Benchmark WA Industrial Relations Case Database

England v Compass Group (ESS)

[2016] FWC 88 Fair Work Commission 2016-01-01 cited 1×
Source
Cited 1×
Applicant: Dannielle England
Respondent: Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd T/A ESS Support Services Worldwide

Ratio

An application for extension of time to lodge an unfair dismissal claim fails where the applicant has provided no reasonable explanation for the delay beyond the 21-day time limit, took no action to dispute the dismissal within the period, was fully aware of the termination when it took effect, and the merits are unclear due to untested factual disputes—the absence of prejudice to the employer alone is insufficient to establish exceptional circumstances warranting extension."

Outcome

Against applicant dismissed

Authority signal

Cited 1× Signal-weighted score: 0.0
Derived from how later decisions have treated this case. Dark green = leading authority, green = positively treated, grey = neutral or sparse data, amber = caution, red = treated negatively.

Key facts · 8

  • Ms England's employment was terminated on 30 September 2015 with notice given on 9 September 2015
  • Ms England was advised that Compass would look for alternative work during the notice period
  • Ms England undertook a medical assessment and tests for another site on 13 October 2015 but was unsuccessful
  • Ms England's unfair dismissal application was lodged on 12 November 2015, more than 21 days after dismissal
  • Ms England did not provide a clear explanation for the delay in lodging her application, citing maternity leave matters
  • Ms England's real dispute was about failure to offer alternative work rather than the decision to make the position redundant
  • All other employees made redundant at the same time were successfully redeployed
  • Ms England claimed she was not offered a position because she was pregnant but did not dispute the operational redundancy

Factors

For
  • No prejudice to the employer as Compass did not call evidence or make submissions on prejudice criterion
Against
  • Applicant provided no reasonable explanation for delay in filing beyond the 21-day limit
  • Applicant was fully aware of the dismissal when it took effect
  • Applicant took no action to dispute the dismissal within the time limit
  • Applicant's real dispute was about failure to offer redeployment, not the redundancy decision itself

Legislation referenced

  • Fair Work Act 2009 (Cth) s.394

Concept tags · 7

[P]Unfair dismissal (federal) [P]Extension of time to file [P]Time limits for filing [S]Genuine redundancy [S]Reasonable redeployment in redundancy [S]Discrimination — protected attributes [M]Parental leave (NES)

Principles · 5

articulates para 4
The expression 'exceptional circumstances' has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare.
articulates para 4
Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered.
articulates para 4
Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional.
articulates para 15
The absence of prejudice to the employer is not of itself sufficient to enable a finding that there are exceptional circumstances.
cites para 4
The expression 'exceptional circumstances' has its ordinary meaning requiring consideration of all the circumstances; to be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, unusual, special, or uncommon but need not be unique or unprecedented; they may comprise a single exceptional matter, multiple exceptional factors, or ordinary factors which when taken together are seen as exceptional.

Cases cited in this decision · 1

Cited
[2011] FWAFB 975 (not in corpus)
"…s and as such Ms England’s claim for an unfair dismissal remedy must be dismissed. DEPUTY PRESIDENT Appearances : D. England on her own behalf. C. Holmes for the Respondent. Hearing details: 2016. Melbourne and...…"
Archived text (1003 words)
England v Compass Group (ESS) [2016] FWC 88 (6 January 2016) [2016] FWC 88 FAIR WORK COMMISSION DECISION Fair Work Act 2009 s.394 —Unfair dismissal Dannielle England v Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd T/A ESS Support Services Worldwide (U2015/14993) DEPUTY PRESIDENT GOOLEY MELBOURNE, 6 JANUARY 2016 Application for relief from unfair dismissal. [1] Ms Dannielle England alleged that the termination of her employment by Compass Group (Australia) Pty Ltd on 30 September 2015 was unfair. [2] Her unfair dismissal application lodged on 12 November 2015 was not made within 21 days of the date of the dismissal. [3] The Fair Work Commission can extend time for the lodging of an unfair dismissal application if it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances. In assessing whether there are exceptional circumstances, the Commission must have regard to certain matters. Only if it is satisfied that there are exceptional circumstances can it then exercise its discretion to decide whether to extend time. [4] The meaning of “exceptional circumstances” was considered in Nulty v Blue Star Group Pty Ltd 1 where the Full Bench said: “[13] In summary, the expression “exceptional circumstances” has its ordinary meaning and requires consideration of all the circumstances. To be exceptional, circumstances must be out of the ordinary course, or unusual, or special, or uncommon but need not be unique, or unprecedented, or very rare. Circumstances will not be exceptional if they are regularly, or routinely, or normally encountered. Exceptional circumstances can include a single exceptional matter, a combination of exceptional factors or a combination of ordinary factors which, although individually of no particular significance, when taken together are seen as exceptional. It is not correct to construe “exceptional circumstances” as being only some unexpected occurrence, although frequently it will be. Nor is it correct to construe the plural “circumstances” as if it were only a singular occurrence, even though it can be a one off situation. The ordinary and natural meaning of “exceptional circumstances” includes a combination of factors which, when viewed together, may reasonably be seen as producing a situation which is out of the ordinary course, unusual, special or uncommon.” [Endnotes not reproduced] (a) the reason for the delay; [5] Ms England was advised on 9 September 2015 that her position was to be terminated on 30 September 2015. She was advised that during the notice period Compass would look for alternative work for her but if they were unable to find such a position, her employment would end on 30 September 2015. She undertook a medical assessment and other tests for another site on 13 October 2015 but was told a few days later that she had not been successful in obtaining the position. [6] Ms England had until 21 October 2015 to file her application. She has not provided any explanation of why she took until 12 November 2015 to file her application. Ms England said she was trying to sort out her maternity leave but it is not clear how this prevented her from lodging an unfair dismissal application. [7] This weighs against a finding that there are exceptional circumstances. (b) whether the person first became aware of the dismissal after it had taken effect; [8] Ms England was aware of the dismissal when it took effect. She had the full 21 days to lodge her application. This weighs against a finding that there are exceptional circumstances. (c) any action taken by the person to dispute the dismissal; [9] Ms England did not take any action to dispute her dismissal. Ms England’s real dispute was about the failure of Compass to offer her alternative work. She did not dispute the decision to end her employment at the mine site. This weighs against a finding that there are exceptional circumstances. (d) prejudice to the employer (including prejudice caused by the delay); [10] As Compass did not call any evidence or make any submissions on this criterion, I find that there would be no prejudice to Compass. This weighs in favour of a finding that there are exceptional circumstances. (e) the merits of the application; [11] Ms England did not dispute that Compass had an operational reason to make her position redundant. Ms England’s complaint was that she was not redeployed to another suitable position. Ms England was put forward for one position and she claimed that she was not offered the position because she was pregnant. All the other employees made redundant at the same time as Ms England were successfully redeployed. [12] Compass submitted that this was a genuine redundancy. It submitted that it consulted with Ms England on 9 September 2015. It submitted that there were no redeployment opportunities available prior to the 30 September 2015. It submitted that, post her termination, Ms England was put forward for a position but that Ms England did not pass the required site entry requirements for that position. It denied selecting Ms England for redundancy because she was pregnant and denied that she was not redeployed because she was pregnant. [13] I am not able to make any assessment of the merits as there are factual disputes between the parties that have not been tested. I consider this criterion to be neutral. (f) fairness as between the person and other persons in a similar position. [14] There were no relevant submissions made on this criterion. Conclusion [15] Ms England has not provided a reasonable explanation for the delay. That there is no prejudice to Compass is not of itself sufficient to enable a finding that there are exceptional circumstances. All the other criterion are either neutral or against a finding of exceptional circumstances. I therefore find that there are no exceptional circumstances and as such Ms England’s claim for an unfair dismissal remedy must be dismissed. DEPUTY PRESIDENT Appearances : D. England on her own behalf. C. Holmes for the Respondent. Hearing details: 2016. Melbourne and Perth, by telephone link: 5 January. 1 [2011] FWAFB 975 Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <Price code A, PR575854>