deputy Chairperson have expertise in all qualifications relevant to the coal mining industry. Accordingly, the fact that the Deputy Chairperson was involved in and employed by a contractor which from time to time did work in the coal industry was not sufficient to require him to disqualify himself on the ground of bias, so the submission went. The nature of his interest was not such as to raise any reasonable apprehension of bias, it was submitted. In this connection, it was submitted that the nature of the Tribunal should be taken into account (see Re Media, Entertainment and Arts Alliance and Theatre Manag- ers' Association; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd (op cit)), as was the fact that the company with which the Deputy Chair- person was involved was not a party to the dispute or pres- ently bidding for work. Further, the issues for determination did not involve the general suitability or appropriateness of contract work in the industry, it was submitted. I turn to the Coal Act and a consideration of the nature of the Coal Act By s.5 and s.6 of the Coal Act the Tribunal consists of a Chairperson and a Deputy Chairperson. There is also a panel of members created to which each employer shall ■ BS SriTiEmitTrZri S gafEg m m principle is that a judge (or a Tibunal) should not sit to hear a case if in all of the circumstances the parties or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that he might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question involved in it (see Livesey v NSW Bar Associa- tion (op cit), Re Finance Sector Union of Australia; ex parte Dlaton Pty Ltd (op cit) and Re Polites and Another; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and Others (op cit)). What was in issue before the Tfibunal, as in Livesey v NSW Bar Associa- tion (op cit), was the appearance and not die actuality of bias. The applicant's case was that there was, without doubt, the appearance of bias because the decision of the Tribunal was the decision of the Deputy Chairperson, and he was, at the relevant time, a consultant to a contractor in the coal mining industry. The case was that because it concerned the capacity of the employers in the coal mining industry to award work to contractors v/ithout reference to the applicant union, there were grounds upon which a party or a member of the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that the Tribunal would not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, having regard to the Deputy Chairperson's connection with a con- tractor to the industry. The respondent's case was similar to the case for Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd, and was as follows. It was submitted that the test was whether it might be suspected by a fair-minded person that the decision-mate might not resolve the questions before him with a fair and unprejudiced mind. lives, at least one of whom shall be a representative of the employer principally concerned in the industrial dispute or matter before the Tribunal, and two persons appointed by the relevant (employee) organisation, as defined (see s.8 of the Coal Act). The Deputy Chairperson is appointed by the Minister to act in the place of the Chairperson who may sit alone to exercise while sitting all of the functions of the Tribunal (see s.5 and s.10 of the Coal Act). If there is any question before the Tribunal at any meeting on which the other members are evenly divided then the opin- ion of the Chairperson prevails (see s.14(4) of the Coal Act). The Tribunal therefore is required to have at least three members whose principal or organisation is directly concerned in the industrial dispute or matter. It is true that the Minister is required to endeavour to ensure that the persons who are ap- pointed as Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson "have exper- tise in, or qualifications relevant to, the coal mining industry". If one has regard to the nature of and structure of the Tribu- nal, it is quite clear that the Tribunal, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, is to be constituted not merely by persons who know the industry, but, to a large extent, by persons who rep- resent die parties to a dispute or industrial matter. In the case of the Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson, that latter qualifi- cation is not expressed to be the case. Tie Minister is required to endeavour to ensure that the person recommended for ap- pointment as Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson shall have expertise in or qualifications relevant to the coal mining in- dustry. It is arguable that by implication from the structure of the Tibunal, those persons should not be persons who repre- sent an employer, or an employee organisation, or are con- nected with either in any way. All that is required is that the Minister must endeavour to ensure that the holders of the of- fices of Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson shall have ex- pertise in or qualifications relevant to the coal mining industry. They do not even have to be a part of or involved in the coal mining industry. Indeed, it would seem desirable that they not be. True it is that bias could not reasonably be apprehended to exist merely because of the Deputy Chairperson's participa- tion in the industry and because he was a person, it would seem, with expertise in or qualifications in the industry. Nor could bias be reasonably seen to exist merely because there was prior knowledge of the circumstances which give rise to the issues for determination, or because the Deputy Chairper- son had formed an attitude about the way in which such is- sues should be determined or the Tribunal's powers exercised (see Re Polites and Another; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and Others (op cit) at pages 86-87) However, that was not the problem at first instance. Firstly, the question to be determined was what the meaning of clause 26 of the award was, and, in particular, whether the ' clause applied to require that no work might be performed by an independent contractor engaged by an employer party to the award, unless the contract be first approved by die Del- egate Board of the union, and unless every such contract shall contain and be deemed to contain the clause 26 covenant as to a minimum wage. It is obvious that the question to be deter- mined therefore was one which extended in its effects beyond the particular matter before the Tribunal. The decision would plainly effect the obligations of any contractor in or to the industry, if it were held to apply, including the wages which a contractor would be required to pay. In Re Polites and Another; ex parte Hoyts Corporation Pty Ltd and Others (op cit) at page 86, the High Court applied what the High Court said in R v Australian Stevedoring In- "... Bias must be 'real'. The (judicial or quasi-judicial) officer must so have conducted himself that a high prob- ability arises of a bias inconsistent with the fair perform- ance of his duties, with the result that a substantial distrust of the result must exist in the minds of reasonable per- sons." This present case was not a case of a preconceived opinion, no such preconceived opinion being evident. The circum- stances were that the Deputy Chairperson, whose decision this was to be, either as part of a majority or in order to break a deadlock, was the employee of or a consultant pursuant to a contract with a company called Eltin. Eltin, whilst not directly concerned in this matter, was and would be given to contract- ing in the industry, as the Deputy Chairperson's statement quoted above evidences. Accordingly, the application of clause 26 of the award, which was said to directly affect contractors by the wage they might pay employees, and therefore their financial interests, was to be decided by an employee of a contractor in the industry. The question to be decided was whether the consent of the Delegate Board of the applicant was required to be obtained by a contractor in the industry. The question to be resolved required an answer determining whether that was the effect of clause 26. The interests of his "employer", or the person to whom he was under contract, were very much involved in the matter before the Tribunal. The parties or the public, I am satisfied, might well entertain a reasonable apprehension that the Tribunal (through the Deputy Chairperson) might not bring an impartial and unprejudiced mind to the resolution of the question before it (see Livesey v NSW Bar Association (op cit)). The Tribunal (through the Deputy Chairperson) erred in not so finding. The Tribunal's decision was therefore in error. CLAUSE 26 OF THE AWARD Clause 26 existed in the award and its predecessors from 1903. The Tribunal heard submissions as to the origins and purpose of that clause of the award. The Full Bench, too, was taken to the award itself and its evolution. In 1990, die Tribu- nal issued a new award (see Coal Miners Industrial Union of Collieries Ltd 72 WAIG 2921). The parties were the same parties as are involved in this matter. The award was described ing. The Tribunal said (see page 2921):— "That new award will replace the four awards which cur- rently govern the conditions of employment for miners on the Collie Coalfield." Clause 24 contained "Preserved Matters" and these included a clause in similar terms to clause 26, which was clause 24D. That award was handed down on 5 September 1990 by con- sent. In 1992, the Tribunal made that award a final award to op- erate on and from 23 March 1992 (see Griffin Coal Mining Union of Workers of WA 72 WAIG 2955). Clause 26 was then inserted as a clause in the final award in the form in which it was before the Tribunal in these proceedings and also be- fore the Full Bench. It was not disputed that it should be. In October and November 1992, the Chairperson issued a decision in a matter (see Coal Miners' Industrial Union of 2968). The question involved the use by the respondent com- pany of contract drillers ((ie) the use of contract drills entirely manned by persons associated with the contractor who pro- vided the drill and were therefore not employees of the re- spondent). Mr Bull appeared in that matter. The Tribunal, in relation to clause 26, held (see page 2969) that the clause op- erated to prohibit the performance of work by contractors unless and until the union approved the work, or, failing that, the Tribunal determined that the work might be carried out by that means. The first approach to interpretation of the clause is to con- strue the meaning of the clause, read in the context of the (1990) 70 WAIG 12871. When the meaning of the language, read in its ordinary and material sense, is obtained, it is not necessary, or, indeed, permissible to look to the intention of the parties. The meaning of the clause depends on what the word "contract" means. Firstly, "contract" can only mean a contract with someone other than a respondent to the award. Mr Ellis (of Counsel), for the respondent, invited us to find that clause 26 of the award could not refer to a contract with an independent contractor, that is from outside the industry. Firstly, he submitted that persons employed by contract would not be covered by the Scope clause of the award because per- sons so employed might not be employed in a classification referred to in the award. However, the Scope clause prescribes that the provisions of the award shall apply throughout the State of Western Australia to all employees "employed in this industry" appointed to or engaged in one of the classifications referred to in the Wage Schedules, as well as to the employers respondent to the award employing such persons within the industry, and to the union. The respondents to the award were said to be Western Collieries Limited and Griffin Coal Min- ing Company Pty Ltd. I accept that, although the award does not have a schedule of respondents, for the purpose of the present review only. It would seem that a reading of the plain words of the Scope clause would enable a reading of clause 26 of the award in the terms urged upon us by Mr Schapper (of Counsel), for the applicant. The scope of the award is clear. The award applies to all employees employed in the industry (which is not de- fined). However, the scope is limited also to employers "re- spondent to this award" ((ie) named as respondents to the award employing such persons) ((ie) employees engaged in the clas- sifications referred to in die Wage Schedules). An employer who is not a respondent to the award is not bound by it How- ever, the clause, since it binds the named respondent employ- ers, means that those named respondents who are bound by the award are prohibited from engaging contractors to do work, unless that step is approved by die Delegate Board of the un- ion, or unless such contract contained or was deemed to con- tain a covenant that the employees of the contractors should receive at least the minimum wage provided by the award. That is the obvious unambiguous meaning. It is not altered by the fact that the words "the employee" is used throughout the award to denote an employee of the company. In other words, the plain meaning of "contractor" in the context must be read tor forms work and Ms employees receive at least the minimum wage provided by the award, even if the contract is first ap- proved by the Delegate Board, or, failing that, by the Tribu- nal. It matters not that the employee of any contractor is not covered by the Scope clause of die award. Clause 26 of the award provides for no work to be performed on behalf of an employer under contract by an independent contractor (the employer) or by anyone else without the conditions in clause 26 being complied with. The employer is therefore bound by the award in relation to Ms, her or its duties under clause 26, as a respondent, as are persons employed under classifica- tions set out in the award. If that meaning is not obvious, and I think that it is, then the Mstory of the award, put to the Tri- bunal, at first instance, does not alter matters. It is quite plain that the "contract work" done by wheelers with horses and any prior work payments ceased after World War DL It is also plain, on Mr Thomas Jones' evidence, that even when the award was not sought to be applied, the umon sought to have a right of veto over outside contractors and their employees being used without the urnon's consent before clause 26 was included in the award. That Mstorical fact is in recent times, on Mr Jones' evidence, more cogent than the more remote Mstory. True it is that the clause is in the same terms as some predecessors. It was, however, included without demur in 1992 when the old Mstory was not relevant and the Mstory of oppo- sition to the use of independent contractors employing labour was relevant and a fact (see the reference to that more recent Mstory in Coal Miners' Industrial Union of Workers of WA v the Chairperson). Indeed, although it is not essential to my finding, no challenge was made to the applicability of clause 26 of the award as decided by the Tribunal in that case. TMs case was one rightly characterised as a case where Western Collieries Limited wished to let a contract to a contractor who was not an employee, but who was an employer who would employ a number of employees to perform the work the sub- ject of the contract. Whilst there was no concession on behalf of Western Col- lieries Limited on tMs review, there was no express disagree- ment with Mr Bull's submission. There was a concession before the Full Bench by Mr Bull, on behalf of Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd, that it was unnecessary to refer to those matters of Mstory, because the clause was left in by er- ror and was the pre-existing clause continuing in the same form. I did not understand Mr Ellis to say that. The clause, however, was permitted to remain in the award long after the Mstory dealt with in such detail at first instance was no longer relevant It is worth setting out what Mr Bull said at page 121 of the transcript (before the Full Bench):— "We say that there's no necessity to spend an hour on trying to point to the transcript and the decision to try to tell tMs full bench that in 1990 it was the understanding of the two companies that that clause operated (so) as to prevent external contractors being used without going through the delegate board of the union. That's conceded. What we are saying is Mat that is an error, that is a mis- take. If it was a contract it could either be a unilateral mistake by one party, either Griffin Coal or Western Collieries or the umon, or a common mistake by everybody, but it's a mistake and it needs to be remedied." At page 122 of the transcript (before the Full Bench), Mr Bull said:— "The position put before the tribunal was quite clear that in 1990 what the intention was and the understanding was, that that was based on a mistaken belief that the clause applied to external contractors, and that's not unu- sual when one looks at the fact that it wasn't 30 or 40 years before the clause ever came befr-e the tribunal in any form of argument." work where the contract is not approved by the Delegate Board (or, alternatively, by the Tribunal) is acting in breach of the award. Further, if that contract is approved it must contain, or, alternatively, is deemed to contain, a covenant that the em- ployee shall receive at least the minimum wage provided by the award. The clause does not make an employee subject to that award, except insofar as the minimum amount payable under any other award might be less than the minimum amount payable under the award. However, what it really does is to say that any transaction, wMch offends clause 26 of the award, is a breach of the award. It does not specifically say that such a transaction is in breach, but it clearly would be. The Deputy Chairperson's opimon that such is unreason- able ((ie) an interpretation of clause 26 of the award in terms of what I have said above) in today's industrial environment is not to the point in the face of the meaning of the clause and its plain words, inserted as it was in 1992. Further, there is no custom or practice wMch, as a matter of fact or law, can be said to exist or to detract from the meaning of clause 26 of the award. In my opimon, a reading of the words inserted in 1992 as clause 26 of the award, in accordance with the principles ap- plied in Norwest Beef Industries Ltd and Derby Meat Process- ing Co Ltd v AMIEU (op cit), gives the meaning wMch I have given them above. The history of clause 26 of the award's predecessor clauses was long irrelevant, "contract" workers TMs contract should have been referred to the tmion Delegate Board, and, after that, if necessary, to the Tribunal. The Tribu- nal erred, too, in not so holding, particularly when it relied upon Mstory properly now conceded by one advocate to be irrelevant and which I hold to have been irrelevant. I now turn to the question whether the Full Bench should permit the review of the decision. In Amalgamated Collieries Workers of WA. Collie 32 WAIG 334 at 335. Jackson J con- sidered a provision in the Mining Act which gave the Presi- dent power to permit a decision or settlement given or effected by the Tribunal to be reviewed. Jackson J held that Parliament intended that the President have a discretion to refuse the right of review if he considered that the application was a frivolous one or that the subject matter of the decision was of a rela- tively trivial nature or a matter of minor importance. How- ever, he held that it was the President's duty to permit a decision to be reviewed, if, in the opimon of the President, the decision of the Tribunal involved a question of considerable impor- tance to the parties or the public, but except where the deci- sion of the Tribunal was plainly correct. Nevile J in Amalgamated Collieries of WA Ltd and Others v Coal Miners' Industrial Union of Workers. Collie 35 WAIG 82 held that ordinarily the decision of the Tribunal will not be subject to appeal, but if an applicant could satisfy the Presi- dent that there were circumstances in a particular case wMch would make it expedient and desirable Mat such a decision should be reviewed by Me court. Men Me President would grant Me necessary permission. Brinsden and SmiM JJ in AMWSU v Griffin Coal Mining Co Ltd and Another 60 WAIG 2137 approved Me dicta of Jackson J to wMch I have referred. The questions on review did not relate to trivial or unimpor- tant mattes, nor was Me Tribunal plainly right in its decision. In fact, as I have found, it erred. The question of alleged bias of Me Deputy Chairperson, and Mus of Me Tribunal, was obviously a question of impor- tance to Me parties and the public. It would be unusual for a matter of alleged bias not to be. The application of clause 26 of the award, wiM Me obvious importance it has, was and is a matter of importance to Me parties and Me industry, concerning as it did Me use of out- side contractors and their employees and Me rate of remu- 2 75 W.A.I.G. its interpretation of clause 26 of the award. Clause 26 plainly means as follows:— (1) No work may be performed by an outside contractor to the industry:— (a) Unless the contract is approved by the Del- egate Board of the union. (b) Unless every such contract contains or is deemed to contain a covenant that the em- ployee shall receive at least the minimum wage provided by the award for the particular class of work to which the contract relates. (2) It is a breach of the award for the employer who is bound by the award to cause or permit a contract to be entered into contrary to this award. (3) It is not a breach of the award if the class of work to which the contract relates being performed by an em- ployee of the contractor is not covered by a mini- mum wage provided by the award. (4) If a Delegate Board of the union refuses to approve of the contract, then the matter may be referred for determination to the Tribunal. (I am not aware, as a matter of fact, what the position was with employees employed by the contractor in this case and their classification). Although s.18 of the Coal Act does not prescribe express powers upon review, Mr Schapper submitted that the power to review was not limited, and it was proper for the Full Bench to either quash or remit the decision back, or to dismiss the application to review, for example. That was a point of view not disputed by Mr Bull for Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd and Mr Ellis for Western Collieries Limited (see also s.50(l) of the Interpretation Act 1984 (as amended) which reads as follows):— "(1) Where a written law confers upon a person power to do or enforce the doing of any act or thing, all such powers shall also be deemed to be conferred on the person as are reasonably necessary to enable him to do or to enforce the doing of the act or thing." I agree that the power to quash exists for those reasons. In all of the circumstances, because of my finding of bias (and I emphasise that it is a finding not of actual bias), I would quash the decision of the Tribunal as void, or at least voidable, and would issue a Minute of Proposed Order to reflect such a find- ing. ing in draft form the Reasons for Decision of His Honour the President I agree with those reasons in that: (1) A review of the decision of the Coal Industry Tribu- nal of Western Australia by the Full Bench is war- ranted on the basis that the issue of ostensible bias by the Deputy Chairperson of the Tribunal is a mat- ter of importance; (2) There was a reasonable apprehension of bias in the circumstance of the Deputy Chairperson being en- gaged with a contractor which from time to time bids for work in the Coal Industry, and the matter before the Tribunal on that occasion relating to the applica- tion of Clause 26—Contract Work of the Coal Min- ing Industry (Miners) Award 1990. This issue related to whether or not a contractor may be engaged to undertake work without the approval of that con- tract by the Delegate Board of the Union, and the conditions which each such contract should contain or be deemed to contain. Having so decided, the application for review of the Deci- sion of toe Tribunal should be granted and toe Order of toe Tribunal quashed. THE PRESIDENT: For those reasons, toe application for review is granted and toe decision of toe Tribunal is quashed. Order accordingly Appearances:Mr D H Schapper (of Counsel), by leave, on behalf of toe applicant. Mr D S Ellis (of Counsel), by leave, and with him Ms A E Colgate (of Counsel), by leave, on behalf of toe respondent. Mr G E Bull, as agent, on behalf of Griffin Coal Mining Company Pty Ltd.