Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer
[2026] QIRC 23
QIRC
2026-01-01
Not yet cited by other cases
Applicant: Loquias
Respondent: Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer
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Concept tags · 5
Cases cited in this decision · 34
Cited
(2008) 167 FCR 537
(not in corpus)
"…for loss or damage suffered because of unlawful discrimination": Ewin v Vergara (No 3) [2013] FCA 1311 at [601] per Bromberg J. The Court’s exercise of that discretion is to be governed by the text of the relevant...…"
Cited
(1989) 20 FCR 217
(not in corpus)
"…s to be governed by the text of the relevant statute: Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537 at [94] per French and Jacobson JJ The principles relevant to the assessment of damages in tort may be of assistance...…"
Cited
[2013] FCA 1311
— Ewin v Vergara (No 3)
"…relevant to the assessment of damages in tort may be of assistance (see Hall v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 217 at 239 per Lockhart J, at 281 per French J), but only to the extent that they do not conflict...…"
Cited
(1998) 90 FCR 202
(not in corpus)
"…oss or damage suffered because of the conduct of the respondent". Phrases such as "by reason of", "because of" and "by virtue of" require a "practical application of causation principles": Macabenta v Minister for...…"
Cited
(1993) 46 FCR 301
(not in corpus)
"…90 FCR 202 at 213. A phrase like "because of" "implies a relationship of cause and effect" between the unlawful conduct of the respondent and the damage incurred by the applicant: see Human Rights & Equal Opportunity...…"
Considered
[1972] AC 1027
(not in corpus)
"…l act and the manner in which Mr Dwyer perpetrated the Act. [216] The following principles relating to aggravated damages were considered in Wotton v Queensland (No 5):99 Aggravated damages were described by Lord...…"
Considered
[1964] AC 1129
(not in corpus)
"…aggravated damages were considered in Wotton v Queensland (No 5):99 Aggravated damages were described by Lord Diplock in Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 at 1124 (citing with approval the description given by...…"
Applied
[1996] NSWSC 614
(not in corpus)
"…ing from the wrongful physical act is justifiably heightened by the manner in which or the motive for which the defendant did it." That formulation was applied with approval by Clarke JA in the New South Wales Court...…"
Cited
[1998] HCA 70
(not in corpus)
"…utterworth [1996] NSWSC 614; 41 NSWLR 1 at 15–18, although it should be noted that the High Court has acknowledged criticism of Rookes v Barnard on other issues, notably that case’s approach to exemplary damages: see...…"
Cited
[1966] HCA 40
(not in corpus)
"…, notably that case’s approach to exemplary damages: see Gray v Motor Accident Commission [1998] HCA 70; 196 CLR 1 at [18]– [19] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and the authorities there cited, especially...…"
Cited
[1951] HCA 23
(not in corpus)
"…conduct she or he has been punished and exemplary damages for substantially the same conduct are not available: at [40]. The character of the conduct necessary for an award of aggravated damages was described by the...…"
Cited
[2025] QIRC 209
(not in corpus)
"…oquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023 Counsel for the complainant: Mr L.R Borgert Counsel for the first respondent: Mr J Wells Solicitors for the complainant: Vocare Law Solicitors for the...…"
Cited
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(not in corpus)
"…24 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 9 March 2021’, 26. 25 Exhibit 1, ’QPS Witness Statement — Complainant’, 16. 26 Exhibit 1, ’Further Termination Letter to John Dwyer’, 36. 27 T 2-27, l 44. 28 Mr Dwyer’s...…"
Cited
[2015] FWC 3156
(not in corpus)
"…ermination Letter to John Dwyer’, 37. 45 T 2-33, ll 47-49 and T 2-34, ll 18-49 to T 2-35, ll 1-2. 46 T 2-34, l 32. 47 T 2-33, l 49. 48 T 2-34, l 7. 49 The AD Act (n 22) s 119(f). 50 Exhibit 1, ’Record of...…"
Cited
[2005] FCAFC 130
— South Pacific Resort Hotels Pty Ltd v Trainor
"…’, 37. 45 T 2-33, ll 47-49 and T 2-34, ll 18-49 to T 2-35, ll 1-2. 46 T 2-34, l 32. 47 T 2-33, l 49. 48 T 2-34, l 7. 49 The AD Act (n 22) s 119(f). 50 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 13 March 2021’, 29....…"
Cited
[2007] FMCA 59
(not in corpus)
"…ll 1-2. 46 T 2-34, l 32. 47 T 2-33, l 49. 48 T 2-34, l 7. 49 The AD Act (n 22) s 119(f). 50 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 13 March 2021’, 29. 51 [2015] FWC 3156 (’Keenan’). 52 [2005] FCAFC 130...…"
Cited
[1999] ICR 547
(not in corpus)
"…7 T 2-33, l 49. 48 T 2-34, l 7. 49 The AD Act (n 22) s 119(f). 50 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 13 March 2021’, 29. 51 [2015] FWC 3156 (’Keenan’). 52 [2005] FCAFC 130 (’Trainor’). 53 Keenan (n 51),...…"
Cited
[1999] IRLR 81
(not in corpus)
"…48 T 2-34, l 7. 49 The AD Act (n 22) s 119(f). 50 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 13 March 2021’, 29. 51 [2015] FWC 3156 (’Keenan’). 52 [2005] FCAFC 130 (’Trainor’). 53 Keenan (n 51), [101]. 54 [2007]...…"
Cited
[2018] QCA 359
(not in corpus)
"…bit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 13 March 2021’, 29. 51 [2015] FWC 3156 (’Keenan’). 52 [2005] FCAFC 130 (’Trainor’). 53 Keenan (n 51), [101]. 54 [2007] FMCA 59 (’Lee’). 55 [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81...…"
Cited
[2018] QCATA 29
(not in corpus)
"…iscussion/File Notes, 13 March 2021’, 29. 51 [2015] FWC 3156 (’Keenan’). 52 [2005] FCAFC 130 (’Trainor’). 53 Keenan (n 51), [101]. 54 [2007] FMCA 59 (’Lee’). 55 [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81 (’Stubbs’). 56 Trainor (n...…"
Cited
[2008] VCAT 261
(not in corpus)
"…[2015] FWC 3156 (’Keenan’). 52 [2005] FCAFC 130 (’Trainor’). 53 Keenan (n 51), [101]. 54 [2007] FMCA 59 (’Lee’). 55 [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81 (’Stubbs’). 56 Trainor (n 52), [70]. 57 [2018] QCA 359. 58 [2018]...…"
Cited
[2023] SACAT 49
(not in corpus)
"…FC 130 (’Trainor’). 53 Keenan (n 51), [101]. 54 [2007] FMCA 59 (’Lee’). 55 [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81 (’Stubbs’). 56 Trainor (n 52), [70]. 57 [2018] QCA 359. 58 [2018] QCATA 29. 59 Keenan (n 51), [97]. 60 [2008]...…"
Cited
[2022] FWCFB 32
— Sydney Trains v Mr Andrew Bobrenitsky
"…53 Keenan (n 51), [101]. 54 [2007] FMCA 59 (’Lee’). 55 [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81 (’Stubbs’). 56 Trainor (n 52), [70]. 57 [2018] QCA 359. 58 [2018] QCATA 29. 59 Keenan (n 51), [97]. 60 [2008] VCAT 261 , [40]. 61...…"
Cited
(1995) 59 IR 103
(not in corpus)
"…01]. 54 [2007] FMCA 59 (’Lee’). 55 [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81 (’Stubbs’). 56 Trainor (n 52), [70]. 57 [2018] QCA 359. 58 [2018] QCATA 29. 59 Keenan (n 51), [97]. 60 [2008] VCAT 261 , [40]. 61 Ibid, [43]. 62 [2023]...…"
Cited
[2013] FCA 102
— Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Limited
"…9 (’Lee’). 55 [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81 (’Stubbs’). 56 Trainor (n 52), [70]. 57 [2018] QCA 359. 58 [2018] QCATA 29. 59 Keenan (n 51), [97]. 60 [2008] VCAT 261 , [40]. 61 Ibid, [43]. 62 [2023] SACAT 49. 63 [2022]...…"
Cited
[2014] QCAT 695
(not in corpus)
"…] IRLR 81 (’Stubbs’). 56 Trainor (n 52), [70]. 57 [2018] QCA 359. 58 [2018] QCATA 29. 59 Keenan (n 51), [97]. 60 [2008] VCAT 261 , [40]. 61 Ibid, [43]. 62 [2023] SACAT 49. 63 [2022] FWCFB 32. 64 (1995) 59 IR 103. 65...…"
Cited
[2006] QADT 8
(not in corpus)
"…. 56 Trainor (n 52), [70]. 57 [2018] QCA 359. 58 [2018] QCATA 29. 59 Keenan (n 51), [97]. 60 [2008] VCAT 261 , [40]. 61 Ibid, [43]. 62 [2023] SACAT 49. 63 [2022] FWCFB 32. 64 (1995) 59 IR 103. 65 [2013] FCA 102...…"
Cited
[2014] FCAFC 82
— Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd
"…]. 69 Webb (n 67), [39]. 70 Richardson (n 65), [153]–[156] and [161]–164]. 71 Exhibit 1, ’Exhibit AB-13 — Independent Investigation Report (2016)’. 72 T 2–13, ll 45–49. 73 Exhibit 1, ’Exhibit AB-13 — Independent...…"
Cited
[2017] QCAT 8
(not in corpus)
"…1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 313. 90 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 314. 91 Ibid, 315. 92 T 1-20, ll 30-32 and ll 36-37. 93 Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July...…"
Cited
[2024] QIRC 93
(not in corpus)
"…ted 30 July 2023’, 313. 90 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 314. 91 Ibid, 315. 92 T 1-20, ll 30-32 and ll 36-37. 93 Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344. 94 [2016] QCAT...…"
Cited
[2021] ICQ 14
(not in corpus)
"…313. 90 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 314. 91 Ibid, 315. 92 T 1-20, ll 30-32 and ll 36-37. 93 Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344. 94 [2016] QCAT 505. 95 [2017] QCAT...…"
Cited
[2016] FCA 1457
(not in corpus)
"…Ibid, 315. 92 T 1-20, ll 30-32 and ll 36-37. 93 Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344. 94 [2016] QCAT 505. 95 [2017] QCAT 8 (’Green’) 96 [2024] QIRC 93. 97 [2021] ICQ 14. 98 STU v JKL (Qld)...…"
Cited
[2016] QCAT 505
(not in corpus)
"…IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344. 94 [2016] QCAT 505. 95 [2017] QCAT 8 (’Green’) 96 [2024] QIRC 93. 97 [2021] ICQ 14. 98 STU v JKL (Qld) Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 505 , [236]. 99 [2016] FCA 1457 ,...…"
Cited
[2012] QCAT 252
(not in corpus)
"…Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344. 105Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 318-319. 106Ibid, 316-317. 107Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344. 108Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K...…"
Archived text (21097 words)
Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer
CaseBase | [2026] QIRC
023 | BC202601037
LOQUIAS v STAR ENTERTAINMENT GROUP BC202601037
Unreported Judgments Qld · 257 Paragraphs
Queensland Industrial Relations Commission
Industrial Commissioner Power
AD/2023/61
31 January 2026
Loquias v The Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer [2026] QIRC 23
Headnotes
HUMAN RIGHTS — Discrimination legislation — Generally — Where there is a referral of a complaint from
the Queensland Human Rights Commission — Where the Complainant alleged sexual harassment in the
area of work — Where the First Respondent was the Complainant’s employer — Where the Second
Respondent was employed by the Complainant’s employer — Where the Second Respondent sexually
harassed the Complainant during work shifts — Where the Second Respondent assaulted the Complainant
at a social function outside of the workplace — Whether the Second Respondent’s conduct contravened
the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 — Whether the First Respondent is vicariously liable for the conduct —
Whether an order for damages should be awarded — Where vicarious liability is made out for the
contraventions in the workplace — Where vicarious liability is not made out for contraventions that took
place outside of the workplace — Whether reasonable steps were taken by the employer to prevent the
contraventions — Order for damages.
(QLD) Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 ss 118, 119, 120, 132, 133, 204, 209
(QLD) Evidence Act 1977 s 79
A v K Ltd & Z (Anti-Discrimination) [2008] VCAT 261 ; Chester v Detective Senior Constable Jane Barnaby (No
2) [2014] QCAT 695 ; Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Stubbs [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81 ;
Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd [2021] ICQ 14 ; Green v Queensland, Brooker and Keating
[2017] QCAT 8 ; Hussein v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) 59 IR 103 ; JF v Oishi Teppanyaki & Café Pty
Ltd [2025] QIRC 209 ; JKL Ltd v STK [2018] QCATA 29 ; Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298 ; Keenan v
Leighton Boral Amey Joint Venture [2015] FWC 3156 ; Lee v Smith [2007] FMCA 59 ; Menere v Poolrite
Equipment Pty Ltd [2012] QCAT 252 ; Neil v Lee [2024] QIRC 93 ; Nguyen v Ross [2023] SACAT 49 ; Oaks
Hotels & Resorts Ltd v Knauer [2018] QCA 359 ; Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA
102 ; Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCAFC 82 ; South Pacific Resort Hotels Pty Ltd
v Trainor [2005] FCAFC 130 ; STU v JKL (Qld) Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 505 ; Sydney Trains v Bobrenitsky [2022]
FWCFB 32 ; Webb v Queensland [2006] QADT 8 ; Wotton v Queensland (No 5) [2016] FCA 1457
Industrial Commissioner Power.
[1] Ms Olivia Loquias (’the Complainant’) was employed with the First Respondent (’The Star’) as a Games Dealer
or ’Croupier’ working within the casino.
[2] The Second Respondent, Mr John Dwyer (’Mr Dwyer’) was employed with The Star as a Gaming Area Manager
also working within the casino.
[3] The Complainant claims that she was sexually harassed by Mr Dwyer in contravention of the Anti-
Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (’the AD Act’).
Page 2 of 33
Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
[4] The Complainant seeks remedies by way of compensation for general and aggravated damages, past
economic loss, future economic loss, past special damages, future special damages and interest.
[5] The Complainant contends that The Star was vicariously liable for the alleged contravention of the AD Act by
Mr Dwyer in accordance with s 133 of the AD Act.
Statutory framework
[6] Chapter 3, Part 2 of the AD Act provides for the prohibition of sexual harassment.
[7] Section 118 of the AD Act provides for the prohibition of sexual harassment as follows:
118 Sexual Harassment
A person must not sexually harass another person.
[8] Section 119 of the AD Act provides for the meaning of "sexual harassment" as follows:
119 Meaning of sexual harassment
Sexual harassment happens if a person —
(a) subjects another person to an unsolicited act of physical intimacy; or
(b) makes an unsolicited demand or request (whether directly or by implication) for sexual favours from the other
person; or
(c) makes a remark with sexual connotations relating to the other person; or
(d) engages in any other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in relation to the other person;
and the person engaging in the conduct described in paragraphs (a), (b), (c) or (d) does so —
(e) with the intention of offending, humiliating or intimidating the other person; or
(f) in circumstances where a reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility that the other person
would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct.
Examples for paragraph (a) —
• physical contact such as patting, pinching or touching in a sexual way
• unnecessary familiarity such as deliberately brushing against a person
Examples for paragraph (b) —
• sexual propositions
Examples for paragraph (c) —
• unwelcome and uncalled for remarks or insinuations about a person’s sex or private life
• suggestive comments about a person’s appearance or body
Examples for paragraph (d) —
• offensive telephone calls
• indecent exposure
[9] In JF v Oishi Teppanyaki & Café Pty Ltd (’JF’), Deputy President Hartigan outlined the following approach to
considering a claim of sexual harassment:1
In adopting an approach similar to that set out in Hughes, s 119(a)–(d) of the AD Act requires the Commission to determine
if any of the identified forms of conduct occurred. Such a determination involves a factual finding as to whether the conduct
described in s 119(a)-(d) has been established on the evidence.
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
If the identified conduct is established, it also requires a finding that the conduct must either be "unsolicited" for the
purposes of s 119(a)–(b) or "unwelcome" for the purpose of s 119(d) of the AD Act.
Finally, once it has been established that the conduct was conduct as described in s 119(a)–(d) of the AD Act, a factual
determination must be made with respect to whether the person engaging in the conduct did so with the intent of offending,
humiliating or intimidating or whether if the person engaging in the conduct did so in circumstances where a reasonable
person would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct. The determination with respect to s 119(f) requires the
application of an objective test. The circumstances to be taken into account in determining the objective test may include
consideration of those matters referred to in s 120 of the AD Act.
[citations omitted]
[10] The meaning of "relevant circumstances" is outlined in s 120 of the AD Act as follows:
120 Meaning of relevant circumstances
The circumstances that are relevant in determining whether a reasonable person would have anticipated the
possibility that the other person would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct include —
(a) the sex of the other person; and
(b) the age of the other person; and
(c) the race of the other person; and
(d) any impairment that the other person has; and
(e) the relationship between the other person and the person engaging in the conduct; and
(f) any other circumstance of the other person.
[11] Chapter 6 of the Act relates to liability for contraventions of workers and agents.
[12] Section 133 of the AD Act outlines the following:
133 Vicarious Liability
(1) If any of a person’s workers or agents contravenes the Act in the course of work or while acting as agent, both
the person and the worker or agent, as the case may be, are jointly and severally liable for the contravention,
and a proceeding under the Act may be taken against either or both.
(2) It is a defence to a proceeding for a contravention of the Act arising under subsection (1) if the respondent
proves, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent took reasonable steps to prevent the worker or
against contravening the Act.
[13] Section 204 of the AD Act outlines that the burden of proof lies with the Complainant:2
204 Burden of proof — general principle
It is for the complainant to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent contravened the Act, subject
to the requirements in sections 205 and 206.
Evidence of the Complainant and Mr Dwyer
[14] The Complainant’s evidence was consistent with the available documentary evidence including the file note
record of a discussion with Ms Heather Lindsay at The Star on 9 March 2021, the Queensland Police Service
(’QPS’) Witness Statement dated 12 March 2021 and the ’description of incident’ form provided to the Star on or
about 13 March 2024.
[15] I note that the Complainant’s submissions refer to the fact that the Complainant was not subject to cross-
examination in relation to much of her evidence.3 I have not placed greater weight on the Complainant’s evidence
on the basis that it was ’unchallenged’ given that Mr Dwyer was not legally represented at the hearing.
[16] I do however find the Complainant to be a credible witness as her forthright evidence given at the hearing was
consistent with the accounts provided in the documentary evidence.
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
[17] Mr Dwyer gave evidence that where he had previously stated that he ’could not recall’ particular incidents or
comments, this choice of words was intended to be taken as a denial.4
[18] I am not persuaded that Mr Dwyer’s initial response to many of the allegations that he ’could not recall’
particular incidents was in fact a denial that he engaged in the conduct. Where Mr Dwyer previously stated that he
could not recall particular conduct, I consider his later evidence denying the conduct less plausible.
[19] I also approach Mr Dwyer’s evidence with caution on the basis that his denial at the hearing was inconsistent
with his prior plea of guilty to the allegation of assault in criminal proceedings.
[20] On balance, I find the evidence of the Complainant is more reliable.
Allegations
[21] The Complainant claims that Mr Dwyer sexually harassed her from September 2020 to March 2021 at work,
and on the evening of 5 March 2021 at venues away from the workplace. It is convenient to adopt The Star’s
description of the allegations as Pattern Allegations, alleged to have occurred within the workplace, and the Valley
Allegations, alleged to have occurred during and following a social function which ended at the Fortitude Valley.
Pattern Allegations
[22] These allegations claim that Mr Dwyer engaged in conduct at the workplace that constitutes sexual
harassment.
[23] Mr Dwyer submits that there are significant inconsistencies between the Complainant’s statement in the Form
85A and her evidence at hearing as to the timing of the Pattern Allegations. The difference referred to is the year in
which the Complainant states the harassment commenced, with the Form 85A stating the harassment commenced
in September 2020 whereas at the hearing the Complainant stated the harassment started in 2019.5
[24] The Complainant gave evidence of her interactions with Mr Dwyer from November 2018 when he trained her
in Roulette. The Complainant describes in the incident report interactions involving ’a few random touches’ by Mr
Dwyer, however, noted that she did not report these occasional touches as she felt they were not intended
maliciously.6
[25] In answer to a question at hearing regarding the timespan over which these interactions occurred, the
Complainant stated, ’from 2019 to 2021’.7 This was in my view an honest answer to the question regarding all of her
interactions with Mr Dwyer, with the earlier ’random touches’ occurring between 2018 and 2019. The Complainant
has consistently stated that the sexually harassing conduct subject of her allegations commenced in September
2020.
[26] The Pattern Allegations involve allegations of the following conduct:
A. Comment about the Complainant’s singlet
[27] The Complainant gave the following evidence about Mr Dwyer’s comments regarding her singlet:8
And do you recall any specific comments that he made towards you that made you uncomfortable? — There was one night
on the smoking balcony where he mentioned my other roulette trainer, Mandy Chen, had commented that – had asked
John Dwyer if he thought what I was wearing was appropriate, and he said no, because he could see my — my tits, and he
relayed this conversation to me, and I didn’t know how to feel, because I wasn’t aware that this conversation had
happened, and so I was really uncomfortable from this comment.
[28] In Mr Dwyer’s evidence he denied making the comments attributed to him by the Complainant.
[29] The documentary evidence in the form of a file note of a discussion between Ms Lindsay of The Star and the
Complainant dated 9 March 2021 (’file note’),9 an incident report provided by the Complainant to The Star on 13
March 2021 (’incident report’),10 and a QPS Statement signed by the Complainant on 12 March 202111 support the
oral evidence given by the Complainant.
[30] In the termination letter to Mr Dwyer, The Star referred to an interview on 23 March 2021 with Ms Lindsay and
Ms Lauren Wood in which Mr Dwyer denied stating words to the effect of "I didn’t mind you came to training in a
singlet because I got to see your tits".12
[31] I note Mr Dwyer’s firm denial that he made the alleged comment, however I give significant weight to the
consistent account provided by the Complainant in both her oral evidence and as recorded in documentary
evidence.
[32] On the balance of probabilities, the evidence supports a finding that Mr Dwyer made a comment to the
Complainant in September 2020 to the effect that he did not mind her wearing a singlet to training because he "got
to see her tits".
B. Pinching the Complainant on the arm between September 2020 to March 2021
[33] The Complainant alleges that Mr Dwyer would pinch and touch her on the arm whilst on shift together.
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
[34] The Complainant gave the following evidence:13
He would pinch me and ask where I was going, and then, on the smoking balcony, he’d just mainly say the same
comments about what I looked like.
And where would he pinch you? --- On my, — my — behind my arm.
[35] The Complainant outlined in the incident that Mr Dwyer had engaged in a number of behaviours including
pinching her arm that occurred on the main floor.
[36] The Complainant outlined in a QPS Statement that when she walked past Mr Dwyer on the floor at work he
would pinch her on the arm.
[37] Mr Dwyer denied pinching the Complainant at any time.
[38] On the balance of probabilities, the evidence supports a finding that Mr Dwyer pinched the Complainant.
C. Touching the Complainant’s face and eyebrows and telling her not to frown between September 2020
and March 2021
[39] The Complainant gave the following evidence in relation to this allegation:14
And what sort of remarks did he make about you? — He would comment about what a — he started off making comments
about my facial expressions, about how I didn’t look pretty if I made a certain face. He would make comments about what I
was wearing, and it would get worse on — in time.
[40] The file note records the Complainant as stating that Mr Dwyer often touched her face and told her not to
frown.15
[41] The Complainant outlined in her QPS Statement that Mr Dwyer would touch her on the forehead if she
frowned and would say ’Don’t do that. You’ll look ugly if you do that’.16
[42] In response to this allegation, the termination letter records Mr Dwyer as stating that he did not recall touching
the Complainant’s face.
[43] Mr Dwyer gave the following evidence at the hearing regarding this allegation:17
So during that meeting with the employer on the 23rd of March, you stated that you do not recall touching Olivia’s face; is
that correct? --- Yes.
You did not deny touching her face. You did not deny touching her face; you simply stated that you could not recall touching
her face? --- Yeah, well, this – this is the same as what happened with Hallie, because I said, "I don’t recall", and that’s
apparently guilty. So obviously, it’s the same way that I answer questions, but no, I didn’t touch her face.
If you could not recall it, isn’t — do you accept that it’s possible that you would --- ? --- No.
--- touch her face and eyebrows? --- No, I don’t accept that. It’s just the way I word things, and obviously it’s the wrong way
to word things.
[44] Mr Dwyer’s evidence appears to be that his previous statements in relation to not recalling the conduct were
intended to be a denial of the allegation.
[45] I am not persuaded that Mr Dwyer’s statement to his employer that he could not recall touching the
Complainant’s face was intended to have the same meaning as a denial. If Mr Dwyer had not touched the
Complainant’s face, one would reasonably expect that he would have denied the allegation when it was first put to
him.
[46] Mr Dwyer’s oral evidence denying the allegation is less persuasive given his previous statement that he simply
could not recall the conduct.
[47] On the balance of probabilities, I am persuaded that the Complainant’s evidence is reliable due to the
consistent nature of the description of the conduct. Accordingly, I am satisfied that Mr Dwyer engaged in the
conduct as outlined in this allegation.
D. In early December 2020 stating that he would do ’a lot worse’ to the Complainant
[48] The Complainant claims that she reported an incident of alleged sexual harassment and assault by two other
managers to Mr Dwyer who responded by sexually harassing the Complainant during the conversation.
[49] The Complainant gave the following evidence at hearing:18
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... And I again got really upset, so I left the party, and I was very upset and uncomfortable by what happened, and the next
shift that I started, I went — I was — I went — I had seen JD on the smoking balcony, and I didn’t know who else to talk to ,
because I wanted to see what I could do about the situation, and I told JD what had happened, and he said to me, "You’re
lucky I wasn’t there. I would have done a lot worse to you, " and when he said this, I was even more upset, and so I left the
balcony
…
And how did you feel when he responded to you the way that he did? --- I was really upset and hurt, and I thought that,
because JD has said this – that everybody else would respond the same, and so I didn’t feel very safe, and I felt really
uncomfortable.
[50] This evidence is consistent with the Complainant’s description as outlined in the complaint to the Qld Human
Rights Commission19 and in the information provided to Dr Barkla as outlined in her subsequent report.20
[51] Mr Dwyer’s evidence was that the conversation did not happen, and he denies the comments attributed to him
by the Complainant.21
[52] On balance, I am more persuaded by the Complainant’s evidence than that given by Mr Dwyer due to my
impression of the Complainant as a generally honest witness and the consistent account provided in the
documentary evidence in relation to this allegation.
[53] Accordingly, I am satisfied that Mr Dwyer engaged in the conduct as outlined in this allegation.
Did Mr Dwyer’s conduct at work fall within s 119(a)–(d) of the AD Act?
[54] As outlined above, I accept the Complainant’s evidence as reliable and find that the Pattern Allegations
regarding Mr Dwyer’s conduct are substantiated as having occurred in the manner alleged.
Consideration of the Pattern Allegations
[55] The conduct subject of Pattern Allegations B and C involved the act of pinching a junior colleague’s arm and
touching her face. There is no evidence that the Complainant requested or solicited these acts. In these
circumstances I am satisfied that Mr Dwyer subjected the Complainant to unsolicited acts of physical intimacy within
the meaning of s 119(a) by pinching her arm and touching her face.
[56] I am satisfied that the conduct subject of Pattern Allegations A and D were remarks with sexual connotations
relating to the Complainant within the meaning of s 119(c). The comment regarding the Complainant’s singlet was
plainly sexual in nature, and the comment that Mr Dwyer ’would do worse’ to her was made in the context of the
Complainant talking about having been previously sexually harassed. There is no submission before the
Commission that the comments were anything other than sexual in nature.
[57] I am not satisfied that the evidence supports a conclusion that Mr Dwyer engaged in the conduct ’with the
intention of offending, humiliating or intimidating the other person’.22
[58] Section 119 (f) of the AD Act requires an assessment of whether Mr Dwyer engaged in the conduct ’in
circumstances where a reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility that the other person would be
offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct.’
[59] The circumstances that are relevant in determining whether a reasonable person would have anticipated the
possibility that the other person would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct include those outlined
in s 120. This section includes a number of factors, including the sex and age of the other person and the
relationship between the parties.
[60] Throughout the period during which the conduct relating to the Pattern Allegations occurred, relevant
circumstances included the following:
• At 21 years old, the Complainant was significantly younger than Mr Dwyer who was aged 53 years old;
• The Complainant was a young female; and
• Although the relationship between the parties may not have been one of direct supervisor / subordinate,
the Complainant was in a junior casual position as a Games Dealer with Mr Dwyer occupying a more
senior role managing the Gaming Area Supervisors.
[61] In considering the relevant circumstances, I place considerable weight on the power imbalance that existed
between the Complainant as a 21-year-old female casual employee and a 53-year-old male manager. I am satisfied
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that a reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility that the Complainant would be offended, humiliated
or intimidated by the conduct substantiated in Pattern Allegations A, B, C and D.
[62] On the basis of the above findings, I find that Mr Dwyer engaged in sexual harassment against the
Complainant in contravention of s 119 of the AD Act.
Valley Allegation
[63] The Valley Allegation involves allegations relating to Mr Dwyer’s conduct on 5 March 2021 at a social function
outside of work hours.
[64] The following facts appear to be uncontentious:
• the Complainant attended a 21st birthday function for a colleague, Ms Alex Mueller at Darling & Co with
another colleague Ms Niki Shinohara on 5 March 2021;
• Ms Mueller was both a work colleague at the casino and Mr Dwyer’s niece;
• Mr Dwyer was also in attendance at the birthday function;
• There were approximately fifty people in attendance, with around half of the attendees being family and
friends and the other half being employees from the casino; and
• A group of attendees, including the Complainant and Mr Dwyer, left the birthday function at Darling & Co
and at some stage of the evening walked through the Valley to Ella Sabe nightclub.
Sexually harassing comments at Darling & Co
[65] The Complainant gave the following evidence regarding the allegation that Mr Dwyer made sexually harassing
comments at Darling & Co:23
We got there around 7, and when we got there, we both saw JD, and we had already discussed prior that I wanted to avoid
JD as much as I could, and when we got there, the first thing that JD has said to us was that our arses looked really nice in
our dresses and that we looked really good.
[66] The file note of the conversation between the Complainant and Ms Lindsay on 9 March 2021 records the
following note:24
[The Complainant] stated she was at a party for dealer Alex Mueller’s 21st on Friday night (5 May) and at the start of the
night [Mr Dwyer] "commented to myself and dealer Niki Shinohara-Rattle how nice you both look, you both have great
arses and great tits and if I was younger I would do some things to you" [the Complainant] stated this put her off, they were
all drinking and both told [Mr Dwyer] to relax and stop saying things like that to us.
[67] The QPS Statement signed by the Complainant on 12 March 2021 is consistent with the account provided to
Ms Lindsay and the evidence given by the Complainant.25
[68] During the meeting with Ms Lindsay and Ms Wood on 23 March 2021, Mr Dwyer denied the allegation that he
had stated words to the effect of "your ass looks so nice in your dress" and "nice tits", stating that he did not make
any comments about the Complainant’s dress or body.26
[69] In Mr Dwyer’s evidence at hearing, he denied making the alleged comments to the Complainant.27
[70] Mr Dwyer submits that there were inconsistencies in the Complainant’s account, specifically her evidence that
Ms Shinohara had intended to avoid him at the function.28 In my view the fact that this detail was not stated in
previous accounts is not material to the allegation
[71] Mr Dwyer submits that the failure to call Ms Shinohara and Mr Austin Palmer to obtain their evidence raised
doubts about the credibility of the allegations. I decline to draw a Jones v Dunkel29 inference in circumstances
where there was no explanation or answer required from these employees. In circumstances where the transcript
from Mr Dwyer’s criminal proceedings confirmed his guilty plea and documentary evidence supported the claim,
there was no unexplained absence of evidence from these employees.
[72] As previously noted, I am more persuaded by the Complainant’s evidence than that given by Mr Dwyer due to
my impression of the Complainant as a generally reliable witness and her consistent account provided in the
documentary evidence in relation to this allegation.
[73] I find that Mr Dwyer engaged in this conduct as alleged.
Sexual assault on the Complainant in the Valley
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[74] The Complainant gave the following evidence in relation to this allegation:30
... and as we were walking on our way to the next club, which was Ella Sabe, John had approached me and said that we
weren’t at work, so he could do whatever he wanted to us, and that’s when he grabbed me, and I was really upset that he
had actually done something to me, and so I got angry, and I told him not to fucking touch me. And then, after that, he did it
again and said that he could do whatever he wanted, and then I left again, because I was really upset, and we had reached
the next venue at this point …
And earlier you mentioned that he grabbed. Where did he grab you? --- On my bum.
And you mentioned that this happened twice. Are you able to describe how long he kept his hand there for? --- So for the
first time, he tried to feel and, like, feel around, and the second time, he really grabbed on.
[75] The QPS Statement of 12 March 2021 signed by the Complainant states the following:31
Sometime between 12:06am and 12:32am we walked down the Centre of the Valley strip towards Ella Sabe Club. During
that time, JD has said, ”I just realized we’re not at work now. I can do whatever 1 want.”
JD then forcibly grabbed me on the arse and had a really good feel. He did this twice. The first time he grabbed it and
jiggled his fingers around and the second time he hung on and felt around.
I immediately said, ”Don’t fucken touch me. You can’t touch me like that.”
JD then laughed and said, “I can do what I want.”
[76] In the meeting with Ms Lindsay and Ms Wood on 23 March 2021 Mr Dwyer denied touching the Complainant
and stated that "the comment is clearly not true".32 The meeting record outlines Mr Dwyer’s statement that "there
was lots of drinking, lots of people and lots of talking but you can’t remember what conversations you had with [the
Complainant] but you certainly would not be touching or making inappropriate comments".33
[77] Mr Dwyer pled guilty to the assault of the Complainant in the Magistrates Court of Queensland on 11 May
2021, with the prosecution outlining the following facts:34
On Friday the 5th of March 2021, the defendant and the complainant and a group of coworkers went to a socializing to
celebrate a friend’s birthday. And at approximately 12.01am on the following day, the complainant and defendant and two
other coworkers were walking through the Brunswick Street mall, and the defendant was walking behind the complainant.
And the complainant felt a hand grab her left buttock and squeezed it. Within a second, she felt her left buttock being
squeezed again.
The complainant has turned and saw the defendant, who was the only person behind her, and the complainant was upset
and angry. She said to the defendant, "Don ’t fucking touch me. You can’t touch me like that." The defendant just laughed
and then responded, "I can do what I want", and the complainant quickly moved a distance herself from the defendant.
[78] Mr Dwyer gave the following evidence at hearing regarding this allegation:35
So on the ... evening of the 5th of March and the early hours of 6th of March, it’s the case that you assaulted her, isn’t it? ---
No, that’s not the case.
But you pled guilty in a Magistrates Court? --- I told you the reasons why I did that, in my statement.
So when you ’re speaking with the employer and you stated you never touched Olivia at all, is that because - do you say
that’s because you didn’t touch her at all that whole evening, or because you didn’t touch her strictly in the nightclub? --- As
I said in my statement, I — I stated that I didn’t recall when I had the NOM, so that’s why I said I didn’t touch her - because
of the intoxication.
And it’s the case that you deny making the comment that you can do what you want now that you’re at work? --- I did not
say that.
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You deny that comment. But in the meeting with your employer you stated, essentially, due to intoxication you can’t
remember what conversations you had with Olivia? --- Yes. You have covered this. Yes.
So isn’t it the case that you can ’t positively deny it now, when you accept that you can’t remember all of the conversations?
--- Is there - is there a question there?
Isn’t it possible that you did make those comments to Olivia but you simply don’t recall it? ---
I don ’t think it’s possible no.
Even though you state you can’t remember what conversations you had with Olivia? --- Yes, even though.
[79] Mr Dwyer made the following submission regarding the reason he pled guilty before the Magistrates Court:36
I would like to clarify that my guilty plea was not an admission of the truth of the allegations. At the time, I was dealing with
significant personal challenges, including my mother being in palliative care, and the recent termination of my 26 year
career. The immense grief from my mother’s later passing, coupled with severe financial hardship due to unemployment
and emotional trauma, placed me in a highly vulnerable state. Under these circumstances, I made the decision to plead
guilty in order to avoid further stress on myself and my family.
My lawyer also advised me that by pleading guilty, the matter would be resolved that day, allowing me to move forward with
my life.
[80] Whilst the circumstances surrounding Mr Dwyer’s personal life and his loss of employment would undoubtedly
have caused him significant stress, I am not persuaded that this would have resulted in his plea of guilty to conduct
which did not occur. A charge of assault is significant, and it seems implausible that Mr Dwyer pled guilty if there
was no truth to the charge.
[81] In JF, Deputy President Hartigan considered previous convictions in the context of an allegation of conduct
pursuant to the AD Act:37
Section 79(2) of the Evidence Act provides that in any civil proceeding the fact that a person has been convicted by a court
of an offence is admissible in evidence for the purpose of proving, where to do so is relevant to any issue in the proceeding,
that the person committed that offence.
[82] It seems to me that Mr Dwyer’s statement regarding ’lots of drinking’ and intoxication indicates that he had
consumed a significant amount of alcohol throughout the relevant time period. Mr Dwyer’s response to his employer
that he could not remember the conversations he had with the Complainant is plausible and, in my view, more
reliable than the subsequent denial at hearing.
[83] Mr Dwyer submits that the Complainant’s evidence of the incident is unreliable due to inconsistent descriptions
of the touching between the record of discussion with Ms Lindsay on 9 March 2021 and the QPS Witness statement
dated 12 March 2021.
[84] Mr Dwyer submits that the Complainant described the grabbing incident as occurring in a nightclub in one
account and on a strip in the Valley in another account.38 The only reference in evidence to the incident occurring at
a nightclub is that of the termination letter to Mr Dwyer. The letter sets out the allegation as taking place ’at a night
club in the Valley’ and was drafted by the employer, not by the Complainant.
[85] The Complainant’s account of the location of the incident in the QPS Statement was in the ’centre of the
Valley Strip’39. The record of discussion with Ms Lindsay records the Complainant as stating that after a few people
left the party they ’went into the Valley’.40
[86] The Sergeant outlined the facts during the Magistrates court hearing as occurring whilst the Complainant was
’walking through the Brunswick Street mall’.41 I accept the Complainant’s submission that the Brunswick Street mall
ought to be construed as the same as the ’valley strip’.
[87] The evidence indicates that the location of the incident was consistent throughout the various accounts
provided by the Complainant.
[88] Mr Dwyer submits that the Complainant gave inconsistent versions of the nature of the incident. Having read
the account provided in the QPS Statement, the record of discussion with Ms Lindsay and the incident report, I am
satisfied that the Complainant has provided a consistent account of Mr Dwyer grabbing her bottom as he walked
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behind her in the Valley. The reference surrounding Mr Dwyer ’jiggling his fingers’ in the QPS Statement is not
inconsistent, rather, it was in my view a more detailed account.
[89] On the balance of probabilities, I am persuaded that the Complainant’s evidence is reliable based on the
consistent account provided to the employer, the QPS and at hearing. I consider this evidence to be more reliable
than that provided by Mr Dwyer primarily due to the inconsistency with his prior guilty plea to the alleged conduct.
[90] I find that Mr Dwyer physically assaulted the Complainant in the manner alleged and made the comments
attributed to him in this allegation.
Sexual harassment at Ella Sabe Club
[91] The Complainant contends that Mr Dwyer continued to sexually harass her at the Ella Sabe Night Club,
providing the following evidence at hearing:42
… we had reached the next venue at this point, and then, in the club, he was throwing ice at me, pushing me over. And
then, when we were sitting down, I saw John trying to do something, and I asked him what he was doing, because I was —
he was making uncomfortable, and he told me he was trying to look up my dress, and at that point, I was just so
uncomfortable and upset that I just left.
[92] In the QPS Statement signed by the Complainant on 12 March 2021, the Complainant stated: 43
After that we had arrived at the Ella Sabe Club and I was really angry at JD. I was ignoring him and when we got into the
Club I was doing my own thing and I was ignoring JD.
After a while he started throwing ice at me to try and get my attention. JD then came over to me and started trying to push
me over. I said, "What are you doing?"
JD said, "I’m trying to look up your dress."
[93] The termination letter of 26 April 2021 noted Mr Dwyer’s response to this allegation in the following terms:44
You stated that you can recall ice being thrown; some being thrown at you; that you threw some and it was some immature
stuff, but you don ’t remember throwing ice at Olivia
You stated that you would never push anyone, male or female and that if referring to accidently knocking into her in a
crowded nightclub, that you couldn’t recall that either.
[94] Mr Dwyer gave the following evidence during cross-examination:45
And do you accept that, given your intoxicated state, and your comment that you can recall ice being thrown, that it is likely
that you did throw ice at Ms Loquias, isn’t it? --- It’s possible. I wouldn’t say likely. It’s possible.
…
And I put to you that you did comment to her that you were trying to see up her dress? --- No.
But again, in allegation 4 — in response to allegation 4, you stated that:
There was lots of drinking, lots of people and lots of talking, but you can’t remember what conversations you had with
Olivia, but you certainly would not be touching or making inappropriate comments.
So where earlier you say you can ’t remember what conversations you had with Olivia — that means you can’t deny ice-
throwing now, isn’t that the case? --- No, that’s not the case — conversations.
But you accept that you were intoxicated and that you can ’t recall much of the event particularly later in the night when you
’re in the Valley? --- Yes.
So isn’t it the case that it’s quite possible that you did make the comment that you were trying to see up her dress? --- No.
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
It’s not possible? --- It’s not possible.
Even though earlier you say you can’t recall all the conversations with Olivia? --- Even though - even though intoxicated, I’m
not talking inappropriately and ---
But you can ’t recall whether you were talking inappropriately or not? --- I can ’t recall the — the — the conversation. But I
mean, that’s not me, I — I — I don ’t talk like that, re - intoxicated or not.
Okay. But you may say now you wouldn’t talk like that, but you can ’t recall of all of the conversations with Olivia that night?
--- Incredibly hard to recall a - a night out three and-a half years later, every single conversation at 1 in the morning.
[95] Mr Dwyer accepted in cross-examination that he was intoxicated and could not recall much of the event,
particularly later in the night in the Valley.46
[96] Mr Dwyer conceded that given his level of intoxication it was possible that he did throw ice at the Complainant,
although he said it was not likely.47
[97] Mr Dwyer accepted that he had stated that the claim of ’pushing’ the Complainant may be referring to
accidentally knocking into her in the crowded nightclub but that he could not recall doing so.48
[98] It seems to me that although Mr Dwyer contends that he would not have touched or made inappropriate
comments to the Complainant regardless of his intoxication, the reality is that he did not have a clear memory of the
interactions with the Complainant at this club.
[99] On the basis of the Complainant’s clear recollection and consistent account provided to the QPS, I accept her
evidence of the allegation. Accordingly, I find that Mr Dwyer threw ice at the Complainant, pushed the Complainant
and commented to the Complainant that he was trying to see up her dress.
Does Mr Dwyer’s conduct in the Valley fall within s 119(a)–(d) of the AD Act?
[100] As outlined above, I accept the Complainant’s evidence as reliable and find that the allegations regarding Mr
Dwyer’s conduct in the Valley are substantiated as having occurred in the manner alleged.
[101] Mr Dwyer’s conduct in the Valley can be summarised as follows:
• Making comments to the Complainant that her ’arse’ and ’tits’ looked good and stating to the Complainant
’the things he would do if he were younger’;
• Grabbing the Complainant’s buttocks; and
• Throwing ice and pushing the Complainant and telling the Complainant he was attempting to look up her
dress.
[102] I am satisfied that the comments to the Complainant can be considered remarks with sexual connotations in
accordance with s 119(c) and the act of touching the Complainant’s buttocks can reasonably be considered an
unsolicited act of physical intimacy or unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in accordance with s 119 (b) and (d).
[103] There is insufficient evidence that the act of throwing ice or pushing the Complainant satisfies the criteria in s
119.
[104] As considered above, the circumstances relevant to a consideration of whether a reasonable person would
have anticipated the possibility that the Complainant would be offended, humiliated or intimidated include the fact
that the Complainant was a 21-year-old female and Mr Dwyer a 53-year-old male.
[105] Although the conduct described in the Valley Allegations did not occur in the workplace, the fact that Mr
Dwyer was a manager at the Complainant’s workplace is also a relevant circumstance to be considered. The power
imbalance that exists between a manager and junior casual continues to exist even when the parties are physically
outside the workplace.
[106] Further, the Complainant made it clear to Mr Dwyer that she was not comfortable with his behaviour.
[107] In the circumstances outlined, I am satisfied that a reasonable person would have anticipated the possibility
that the Complainant would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by the conduct.49
[108] Accordingly, I find that Mr Dwyer sexually harassed the Complainant in contravention of s 118 of the AD Act.
Vicarious liability
[109] The AD Act provides for vicarious liability, with s 132 outlining the purpose:
132 Act’s vicarious liability purpose and how it is to be achieved
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(1) One of the purposes of the Act is to promote equality of opportunity for everyone by making a person liable for
certain acts of the person’s workers or agents.
(2) This purpose is to be achieved by making a person civilly liable for a contravention of the Act by the person’s
workers or agents.
[110] Section 133 of the AD Act provides for the vicarious liability of a person’s workers or agents:
133 Vicarious Liability
(1) If any of a person’s workers or agents contravenes the Act in the course of work or while acting as agent,
both the person and the worker or agent, as the case may be, are jointly and severally liable for the
contravention, and a proceeding under the Act may be taken against either or both.
(2) It is a defence to a proceeding for a contravention of the Act arising under subsection (1) if the respondent
proves, on the balance of probabilities, that the respondent took reasonable steps to prevent the worker or
against contravening the Act.
[111] The Complainant contends that the sexual harassment perpetrated by Mr Dwyer constituted a contravention
of the Act which took place ’in the course of work’ having regard to s 133(1) of the Act.
Did the sexual harassment occur ’in the course of work’?
[112] If it can be demonstrated that Mr Dwyer’s sexual harassment (’unlawful conduct’) occurred ’in the course of
work or while acting as an agent’, both Mr Dwyer and The Star will be jointly and severally liable for the
contravention (subject to the defence available pursuant to s 133(2)).
[113] The Complainant made the following submissions in support of the claim that the unlawful conduct
substantiated in the Valley Allegations occurred in the course of work:
• the unlawful conduct can reasonably be said to be a consequence of the relationship of the parties as co-
employees.
• The parties knew each other through their shared work at the casino, with Mr Dwyer supervising the
Complainant.
• The social event on 5 March 2021 was organised by Games Dealer, Ms Mueller, who invited the
Complainant. It was common for social gatherings to take place between employees.
• The Complainant spent almost all of her evening in the presence of her colleagues Ms Shinohara and Mr
Palmer and caught an uber from the gathering to the Valley with three colleagues including Mr Dwyer.
• The Complainant remained present with her colleagues throughout the evening and was with them just
after midnight on 6 March 2021 when she was assaulted by Mr Dwyer.
[114] The Complainant refers to the investigation conducted by The Star into the allegations, referring to a file note
of the conversation between Ms Lindsay and the Complainant on 13 March 2021 that records the following:50
... I also apologised for initially advising her we would not consider allegations that took place outside the work environment
and explained after talking to P & P I became aware that this was to be included as you were all familiar with each other
because of your employment at Treasury Brisbane.
[115] The Complainant made the following submissions regarding The Star’s termination of Mr Dwyer’s
employment:
• The investigation took place because the employer formed a view that all the persons involved knew each
other through their common and shared employment at The Star.
• After terminating Mr Dwyer for serious misconduct, the employer considered that Mr Dwyer had
contravened their policies and formed a view that Mr Dwyer could not be trusted to work unsupervised in
his role.
• The disciplinary actions taken by the employer enhance the view that the sexual harassment perpetrated
by Mr Dwyer against the Complainant was work-related.
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[116] The Star accepts that the Pattern Allegations relate to conduct in the course of work, however, maintains that
reasonable steps were taken to prevent the contravention.
[117] I accept The Star’s submission that s 133 anticipates that the harassment occurred in a context where the
employer can be expected to have a degree of responsibility for the contravening employee, otherwise s 133 would
be expressed as absolute, without limitation as to context.
[118] In support of the contention that the Valley Allegations did not occur ’in the course of work’, The Star submits
the following:
• The contention that the Valley Allegations would not have occurred ’but for’ Mr Dwyer’s escalating
workplace behaviour falls into the same error identified in the cases; a ’but for’ test would effectively
capture all employees who work together and socialise, as they would not be socialising ’but for’ having
met through work.
• The Complainant had not made the employer aware of the Pattern Allegations and cannot be treated as
having created the circumstances for the Valley Allegations by not intervening earlier;
• That Mr Dwyer was senior to the Complainant does not create such a circumstance, as seniority at work
does not create a forum for harassment at private events outside work.
• The event which led the Complainant and Mr Dwyer to be out together on 5 March was a birthday party for
a close relative of Mr Dwyer, his niece.
• The host, Mr Dwyer’s niece was a ’work friend’ of the Complainant
• The relationship between the Complainant and Ms Shinohara and Mr Palmer was one of friendship as
demonstrated in the Complainant’s statement and incident report, despite the reference to minimise the
friendship by referring to them as ’colleagues’ in submissions.
• The evidence demonstrates that the Complainant developed work friendships, which is not uncommon and
socialised accordingly. Each of ’context incidents’ and the Valley Allegations concerned the Complainant
socialising with co-workers in a private capacity and on their own time.
• The party was hosted off premises, and out of hours.
• The alleged assault forming part of the Valley Allegations did not occur at the party. The alleged assault is
further removed, to venues which required vehicular travel at a late hour and after a lapse of time following
the party.
• It is unexceptional that a proportion of the host’s friendships include fellow workers and while there were
attendees who worked at The Star, there were at least as many attendees who did not.
• The attraction of the event to the Complainant was so she could socialise with her friends.
[119] The Star makes the following submissions regarding the facts of this matter in the context of the case law:
• The events in the Valley Allegations were even further removed from the course of employment than the
facts in Keenan v Leighton Boral Amey Joint Venture (’Keenan’),51 where the broader test in s 106 of the
Commonwealth legislation did not extend the scope of work.
• Neither the Complainant nor Mr Dwyer had any reason connected with work to attend the event, or its
aftermath. They were not there ’because of, and for the purposes of’ their employment (in the language of
the joint judgment in South Pacific Resort Hotels Pty Ltd v Trainor (’Trainor’),52 nor was any part of the
Valley Allegations ’organised, authorised, proposed, or induced’ by The Star (in the language of Keenan).53
• They were not expected to attend the event by their employer; there was no connection with the
employment at all, other than that they knew each other from work, and that some other attendees were
also employees. But these attendees, according the Complainant’s evidence, were friends.
• With the exception of Lee v Smith (’Lee’),54 none of the authorities would entertain an extension of the
employer’s liability to the Valley Allegations. As noted the decision has been criticised, and the criticism is
well founded in principle. The Star submits it was wrongly decided.
• If it were necessary to distinguish Lee, the facts there demonstrate a chain of events starting from the
employees being at work and then directly transitioning to social activities immediately following work.
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• The connection in Lee did not involve employees coming together at a place away from the workplace, on
the weekend (not after work or a work shift), to celebrate a private matter, attended by family and friends.
Even if Lee were correctly decided, the cases are not analogous.
• In Chief Constable of Lincolnshire Police v Stubbs (’Stubbs’),55 the facts are distinguishable from this case
in that the Complainant attended an event to celebrate her friend’s birthday and even if workers were there,
they were there because they also had become her friends (and in Mr Dwyer’s case, he was a relative).
• There is no foundation in any of the cases for the idea that once people work together, they are forever
colleagues and not friends, and therefore forever remain within the scope of employment. The connection
occurs at the initiative of the employee; not the employer.
• The clear policy behind s 133 is an expectation that the employer should be responsible for a
contravention; and therefore must be in a position to influence or control conduct, and to take reasonable
steps to do so.
• The Valley Allegations are one of those events which occurred so far away from the workplace, in space
and in time, that the employer could not in any way influence what happened. If an employer can be held
liable on those facts, the employer might then be justified in managing that risk by dictating to employees
how, and with whom, employees spend their own time away from the workplace.
Consideration of whether the Valley Allegations occurred ’in the course of work’.
[120] The parties referred the Commission to a number of cases in which vicarious liability has been considered.
The Complainant acknowledges that many of the cases cited concerned are accommodation cases, however
contends that vicarious liability was not intended to be limited strictly to work-sanctioned functions or in cases where
accommodation had been provided by the employer.
[121] InTrainor, the Court considered s 106 of the Commonwealth legislation which refers to an employer being
liable for conduct ’in connection with the employment’. The Complainant refers to Kiefel J’s phrase in obiter that the
section refers to conduct "in some way related to or associated with the employment".56
[122] The language in s 133 of the AD Act is different to that in s 106 of the Commonwealth Act and the reference
to Kiefel J’s phrase in obiter was in regard to the broader meaning of the Commonwealth provision.
[123] The facts in Trainor are not analogous to this matter, with Trainor involving harassment in accommodation
occupied by co-workers for the purposes of their common employment. The context involving accommodation was
a critical fact in that decision, with the Court determining that the accommodation provided by the employer created
an opportunity in which the offending conduct could occur.
[124] When considering the language of s 133, the phrase "in some way related to or associated with the
employment" can be applied to the term "in the course of employment" such that it extends to cover scenarios
where the only connection to employment is the fact that the parties are both employees in the absence of some
further association.
[125] In Oaks Hotels & Resorts Ltd v Knauer,57and JKL Ltd v STK,58sexual harassment had occurred in the context
of accommodation.
[126] There is limited support amongst the authorities for the approach that conduct may be considered to have
occurred ’in the course of’ employment if the conduct would not have occurred ’but for’ the parties being employed
at the same time.
[127] Keenan determined that a social interaction immediately following an official Christmas function could not be
taken as organised, authorised, proposed, or induced by the employer. The Fair Work Commission (’FWC’)
considered that the employees were at the event following the work event voluntarily and had the option to go
home, thereby severing the nexus with work. The FWC rejected a ’but for’ test in considering whether something
occurred in connection with employment.59
[128] In A v K Ltd & Z (Anti-Discrimination),60 relevant factors were considered to include that the privately
organised social function that was not authorised by the employer and was held outside of the workplace. The
decision maker also rejected any application of a ’but for’ test.61
[129] In the matter of Nguyen v Ross,62 the Tribunal determined that conduct in a hotel room during a work
conference did not occur ’in the course of employment’. The decision maker considered that the nexus with the
parties’ employment was broken following a lengthy period of private after-hours socialising.
[130] The Complainant contends that this matter is analogous to Lee. As submitted by The Star, this decision
appears to adopt a ’but for’ test which was criticised in A v K Ltd & Z (Anti-Discrimination) and Keenan.
[131] The Complainant contends that the matter of Stubbs is analogous on the basis that the sexual harassment in
that matter did not involve a chance meeting between the parties (for example, at a supermarket), rather, the social
event involved a gathering of colleagues away from the workplace.
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[132] The circumstances of the social functions in Stubbs can be distinguished, with one of the social events in that
matter involving colleagues gathering immediately after work and the other for an organised leaving party. That is,
in my view, quite different to a 21st birthday party held in different premises with many family friends not connected
to the employer in attendance.
[133] The Complainant refers to a number of authorities in relation to employer liability in unfair dismissal matters
in support of vicarious liability in harassment matters. As outlined above the Complainant submits that the
disciplinary actions taken by The Star enhance the view that the sexual harassment perpetrated by Mr Dwyer
against the Complainant was work-related.
[134] I accept The Star’s submission that these two matters should not be conflated given the different tests
involved. Simply because there are work consequences of conduct does not mean that the employer is vicariously
liable for the conduct. In Sydney Trains v Bobrenitsky,63 the Full Bench referred to the matter of Hussein v Westpac
Banking Corporation (’Hussein’),64 which concerned the fraud of a bank employee on another bank in the
employee’s own time. In Hussein it was found that conduct may give rise to a valid reason for dismissal even if it
could never be described as occurring ’in the course of work’.
[135] It does not automatically flow that disciplinary action taken by the employer following unlawful conduct
establishes a work-related connection for the purposes of vicarious liability. There may be a lawful and valid reason
for disciplinary action or dismissal of an employee for conduct that was not undertaken in the course of work.
[136] I accept that The Star included the Valley Allegations in their investigation into the Pattern allegations as part
of their risk management obligations. It was an entirely reasonable course of action particularly given that Mr Dwyer
had already been the subject of substantiated allegations of sexual harassment. The investigation and termination
for all of the substantiated conduct does not demonstrate that the Valley Allegations occurred in the course of work.
[137] After considering all of the circumstances, I am not of the view that the unlawful conduct undertaken as part
of the Valley Allegations was done ’in the course of work’ for the following reasons:
• The social function was a 21st birthday part that was entirely unconnected to work;
• The social function took place outside of the work premises and outside of work hours;
• The attendees at the social function included family, friends and employees who were friends of the host;
• There was no requirement that any employees attend the social function;
• The employer did not know about the social function or authorise the function; and
• The only connection to the employer is the fact that the parties knew each other through that shared
employment.
[138] To find that the Valley Allegations occurred in the course of work would be to enlarge the scope of vicarious
liability to effectively make it an absolute provision. The limitation to conduct that occurred ’in the course of work’
requires some nexus with work beyond simply knowing someone from the same workplace.
[139] Following my finding that the Valley Allegations did not occur in the course of work, The Star is not
vicariously liable for the unlawful conduct of Mr Dwyer in relation to those allegations.
[140] The Star has conceded that the Pattern Allegations did occur in the course of work, however, contends that
reasonable steps were taken to prevent the conduct. This will be considered below.
The Star’s submissions regarding ’reasonable steps’
[141] The Star made the following submissions regarding the operation of s 133 relating to ’reasonable steps’
taken to prevent the contravention:
• The existence of a contravention does not speak to the adequacy of the steps which were taken, as s 133
necessarily assumes there has been a contravention.
• The policy of the defence is to hold employers liable for conduct in the course of work, but to excuse the
employer if, despite the employer’s reasonable efforts, an employee has still contravened the legislation.
• Citing Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (’Richardson’),65Chester v Detective Senior
Constable Jane Barnaby (No 2),66 and Webb v Queensland (’Webb’),67the authorities have recognised that
’reasonable steps’ do not mandate any particular steps that need to be taken; though certain steps have
been recognised typically as being relevant.
• In Webb the employer relied on training and testing on the Code of Conduct, publishing a harassment
policy, taking steps to identify the alleged harassment, inviting the complainant to make a formal complaint
and conducting an investigation.
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
• The Tribunal in Webb considered a range of authorities and concluded that the only deficiency in the
employer’s steps was a failure to intervene earlier, leading to further contraventions.68
• The assessment depends on what might reasonably have prevented the contravention. The section refers
to steps to prevent the worker contravening the legislation. The circumstances of the worker, and the
contravening conduct, are critical to that assessment, as the steps need to be adapted to that person and
their conduct.
• The assessment must look at what was done, and consider whether what was done was reasonable, to
prevent the later contravention.
[142] The Star made the following submissions regarding the ’reasonable steps’ taken by The Star to prevent
contravention of the AD Act:
• The evidence does not support the contention that the harassment escalated over time, and in any case,
The Star was not aware of the Pattern Allegations and cannot be criticised for any alleged protraction,
escalation, or seriousness;
• The Complainant’s submissions relating to the initial response by The Star that no action would be taken to
investigate the Valley Allegations are not material as reasonable steps must be taken to prevent a
contravention; not to address a complaint after an alleged contravention has occurred.69 There was no
further alleged contravention after the complaint was made; and
• In any case the initial decision not to investigate the complaint, due to the incident occurring other than in
the course of work, was reasonable and open. That the decision was reversed does not mean the initial
view was not reasonable; only that a different approach was taken from a risk management perspective.
[143] The Star made the following submissions in response to the Complainant’s contentions regarding the quality
of the training provided:
• The training is, on its face, more fulsome than any other training offered, and makes the points clearly
about what is and is not acceptable;
• The fact that the events occurred so long before the Complainant’s allegations is now being referenced to
distance the ’step’ from the QIRC’s assessment. The Star would accept that what happened after 2016,
and before 2020/21, is relevant to reasonable steps. But the Complainant put training in issue, by pursuing
a line of questioning at trial in relation to it;
• All of these matters are being submitted against a backdrop where the Complainant never made a
complaint about Mr Dwyer before March 2021. One might accept greater scrutiny and forensic assessment
of The Star’s approach had it been possessed of information sufficient to enable it to act.
[144] The Star made the following submissions regarding positive steps taken by them:
• The Star published and implemented the following policies — Code of Conduct; Misconduct and Discipline
Policy; Grievance Policy; and Equal Employment Opportunity Policy.
• The Equal Employment Opportunity Policy deals expressly with sexual harassment, and addresses:
a) the statutory sources prohibiting sexual harassment;
b) a detailed definition, an explanation, and examples, of sexual harassment;
c) that harassment can occur in the workplace, or in connection with work;
d) that harassment is unlawful;
e) that harassment is not tolerated under any circumstances;
f) that an employee is entitled to complain about harassment, and sets out a hierarchy of steps through
which a complaint might be advanced (cross referencing the Grievance Policy);
g) that if a complaint is made:
i) action will be taken to ensure that it stops;
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
ii) a complaint will be taken seriously;
iii) a complainant will be protected against victimisation;
h) that an employee may opt to report sexual harassment externally;
i) that the employer can be held liable for harassment by another;
j) that an observer of harassment should act positively, and report the conduct themselves; and
k) support options for a person who feels distressed about a situation.
• The Grievance Policy deals with the process when a grievance is raised, and includes 4 internal steps
before referring to the right to pursue an external complaint.
• The Misconduct Policy deals with disciplinary procedures and refers expressly to serious misconduct as
including breaches of the Equal Employment Opportunity Policy, including inappropriate behaviour and
sexual harassment.
• Under standard terms of employment, employees agree to comply with policies. Such provision appeared
in Mr Dwyer’s contract of 4 July 2013 and the Complainant’s contracts of 19 December 2019 and 27 June
2022.
• Employees are required to participate in training modules, including:
a) Code of Conduct at The Star Entertainment Group; and
b) Do the Right Thing.
c) Code of Conduct Training which includes a range of conduct expectations and deals specifically with
sexual harassment.
d) Do the Right Thing is more expansive, and deals extensively with the subject matter of sexual
harassment.
e) Training is mandatory and was completed every two years.
• Training records confirm that:
a) Mr Dwyer completed the Do the Right Thing and Code of Conduct training in May 2017 and May 2019.
b) The Complainant completed the Do the Right Thing and Code of Conduct training in January 2018,
January 2020 and February 2022.
• These steps meet even the onerous expectations set out in Richardson.70
[145] In response to the Complainant’s contentions regarding the form of training modules and time spent by Mr
Dwyer on training, The Star made the following submissions:
• The modules of the type used by The Star, involving PowerPoint information with quiz testing, are typical;
• There is a wide range of topics which are covered by workplace training, eg OHS, Bullying, Diversity and
Inclusion, Information Technology Usage, Modern Slavery, Whistleblowing and so on;
• The intent of training is not to qualify the employee as a specialist on the topic. The objective is to raise
awareness, and the modules do not necessarily change unless the underlying principles change. Training
can never capture all information relevant to the topic; it can only raise awareness about the general
principles, to ensure employees recognise and can react to a scenario so covered;
• Mr Dwyer confirmed under cross examination that he had worked for The Star for a long time (26 years),
the content was familiar and he considered the content relevant to this particular topic of sexual
harassment, as commonsense;
• Mr Dwyer gave clear evidence when he said he was in no doubt that the conduct alleged would not have
been permissible. There was never any evidence, nor even a proposition put to Mr Dwyer, that he might
not have understood the appropriate standard;
• A contention that more comprehensive training of a different type, or frequency, would have changed
anything in this case, is without foundation;
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
• The Complainant’s evidence actually supports a contrary position, when she alleged that Mr Dwyer said to
her during the Valley Allegation that, because ’they were not at work, he could do as he liked’;
• Contrary to the Complainant’s criticism in reference to the training not identifying the source of the relevant
legal standard, The Star’s Equal Employment Opportunity Policy did in fact do this;
• The only conclusion, in the context of Mr Dwyer’s employment history, his evidence about his
understanding of the rules, and the Complainant’s own evidence, is that there was nothing The Star could
have done, which would have changed a thing between those parties;
• This is not a case where the alleged contravener claims they did not know the rules; or knew the rules but
did not appreciate the gravity of the conduct. Mr Dwyer denies the events occurred; not that they did occur,
but in his mind were not serious;
• Mr Dwyer was on a final warning. The next alleged contravention led to termination; and
• The Complainant raised two complaints in total. The first regarding an allegation of drink spiking outside of
the workplace was properly referred to the police. The second, in March 2021, led to Mr Dwyer’s
employment being terminated.
Previous warning and workplace culture
[146] In 2016 a casual Games Dealer, Ms Halle Burstow, made a complaint alleging sexual harassment by Mr
Dwyer and two other employees at The Star. This complaint was the subject of an Investigation Report
commissioned by The Star.71
[147] Mr Dwyer was alleged to have said words to the effect that Ms Burstow had a weak spin and "clearly doesn’t
masturbate enough" and had made a ball spin hand gesture whilst training Ms Burstow in roulette.
[148] Mr Dwyer initially stated to the workplace investigator in the 2016 matter that he could not recall making the
comment, however in evidence stated that he did not make the comment and that he had intended his initial
response to be taken as a denial.72
[149] Ms Burstow made specific complaints about three employees which The Star arranged to be investigated. As
a result of adverse findings following the investigation, the employment of one of the subject employees was
terminated, and Mr Dwyer was issued with a final warning.
[150] The investigator’s report cited an allegation from Ms Burstow that the "the entire culture of the workplace at
the casino revolves around both sexual innuendo and blatant sexual discussion".73
[151] The investigator noted in the report that they had not drawn any conclusions or made any findings in relation
to the nature of the workplace culture because it was outside the terms of reference and beyond the scope of the
report.
[152] The only evidence of the workplace culture was the investigator’s reference to a general assertion made by
Ms Burstow as outlined at [150].
[153] If it were the intention of the Complainant to contend that further steps were required given the presence of a
workplace culture problem, additional evidence should have been presented to demonstrate that such a problem
went beyond the allegations subject of the investigation. Accordingly, I decline to make a finding that such a
problem exists at The Star given the lack of evidence to substantiate such a proposition.
[154] I accept the submission that an adverse culture is easily asserted, however, such a serious allegation must
be supported by evidence. There is no evidence that Mr Dwyer engaged in the unlawful conduct because of cultural
tolerance of such behaviour by The Star.
Consideration of ’reasonable steps’
[155] The Star contends that the Complainant’s evidence supports a position that no further training would have
prevented Mr Dwyer’s conduct.
[156] The Complainant gave evidence that Mr Dwyer said to her during the Valley Allegations that he could do as
he liked because they were not at work. Mr Dwyer denies that this conversation took place, however I accept the
evidence of the Complainant for the reasons outlined above.
[157] I consider this evidence to indicate that Mr Dwyer understood that he could not physically assault the
Complainant at work, not however that the conduct involved in the Pattern Allegations could not occur at work.
[158] The Complainant contends that the training provided to Mr Dwyer does not constitute ’reasonable steps’ for
the purpose of the defence under the Act.
[159] In Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd,74 the court held that an employer ought not proceed on
the basis that employees would not take their responsibilities in the online training course seriously, in the absence
of any evidence to the contrary.
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[160] Despite concerns regarding the limited time in which the training was completed, I am not persuaded that the
content of the training was inadequate. Training is required to ensure that employees understand their obligations
and the seriousness of such conduct. The training received by Mr Dwyer made it clear that sexual harassment is
unlawful and that the employer could be vicariously liable, satisfying the concerns raised in Richardson.
[161] Whilst I accept that the content of the online training was appropriate, I do not however consider the manner
in which employees undertook the online training to be reasonable.
[162] Mr Dwyer gave the following evidence during cross-examination:75
Did — do you recall, at all, skipping through the material? --- I — I probably would’ve, yes. I mean, as managers, we just
had to do it during the course of our — our job. I mean, we still had to run the pit. Sometimes you ’re busy and you ’re - you
’re under the pump and just had to do this, so the majority of managers would do this. Majority of staff would do this, to be
honest with you. If ---
So when you say---? --- you — if you’d been working there — if you’d been working there for that long, it — it’s the same
stuff and - and people just skip through it, yes.
So when you say a majority of people would do this, you mean a majority of staff would skip through the material? ---
Probably. I mean, I can’t speak for them, obviously ---
No, of course? but - but probably.
…
And it’s the case that you didn ’t need to read the course material because you could always change your answers if it was
wrong? — That is correct.
Thank you? See, back in the day, the Star used to — back in the day, before all this computer stuff happens — ’cause I’ve
been there for 26 years. The — a group of people would be tapped off, gone to a — an office downstairs, conduct a — I
think Safety and Security would conduct and, we’d all do — and then we’d all go back. But this new system, supposed to be
more efficient, it’s — it’s — yeah, its not, and — and — and skipping happens. And the Star are very keen on saving labour
costs, so this is all about getting it done quicker and cheaper than what it — used to happen 20 years ago, in my opinion.
[163] I am not persuaded that the provision of the online training modules can be considered reasonable steps in
circumstances where the employee is completing the online training at the same time as conducting work duties.
[164] Mr Dwyer’s description of the manner in which the online training was completed reflects a lack of
engagement with genuine training. Mr Dwyer described a previous process in which employees were removed from
their work area and brought to another area to complete training, and contrasted this with the current online training
for which no work time was allocated for completion. Genuine training cannot reasonably occur when employees
are completing the training online whilst simultaneously attending to their duties.
[165] This can be distinguished from the consideration in Richardson, where there was no evidence that
employees were completing training whilst multi-tasking with their other work.
[166] The Star refers to Mr Dwyer’s evidence that he understood the module content and that it was
’commonsense’ to indicate that further training would not have prevented his unlawful conduct. I am not persuaded
by the submission. There is a difference between having a ’commonsense’ understanding and genuinely engaging
with the content. In my view, the unlawful conduct could have been prevented if Mr Dwyer had conducted his
training away from his work duties such that he could actually focus on the content of the training.
[167] ’Reasonable steps’ must involve practical and appropriate measures within the context of the particular
workplace, and I accept The Star’s submission that it does not require the employee to be trained as a subject
matter expert. However, the completion of online training conducted concurrently whilst completing work duties is
below basic training expectations to the extent that it cannot be considered reasonable.
[168] Consideration of whether the provision of online training modules constitutes ’reasonable steps’ in this matter
must also be considered in the context in which the employer had determined that Mr Dwyer had previously
engaged in sexual harassment and had received a final warning.
[169] The fact that Mr Dwyer had been found by The Star to have previously engaged in sexual harassment
against a Games Dealer and was in receipt of a final warning is a significant factor in my determination that
reasonable steps were not taken to prevent his conduct against the Complainant.
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[170] The Star was on notice that Mr Dwyer had breached their sexual harassment policies and, in these
circumstances, steps should have been taken to ensure that he did not repeat this conduct. This is particularly so
where Mr Dwyer had not demonstrated insight or remorse regarding his previous conduct.
[171] The Star submits that there was nothing it could have done to prevent the unlawful conduct as Mr Dwyer’s
evidence confirmed that he knew that the conduct was not permissible. This submission is unpersuasive. If it were
simply a question of knowledge there would be no requirement for ongoing training. Regular raining is required to
ensure that employees have their understanding of the requirements refreshed on a consistent basis.
[172] The Star conducted specific sexual harassment training in 2016 following the investigation, however there is
no evidence that any other measures were taken to address the heightened risk of having Mr Dwyer in the
workplace. Although the completion of Code of Conduct and Do the Right Thing training every two years may have
been appropriate for most employees, one would have thought that any employees who had been found to have
breached particular policies would reasonably be expected to complete additional training.
[173] In my view, reasonable steps for someone in Mr Dwyer’s position would have involved additional training of
some kind. For example, the completion of annual training rather than the standard biennial training would not have
been an onerous or unreasonable process for The Star to administer, but would have served as a reminder of Mr
Dwyer’s obligations to comply with the sexual harassment policies. I consider it likely that additional training
reminding Mr Dwyer of the consequences of engaging in sexually harassing conduct would have prevented his
behaviour. An annual reminder of the precarious nature of his employment given his final warning would likely have
had a sobering effect on someone with a 23-year career with the casino.
[174] I accept The Star’s submission that it would not have been reasonable to terminate Mr Dwyer’s employment
on the basis of the 2016 incident alone. However, once The Star substantiated the conduct and gave him a final
warning, it was incumbent on them to ensure that measures were put in place to prevent a repeat of the sexually
harassing conduct.
[175] The purpose underlying s 133 is "to promote equality of opportunity for everyone by making a person liable
for certain acts of the person’s workers or agents’.76 The Complainant did not have equality of opportunity to enjoy a
safe workplace due to the failure of The Star to take reasonable steps to prevent the actions of Mr Dwyer.
[176] Accordingly, I find The Star did not take reasonable steps to prevent Mr Dwyer’s contraventions and is
vicariously liable for the contraventions of the Act by Mr Dwyer relating to the Pattern Allegations.
Remedy
[177] The Complainant seeks compensation in the following amounts for the loss or damage caused by the
contravention of the AD Act:
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
Head of Damages Amount Notes on Calculation
General Damages & Aggravated Damages $130,000
Interest on General Damages & Aggravated Damages From 6 March 2021, calculated at an interest rate of 2% per
annum
Past Economic Loss $27,507
Interest on Past Financial Loss Interest on $10,000 from 6 March 2021, calculated at an
interest rate of 3.5% per annum
Past superannuation (10%) $2,750.70
Interest on Past Superannuation Benefits Interest calculated at 3.5% per annum from 6 March 2021
Future Economic Loss $106,767.20
Future Superannuation (12%) $11,983.26
Past Special Damages $4,773.35
Interest on Past Special Damages Interest at 3.5% per annum from 6 March 2021
Future Special Damages $15,000.
TOTAL $298,781.51 Plus interest
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
[178] Section 209 of the AD Act provides that the following orders may be made:
209 Orders the tribunal may make if complaint is proven
(1) If the tribunal decides that the respondent contravened the Act, the tribunal may make 1 or more of the
following orders —
(a) an order requiring the respondent not to commit a further contravention of the Act against the
complainant or another person specified in the order;
(b) an order requiring the respondent to pay to the complainant or another person, within a specified period,
an amount the tribunal considers appropriate as compensation for loss or damage caused by the
contravention;
(c) an order requiring the respondent to do specified things to redress loss or damage suffered by the
complainant and another person because of the contravention;
(d) an order requiring the respondent to make a private apology or retraction;
(e) an order requiring the respondent to make a public apology or retraction by publishing the apology or
retraction in the way, and in the form, stated in the order;
(f) an order requiring the respondent to implement programs to eliminate unlawful discrimination;
(g) an order requiring a party to pay interest on an amount of compensation;
(h) an order declaring void all or part of an agreement made in connection with a contravention of this Act,
either from the time the agreement was made or subsequently.
(2) An order may be made under subsection (1)(b) in favour of a person on whose behalf a representative
complaint was made, without the necessity for the person to make an individual complaint, if on the evidence
before it the tribunal is able to assess the loss or damage of the person.
(3) If, in respect of a representative complaint —
(a) the tribunal decides that the respondent contravened the Act; but
(b) the tribunal is unable, on the evidence before it at the hearing of the representative complaint, to assess
the loss or damage of a person on whose behalf the complaint was made;
the person may subsequently make a request for the tribunal to assess the person’s loss or damage.
(4) In this section, the specified things a respondent may be required to do, include, but are not limited to —
(a) employing, reinstating or re-employing a person; or
(b) promoting a person; or
(c) moving a person to a specified position within a specified time.
(5) In this section —
damage, in relation to a person, includes the offence, embarrassment, humiliation, and
intimidation suffered by the person.
[179] In JF, Deputy President Hartigan summarised the approach adopted by the Commission in applying s
209(1)(b):77
In considering the application of s 209(1)(b) of the AD Act, the Commission has previously adopted a similar approach to
that taken to the application of s 46PO(4)(d) of the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth).
In adopting such an approach, the Commission has summarised the following principles relevant to the consideration of s
209(1)(b) of the AD Act as follows:
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Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
[112] First, the power provided by s 209(1)(b) of the AD Act, to order compensation for loss and damage caused by
the contravening conduct of a respondent, is a statutory power which is conferred in the context of the legislative
scheme dealing with unlawful discrimination. Thus, the Commission, in assessing an amount of loss or damage
for the purpose of making an order under s 209(1)(b) of the AD Act, is attributing legal responsibility, namely,
blame, in order to give effect to a statute with a discernible purpose; and that purpose provides a guide to the
requirements of justice and equity in the case where the requirements are determined by the judge’s concept of
principle and of the statutory purpose.
[113] Secondly, unlawful discrimination is proscribed in several different fields of activity which give rise to the need
for different kinds of remedies. Unlawful discrimination may occur in a setting which aligns its consequences
closely with the consequences of common law causes of action such as breach of contract, or it may occur in a
setting which aligns its consequences with common law causes of action such as intentional torts. In other
circumstances the statutory cause of action for unlawful discrimination has no close relative in the common law
which is why it is important to recall that it is the words of the statute which will provide the criterion for such an
order, not common law principles.
[114] In Richardson v Oracle Corporation Australia Pty Ltd (’Oracle’), which was a case involving sexual harassment
under the Sex Discrimination Act 1984, Kenny J stated:
27. Section 46PO(4)(d) of the AHRC Act supplies the governing criterion for the assessment of the damages to be
awarded under this provision. That is, s 46PO(4)(d) contemplates that these damages will be ’by way of
compensation’ (emphasis added). In giving content to the concept of compensatory damages in this context,
the authorities establish that the court may be guided, at the assessment stage, by the general principles
governing the assessment of damages in tort: see Hall v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 217 (Hall v A
& A Sheiban) at 238–239 (Lockhart J), 256-257 (Wilcox J); and 281 (French J) and Qantas Airways Ltd v
Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537 (Qantas Airways Ltd v Gama) at [94] (French and Jacobson JJ). In the latter
case, French and Jacobson JJ stated (at [94]) in respect of s 46PO(4) (in its current form):
The damages which can be awarded under s 46PO(4) ... are damages "by way of
compensation for any loss or damage suffered because of the conduct of the respondent".
Such damages are entirely compensatory. In many cases, as in damages awarded under s 82
of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) the appropriate measure will be analogous to the
tortious. That may not be in every case. Ultimately, it is the words of the statute that set the
criterion for any award.
[115] In Watts v Australian Postal Corporation (’Watts’), a case concerning a contravention of the Disability
Discrimination Act 1992 where compensation was sought under section 46PO(4) of the AHRCA, Mortimer J
relevantly stated:
281.The provision grants plenary power to the Court to make orders "as it thinks fit". In particular, s 4(d) provides
the Court with a "wide discretion as to the amount of compensation the Court may order for loss or damage
suffered because of unlawful discrimination": Ewin v Vergara (No 3) [2013] FCA 1311 at [601] per Bromberg
J. The Court’s exercise of that discretion is to be governed by the text of the relevant statute: Qantas Airways
Ltd v Gama (2008) 167 FCR 537 at [94] per French and Jacobson JJ The principles relevant to the
assessment of damages in tort may be of assistance (see Hall v A & A Sheiban Pty Ltd (1989) 20 FCR 217 at
239 per Lockhart J, at 281 per French J), but only to the extent that they do not conflict with the words of the
statute: Ewin [2013] FCA 1311 at [604] per Bromberg J.
[116] Thirdly, consideration must be given to the phrase used in s 209(1)(b) of the AD Act, namely, compensation
for loss or damage ’… caused by the contravention.’ In Watts, Mortimer J stated of s 46PO(4)(d) of the AHRCA:
282.An order for compensation may be made for "any loss or damage suffered because of the conduct of the
respondent". Phrases such as "by reason of", "because of" and "by virtue of" require a "practical application
of causation principles": Macabenta v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural Affairs (1998) 90 FCR 202 at
213. A phrase like "because of" "implies a relationship of cause and effect" between the unlawful conduct of
the respondent and the damage incurred by the applicant: see Human Rights & Equal Opportunity
Commission v Mount Isa Mines Ltd (1993) 46 FCR 301 at 321 per Lockhart J; Ewin at [605].
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[117] The statutory phrase ’… caused by’ connotes a direct or proximate relationship of cause and effect. Thus,
there is no reason the construction given in Watts to the phrase ’… because of’ in s 46PO(4)(d) of the AHRCA
should not be given to the phrase ’…caused by’ in s 209(1)(b) of the AD Act. In my view, given the similar
statutory text, like s 46PO(4)(d) of the AHRCA, s 209(1)(b) of the AD Act is concerned with the relationship of
cause and effect.
[118] Further where the Commission is considering a statutory power to award damages, the statutory objects and
purposes may inform the proper approach to causation in a particular case.
[119] Fourthly, two other matters seem clear about the discretion to award compensation by way of general
damages. They are:
• it is appropriate to obtain assistance from awards of damages in other sexual harassment cases with similar
facts; and
• general damages are not assessed by performing arithmetical adjustments to prior determinations.
[120] Fifthly, aggravated damages may form part of an order for compensation under s 209(1)(b) of the AD Act.
Aggravated damages compensate the plaintiff where the harm done to them by a wrongful act was aggravated by
the manner in which the act was done. The character of the conduct necessary has been described as lacking
bona fides, or being improper or unjustifiable. The aggravation may come from subsequent conduct to the same
effect as the contravening conduct, such as the way a respondent conducted proceedings brought against them.
It has been accepted that the statutory objects are relevant to that aspect of damages which concerns causation and also
relevant to the assessment of damages more generally.
As noted at the outset, one of the statutory objects of the AD Act is to promote equality of opportunity for everyone by
protecting them from sexual harassment. One of the ways the AD Act achieves this purpose is by prohibiting sexual
harassment.
This statutory object may be used as a guide in applying the principles with respect to the assessment of damages.
[citations omitted]
General Damages
[180] The Complainant seeks damages for pain, suffering, loss of enjoyment of life, and the offence,
embarrassment, humiliation and intimidation compensable in general damages.
[181] As noted above, an order for compensation may be made for loss or damage ’caused by the contravention’.78
The difficulty in assessing damages in this matter is determining the extent to which the Complainant’s conditions
were caused by the unlawful conduct rather the pre-existing stressors and determining the proportion for which The
Star is vicariously liable.
Pre-existing medical history
[182] The Complainant has a significant medical history pre-dating the events in these proceedings. In the medical
evidence the practitioners referred to the Complainant’s medical condition as an ’exacerbation’ of pre-existing
circumstances due to this history.
[183] The letter by Dr Lauren Wilson states that the Complainant was first treated for anxiety and depression on 28
May 2018, and at that time had previously been treated for depression by another doctor.79
[184] Dr Wilson stated that the Complainant was periodically reviewed for her mental health where she alluded to
several stressors but did not disclose any specific details. The Complainant first disclosed work stressors on 24
March 2021 and on 31 March 2021 disclosing that her manager was ’speaking to her inappropriately’.80
[185] The Star made submissions regarding a number of matters identified in the Complainant’s history that are
relevant to an assessment of damages.81 These matters are significant, however, the seriousness of the pre-
existing stressors are only relevant to the extent to which they can be said to have caused the Complainant’s
conditions.
[186] I accept The Stars submission that not all of the Complainant’s issues arose out of her interactions with Mr
Dwyer, and he should not be held accountable for unrelated factors which contributed to her entire medical profile.
[187] Dr Wilson noted in her letter the following:82
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It is my opinion that [the Complainant] has suffered significant emotional and psychological pain as a result of her mental
health. [The Complainant] has several stressors and previous traumatic incidents which contribute to her Post Traumatic
Stress disorder, and this has been significantly exacerbated by her work related stressors.
[188] Dr Kiran Sangha outlined the following opinion:83
[The Complainant’s] presentation can be best understood in the context of Complex PTSD in that [she] has experienced
several significant traumatic experiences throughout her childhood, adolescence and adulthood, and her recent response to
the experience of sexual harassment in the workplace and sexual assault appears to be an exacerbation of Complex PTSD
symptoms, anxiety and depression. Despite [the Complainant’s] trauma history, it appears the recent incidences did
significantly exacerbate [the Complainant’s] symptoms of Complex PTSD, anxiety and depression and caused her
significant emotional distress that impacted on her work, study and relationships.
…
whilst the stress of the incident impacted on [the Complainant’s] ability to enjoy her usual activities, symptoms of PTSD in
relation to traumatic experiences previous to the incident also impacted significantly on her enjoyment of life.
[189] By the time the reports by Dr Barkla, Dr Wilson and Dr Sangha were compiled, the Complainant was
suffering symptoms related her medical history pre-dating Mr Dwyer’s unlawful conduct, symptoms resulting from
Mr Dwyer’s unlawful conduct, and symptoms resulting from other matters post-dating this conduct.
[190] I am satisfied that medical evidence indicates that the Complainant had significant preexisting mental health
issues and that the unlawful conduct in the workplace caused an exacerbation of those issues.
Contribution of Pattern Allegations
[191] The evidence demonstrates that it was both the conduct involved in the Pattern Allegations and the Valley
Allegations which led to the various consequences cited for the Complainant.84
[192] Dr Wilson’s report states that the Complainant was seen to have a significant decline in her mood on 4
December 2020 due to both work and personal stressors. Dr Wilson states:85
She was seen regularly after this time and in my opinion this was when her psychological symptoms were most severe.At
the time her DASS 21 scores (for measuring psychological distress) administered by her psychologist fell within the
"extremely severe’ range for anxiety and depression and "severe" range for stress. Specifically she was suffering from
excessive rumination and worry, lack of enjoyment of any activities and insomnia.
[193] The fact that Dr Wilson considered that the psychological symptoms were most severe in December 2020,
some 3 months prior to the Valley Allegations, indicates that the Pattern Allegations contributed significantly to the
Complainant’s symptoms.
[194] The Complainant’s treating clinical psychologist, Dr Sangha, provided a report on 30 July 2023, which
detailed her ongoing treatment of the Complainant since May 2021.
[195] Dr Sangha outlined the following in her report:86
Based on [the Complainant’s] reports, this behaviour was ongoing since approximately September 2020 until the 8th of
March 2021 when JD sexually assaulted her during a night out. The continuous sexual harassment at work appears to have
triggered an exacerbation of anxiety symptoms for [the Complainant] whilst at work. This included physical symptoms of
anxiety such as heart palpitations, shortness of breath, and trembling. [The Complainant] reported feeling highly anxious at
work at times, and also experienced cognitive symptoms of anxiety such as excessive rumination, intrusive thoughts, and
difficulties with attention and concentration.
[196] The assessment and subsequent report by Dr Joanne Barkla, Psychiatrist, of 18 July 2023 diagnosed the
Complainant with an exacerbation of Major Depressive Disorder and the onset of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder.87
[197] Dr Barkla outlined the following in her report that the Complainant has experienced, "obvious insomnia and
depressed mood, anxiety, impairment of concentration, and self-harming behaviour as a consequence of the
alleged incidents’. Further, that the Complainant has:88
…ongoing impairment in her ability to enjoy life. She has disengaged from her recreational interests. She is not engaging in
any social activities at all, and this is not exclusively because she has moved. Prior to her moving she felt she had lost her
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friendships, and this was directly related to the events that occurred within the workplace, Because of her lowered mood
she is less likely to engage in activities that would usually bring her pleasure.
[198] Whilst Mr Dwyer’s conduct in the Valley Allegations may have prompted the complaint, the medical evidence
indicates that the continuous sexual harassment by Mr Dwyer at work led to the exacerbation of her symptoms
before the ’final straw’ occurring in the form of the Valley Allegations.
[199] Based upon the evidence of Dr Wilson, Dr Sangha, and Dr Bakla, I am of the view that the Pattern
Allegations contributed only marginally less than the Valley Allegations for the Complainant’s loss and feelings of
offence, embarrassment, humiliation, and intimidation.
[200] The medical evidence indicates that although the Complainant will require ongoing lifelong management of
her PTSD symptoms, her symptoms are improving. Dr Sangha noted that there had been a clinically significant
reduction in the Complainant’s depression and anxiety scores since the initial assessment on 25 May 2021.89
[201] Notwithstanding this improvement. Dr Sangha also noted that the Complainant remains vulnerable to an
exacerbation of anxiety and PTSD symptoms in response to cues that remind her of any of her past trauma.90
[202] Dr Sangha made the following observations in his report:91
The Complainant has suffered significant psychological and emotional distress in response to the workplace-related
incidences.
In addition to the emotional distress associated with the sexual harassment and sexual assault perpetrated by Mr Dwyer,
the Complainant has also experienced significant psychological and emotional distress in response to the resurfacing of
thoughts, memories and feelings associated with past trauma triggered by the harassment and assault by Mr Dwyer; and
There have been many occasions in the past when the Complainant has had significant difficulties with her daily
occupational functioning due to the severity of her emotional distress.
[203] This Complainant gave the following evidence regarding the impact that the offending conduct had on her
enjoyment of life:92
I feel like I can’t socialise with people anymore. I have really high social anxiety, and so I struggle to go and interact with
these people, and I don’t feel like I — I’m in a good enough position to be able to want to do anything/or myself.
... I don ’t feel like doing them [social activities] will make me happy anymore.
[204] I am satisfied that the effect of the unlawful conduct on the Complainant was significant, notwithstanding the
contribution of her previous medical history to her symptoms. The unlawful conduct caused the Complainant to
disengage from her recreational interests and has experienced insomnia, depressed mood, anxiety, and impairment
of concentration.93
[205] The Complainant was entitled to attend her workplace without being sexually harassed by a senior colleague.
Mr Dwyer’s conduct caused the Complainant hurt, humiliation and offence.
[206] The conduct has adversely impacted the Complainant’s relationship with family members and friends and
has exacerbated her symptoms of depression and anxiety.
[207] The Star submits that there are a number of other matters that the Complainant experienced following March
2021 that have contributed to her medical symptoms. Whilst these matters are noted in the medical evidence, the
opinions of Dr Wilson, Dr Sangha and Dr Barkla do not indicate that these other matters have caused the
Complainant’s current mental health condition. As the medical witnesses were not called for cross-examination, the
contribution of these other matters to the Complainant’s current mental health condition was not put to them.
[208] I am satisfied that the unlawful conduct caused the Complainant to suffer loss and damage.
[209] Although it is somewhat artificial to divide the award of general damages between the loss and damage
caused by the two types of allegations, it is necessary in circumstances where I have made a finding that The Star
is vicariously liable for the loss and damage associated with the Pattern Allegations but not the Valley Allegations.
[210] The unlawful conduct that gave rise to the Pattern Allegations resulted in significant mental health symptoms,
as outlined in the general practitioner medical notes, however, the Complainant was able to continue working in the
same environment despite the increased symptoms outlined in the medical evidence.
[211] The unlawful conduct that gave rise to the Valley Allegations resulted in the Complainant making a formal
complaint to the police and The Star, changing working shift times and seeking treatment with a psychologist. This
conduct caused a significant exacerbation of the Complainant’s mental health symptoms.
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[212] Accordingly, I consider that 40% of the Complainant’s loss and damage is attributable to the Pattern
Allegations with the remaining 60% attributable to the Valley Allegations.
[213] I have had regard to the decisions in Richardson, STU v JKL (Qld) Pty Ltd,94Green v Queensland, Brooker
and Keating (’Green’),95 Neil v Lee,96 and Golding v Sippel and The Laundry Chute Pty Ltd,97 as to the range of
general damages in matters involving sexual harassment.
[214] I consider that the appropriate award of compensation for general damages in this matter is $90,000 plus
interest calculated at 2%98 from 6 March 2021 of $8,826.28 totalling an amount of $98,826.28. Mr Dwyer and The
Star are jointly and severally liable for $39,530.51 (for compensation for loss and damage relating to the Pattern
Allegations) and Mr Dwyer liable for $59,295.76 (for compensation for loss and damage relating to the Valley
Allegations).
Aggravated Damages
[215] The Complainant seeks aggravated damages as additional compensation for injured feelings where her
sense of injury has resulted from the wrongful physical act and the manner in which Mr Dwyer perpetrated the Act.
[216] The following principles relating to aggravated damages were considered in Wotton v Queensland (No 5):99
Aggravated damages were described by Lord Diplock in Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 at 1124 (citing
with approval the description given by Lord Devlin in Rookes v Barnard [1964] AC 1129 ) as "[a]dditional compensation
for the injured feelings of the plaintiff where his sense of injury resulting from the wrongful physical act is justifiably
heightened by the manner in which or the motive for which the defendant did it." That formulation was applied with approval
by Clarke JA in the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Spautz v Butterworth [1996] NSWSC 614; 41 NSWLR 1 at 15–18,
although it should be noted that the High Court has acknowledged criticism of Rookes v Barnard on other issues, notably
that case’s approach to exemplary damages: see Gray v Motor Accident Commission [1998] HCA 70; 196 CLR 1 at [18]–
[19] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ) and the authorities there cited, especially Uren v John Fairfax & Sons
Pty Ltd [1966] HCA 40; 117 CLR 118.
Another description of the function of aggravated damages was given by Windeyer J in Uren at 149, where his Honour said
that aggravated damages "compensate the plaintiff where the harm done to him by a wrongful act was aggravated by the
manner in which the act was done". This passage was cited with apparent approval in Gray v Motor Accident Commission
at [6] (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ). The plurality opinion in Gray emphasises that exemplary damages
are punitive, by finding that once a person has been convicted and sentenced for conduct she or he has been punished and
exemplary damages for substantially the same conduct are not available: at [40]. The character of the conduct necessary
for an award of aggravated damages was described by the High Court in Triggell v Pheeney [1951] HCA 23; 82 CLR 497
at 514 as lacking bona fides, or being improper or unjustifiable.
[217] The evidence indicates that the Complainant had requested that Mr Dwyer cease his conduct during the
night of the Valley Allegations and that during the time of the assault, Mr Dwyer ignored this request by stating, "I
am not at work … I can do what I want".
[218] The comments made by Mr Dwyer when he sexually assaulted the Complainant demeaned her by
suggesting that he had the power to act unlawfully toward her simply because they were not at work. This was an
aggravating act done in the knowledge that it was not appropriate behaviour.
[219] The fact that The Star initially informed the Complainant that the Valley Allegations would not be investigated
before changing this position and ultimately investigating all of the allegations is not in my view aggravating
conduct.
[220] I find that an amount of $3,000 should be paid by Mr Dwyer for aggravated damages. Interest calculated at
2%100 from 6 March 2021 is ordered in the amount of $294.21 with a total of $3,294.21.
Economic loss
[221] The Complainant makes a global claim for past economic loss of $27,507 as a consequence of delayed
graduation and a reduction in shifts and opportunities.
[222] The Complainant submits that she was expected to graduate at the end of December 2023 and desired to
commence work as a full-time software developer.
[223] The Complainant contends that as a result of the sexual harassment and her psychiatric symptoms, her
education was significantly disrupted, and her expected graduation date is now the end of 2026.
[224] The Complainant’s claim for past economic loss as a result of the delay in her education is on the basis of
her anticipated earnings as a graduate full-time software developer by reference to the ordinary salary from
December 2023 to July 2024.
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[225] I consider this to be a speculative claim. The Complainant’s academic history was not consistent, and the
number of subjects undertaken varied across semesters.101 Whilst the evidence indicates that the unlawful conduct
impacted on the Complainant’s studies, I am not persuaded that the Complainant would have graduated in
December 2023 had it not been for Mr Dwyer’s conduct due to the uneven pattern of studies and significant work
hours.
[226] The Complainant additionally claims for past economic loss as a result of a reduction in shifts and
opportunities. The Complainant submits that following the assault in March 2021, her shifts were reduced to ensure
that she did not have to interact with Mr Dwyer. The Complainant gave evidence that when The Star moved her to
the day shift, she lost income as she was not receiving penalty rates for between two and three weeks.102 There is
no evidence as to the monetary value of this loss. In circumstances where payslips would presumably demonstrate
the change in income over this period, it is unclear why such evidence was not provided. In the absence of any
evidence of the change in income over the two or three-week period, I am unable to make an order to compensate
for this loss.
[227] The Complainant submits that she was eager to pursue further responsibilities and step up within her role
however as a result of her injuries and deteriorated trust and confidence in her employer, she was not able to
pursue such responsibilities.
[228] There is no evidence that the Complainant had previously indicated that she wished to pursue further
responsibilities and step up within her role, nor that she could not have pursued such responsibilities if she was
inclined following the termination of Mr Dwyer some three weeks later after her complaint was made.
[229] There is no evidentiary basis for an order for past economic loss and I decline to make such an award.
Future Economic loss
[230] The Complainant claims for future economic loss arising from the delay in the Complainant’s graduation and
respective delay in obtaining full-time employment as a software developer as well as a global claim arising from
ongoing incapacity and management of psychiatric injuries until retirement age.
[231] The Complainant claims that at the time of the unlawful conduct she was working in casual employment while
she studied a Bachelor of Creative Industries / Bachelor of Information Technology at the Queensland University of
Technology with an anticipated graduation date of 2023.
[232] The Complainant contends that as a result of the unlawful conduct her studies have been delayed and as a
consequence she will not graduate until the end of 2026. Her intention is to commence full time employment as a
software engineer.
[233] The difficulty with this claim is the evidence given by Dr Sangha that whilst the impact of the unlawful conduct
on the Complainant’s mental health contributed to her failing university subjects, this was also caused by excessive
working and family related stressors.
[234] This evidence is consistent with the letter sent to QUT by the Complainant in which she outlines in
considerable detail the change in her shifts at work which led to her missing classes, along with the stress
associated with this sexual harassment claim.103
[235] The medical evidence indicates that the delay in the Complainant’s graduation was caused by an
exacerbation of symptoms of stress, anxiety and depression, however Dr Sangha noted that on some occasions the
Complainant’s capacity to complete her university assignments was affected by doing too many shifts at work and
therefore not having adequate time to complete her work along with other family related stressors.
[236] In the report of 31 July 2023, Dr Barkla stated:104
The effect of the incident on [the Complainant’s] studies was significant. She did well in her first semester. There were
difficulties in 2020, and this appeared based on her history to be associated with the working hours that she was allowed
which prevented her from being able to devote the required time to her studies in the second semester of that year.
However in 2021, her ability to study appeared to have been significantly affected primarily by her mental health, and as a
result she failed. The history of show cause and potential loss of her placement in the course is noted.
[237] The report of 30 July 2023, Dr Sangha, stating:105
[The Complainant’s] studies appear to have been adversely impacted by her mental health since 2021. It appears that the
incidents at work which are the current subject of legal proceedings, and the sexual assault perpetrated by JD, precipitated
an exacerbation of symptoms of anxiety, stress and depression, and also triggered the exacerbation of pre-existing PTSD
symptoms in relation to past trauma, which subsequently impacted on [the Complainant’s] ability to study and complete her
assignments, which led to [the Complainant] failing two of her subjects and almost led to her being excluded from university
in December 2021. [The Complainant] was again unable to complete two of her assessments in June 2022 due to an
exacerbation of symptoms of anxiety and depression. Therefore, exacerbation of symptoms of stress, anxiety and
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depression appear to have impacted on [the Complainant’s] studies, however on some occasions [the Complainant’s]
capacity to complete her university assignments also appears to have been affected by doing too many shifts at work and
therefore not having adequate time to complete her work. Other family related stressors have also impacted on [the
Complainant’s] ability to complete her university assessments at times.
[238] The Complainant makes a further global claim for ongoing incapacity as a result of her ongoing psychiatric
injuries. The Complainant submits she is expected to work another 42 years until retirement and is now prejudiced
on the open labour market as she manages her ongoing psychiatric injuries.
[239] On the basis that the medical evidence indicates that the unlawful conduct contributed to some degree to a
delay in the Complainant’s graduation, I accept that the Complainant has suffered loss in the form of future
earnings. I consider fifty percent of the amount claimed to be appropriate, being $53,383.60. Fifty percent of lost
future superannuation is payable in the amount of $5,991.63 with a total amount of $59,375.23. A 60% reduction is
applied for anticipated earnings working in casual employment during the period of studying and a 10% reduction
for vicissitudes and contingencies. A total amount of compensation for the delayed graduation and commencement
of full-time work is $17,813.23.
[240] The basis of the global claim for future economic loss is unclear. The medical evidence indicates that there is
no ongoing limitation on the Complainant’s capacity to work.106
[241] The Complainant’s work history indicates that there has been no interruption in her ability to work as a
consequence of the unlawful conduct.
[242] The medical evidence indicates that the Complainant has good prospects of working in her chosen field,
although she would need to manage her levels of stress, and that the Complainant’s prognosis is positive.
[243] Dr Barkla provided the following opinion:107
I believe [the Complainant] has capacity to work as a software developer, and it is likely that she would be able to pursue a
career related to her field of study. She most likely has the capacity to fulfil all the skills associated with the duties of a
software developer provided her mental health continues to be managed into the future.
[244] Dr Sangha also opined that there is a likelihood of the Complainant being able to work as a software
developed in future.108
[245] Both Dr Sangha and Dr Barkla noted the heightened risk of exacerbation of symptoms if the Complainant did
experience high levels of stress at work and the potential need for additional support to manage stress levels. There
is no evidence to indicate the extent to which this heightened risk is a result of the unlawful conduct rather than the
pre-existing medical history or the additional post-March 2021 stressors.
[246] On the basis that the Complainant’s prognosis is positive and there is no indication that the Complainant will
not be able to earn a full time living in her chosen profession upon graduation, I do not find a proper basis for
making an order for a ’global’ claim of $50,000. Accordingly, I decline to make an order for ongoing incapacity.
Past special damages
[247] The Complainant claims for past special damages including out of pocket expenses for treatment and
pharmaceuticals since March 2021:
(a) $1,564.35 for 36 sessions with psychologist Dr Sangha; and
(b) Global claim of $1,000 for pharmaceutical expenses; and
• $541.21 for pharmaceutical expenses, including regular payments for Mirtazapine, Zoloft, Axit and
Alivan, from 20 March 2021 to 23 August 2022 and 30 October 2023 to present; and
• The remainder assessed as a global claim for pharmaceutical expenses between 24 August 2022 and
29 October 2023, noting bank statements not provided and Complainant’s evidence that
pharmaceutical expenses continued during this time.
(c) $223.00 for visits to the General Practitioner (noting other GP visits were bulk billed);
(d) $1,986.00 claim for university subjects failed and attributable to the Complainant’s injuries:
[248] The evidence demonstrates that the sessions with Dr Sangha commenced soon after the sexual assault and
I accept this expense was a consequence of the unlawful conduct.
[249] I accept the global claim of $1,000 for pharmaceutical expenses for medication for mental health symptoms
as reasonable compensation for the amount outlaid by the Complainant.
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[250] As outlined above, the unlawful conduct partially contributed to the Complainant failing her university
subjects, with the other contributing factors being her working rosters and family stressors. In these circumstances,
50% of the claim for university subjects failed will be ordered in the amount of $993.00.
[251] The total ordered for past special damages is $3,780.35. Interest calculated at 3.5% per annum from 6 March
2021 is ordered in the amount of $649.24 with the total amount of past special damages $4,429.51.
Future special damages
[252] The Complainant makes a global claim for future special damages for ongoing psychiatric treatment,
referring to Green where a global amount was claimed for future special damages, as well as Menere v Poolrite
Equipment Pty Ltd.109
[253] The Complainant submits that she has been prescribed a variety of antidepressants as well as psychological
intervention, and that such ongoing treatment and medication is explicitly contemplated in the reports of Dr Sangha
and Dr Barkla.
[254] I note the report of Dr Barkla makes the following observations:110
• The Complainant will continue to require medication, however, she is not taking any at the current time;
and
• The Complainant is likely to require treatment as a result of the alleged workplace incident for a further 18
months to two years to treat her psychological injury.
[255] I also note the Complainant’s past medical history and am mindful that damages are intended to compensate
only for the loss or damage caused by the contravention. The ongoing costs of the Complainant’s psychological
treatment cannot be taken to be a consequence solely of the contravention.
[256] Basing my assessment on the number and cost of sessions with Dr Sangha between May 2021 and June
2023, I consider that compensation for a further two years of psychologist sessions and medication is appropriate.
Accordingly, I order $2,500 for future special damages.
Orders
[257] For the reasons set out above, I make the following orders:
1. Pursuant to s 209(1)(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, The Star and Mr Dwyer are jointly and
severally liable and must pay, within 28 days, compensation to the Complainant comprising of:
(a) general damages including interest in the amount of $39,530.51
(b) future economic loss including superannuation in the amount of $7,125.29
(c) past special damages including interest in the amount of $1,771.80
(d) future special damages in the amount of $1,000
2. Pursuant to s 209(1)(b) of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991, Mr Dwyer must pay, within 28 days,
compensation to the Complainant comprising of:
(a) general damages including interest in the amount of $59,295.76
(b) future economic loss including superannuation in the amount of $10,687.94
(c) past special damages including interest in the amount of $2,657.71
(d) future special damages in the amount of $1,500
(e) aggravated damages in the sum of $3,294.21.
3. If there is no agreement as to costs, application to be made within 28 days.
Order
Orders as per [257] of this decision.
The second respondent appeared in person.
Page 31 of 33
Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
Counsel for the complainant: Mr L.R Borgert
Counsel for the first respondent: Mr J Wells
Solicitors for the complainant: Vocare Law
Solicitors for the first respondent: Mills Oakley
1 [2025] QIRC 209 (’JF’), [55]–[57].
2 This section of the Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) has since been amended.
3 The Complainant’s Closing Submissions filed on 29 August 2024 (’The Complainant’s Closing Submissions’), 17.
4 T 2-13, ll 45-49 and T 2-22, ll 39-49.
5 Mr John Dwyer’s Closing Submissions filed on 12 September 2024 (’Mr Dwyer’s Closing Submissions’), 1.
6 Exhibit 1, ’Description of Incident 05/03/2021’, 31.
7 T 1-14, l 19.
8 T 1-14, ll 6-12.
9 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 9 March 2021’, 26.
10 Exhibit 1, ’Description of Incident 05/03/2021’, 31.
11 Exhibit 1, ’QPS Witness Statement – Complainant’, 15.
12 Exhibit 1, ’Further Termination Letter to John Dwyer’, 35.
13 T 1-13, ll 39-42.
14 T 1-13, ll 16-19.
15 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 9 March 2021’, 26.
16 Exhibit 1, ’QPS Witness Statement — Complainant’, 16.
17 T 2-22, ll 36-49.
18 T 1-15, ll 5-11 and ll 24-27.
19 Exhibit 1, ’QHRC Complaint Form’, 8.
20 Exhibit 1, ’IME Report – Dr J Barkla’, 325.
21 T 2-24 ll 43-49 and T 2-25 ll 1-41.
22 Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) (’the AD Act’) s 119(e).
23 T 1-15, ll 36-39.
24 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 9 March 2021’, 26.
25 Exhibit 1, ’QPS Witness Statement — Complainant’, 16.
26 Exhibit 1, ’Further Termination Letter to John Dwyer’, 36.
27 T 2-27, l 44.
28 Mr Dwyer’s Closing Submissions (n 5), 4.
29 (1959) 101 CLR 298.
30 T 1-15, ll 46-47 to T 1-16, 5 and ll 18-22.
31 Exhibit 1, ’QPS Witness Statement – Complainant’, 17.
32 Exhibit 1, ’Further Termination Letter to John Dwyer’, 37.
33 Ibid.
34 Exhibit 1, ’Transcript of Proceedings — Hearing’, 21.
35 T 2-32, ll 12-42.
36 Mr Dwyer’s Closing Submissions (n 5) 8.
Page 32 of 33
Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
37 JF (n 1), [92].
38 Mr Dwyer’s Closing Submissions (n 5), 7.
39 Exhibit 1, ’QPS Witness Statement — Complainant’, 17.
40 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 9 March 2021’, 26.
41 Exhibit 1, ’Transcript of Proceedings — Hearing’, 21.
42 T 1-16, ll 4-9.
43 Exhibit 1, ’QPS Witness Statement – Complainant’, 17.
44 Exhibit 1, ’Further Termination Letter to John Dwyer’, 37.
45 T 2-33, ll 47-49 and T 2-34, ll 18-49 to T 2-35, ll 1-2.
46 T 2-34, l 32.
47 T 2-33, l 49.
48 T 2-34, l 7.
49 The AD Act (n 22) s 119(f).
50 Exhibit 1, ’Record of Discussion/File Notes, 13 March 2021’, 29.
51 [2015] FWC 3156 (’Keenan’).
52 [2005] FCAFC 130 (’Trainor’).
53 Keenan (n 51), [101].
54 [2007] FMCA 59 (’Lee’).
55 [1999] ICR 547 [1999] IRLR 81 (’Stubbs’).
56 Trainor (n 52), [70].
57 [2018] QCA 359.
58 [2018] QCATA 29.
59 Keenan (n 51), [97].
60 [2008] VCAT 261 , [40].
61 Ibid, [43].
62 [2023] SACAT 49.
63 [2022] FWCFB 32.
64 (1995) 59 IR 103.
65 [2013] FCA 102 (’Richardson’).
66 [2014] QCAT 695.
67 [2006] QADT 8 (’Webb’).
68 Webb (n 67), [54]–[58].
69 Webb (n 67), [39].
70 Richardson (n 65), [153]–[156] and [161]–164].
71 Exhibit 1, ’Exhibit AB-13 — Independent Investigation Report (2016)’.
72 T 2–13, ll 45–49.
73 Exhibit 1, ’Exhibit AB-13 — Independent Investigation Report (2016)’, 294.
74 [2014] FCAFC 82.
75 T 2–15, ll 6-20 and T 2–16, ll 35–45.
76 The AD Act (n 22) s 132.
77 JF (n 1), [127]–[131].
78 The AD Act (n 22) s 209(1)(b).
Page 33 of 33
Loquias v Star Entertainment Group and John Dwyer, [2026] QIRC 023
79 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr L Wilson dated 18 July 2023’, 309.
80 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr L Wilson dated 18 July 2023’, 309.
81 The Star’s Closing Submissions filed on 13 September 2024 (’The Star’s Submissions’) [212]–[213].
82 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr L Wilson dated 18 July 2023’, 310.
83 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 312 and 320.
84 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr L Wilson dated 18 July 2023’, 309-310; Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’,
311.
85 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr L Wilson dated 18 July 2023’, 310.
86 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 311.
87 Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 345.
88 Exhibit 1, ’IME Report – Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344.
89 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 313.
90 Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 314.
91 Ibid, 315.
92 T 1-20, ll 30-32 and ll 36-37.
93 Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344.
94 [2016] QCAT 505.
95 [2017] QCAT 8 (’Green’)
96 [2024] QIRC 93.
97 [2021] ICQ 14.
98 STU v JKL (Qld) Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 505 , [236].
99 [2016] FCA 1457 , [1731]–[1732].
100STU v JKL (Qld) Pty Ltd [2016] QCAT 505 , [236].
101Exhibit 1, ’Academic Record — Queensland University of Technology’, 564.
102T 1-17, ll 15-27.
103Exhibit 1, ’Personal Statement for QUT’, 566.
104Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344.
105Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 318-319.
106Ibid, 316-317.
107Exhibit 1, ’IME Report — Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 344.
108Exhibit 1, ’Report — Dr K Sangha dated 30 July 2023’, 318.
109 [2012] QCAT 252 , [70].
110Exhibit 1, ’IME Report – Dr J Barkla dated 31 July 2023’, 341.
End of Document