In applying principles of natural justice, it is necessary to question what needs to be done to act fairly in the circumstances of the particular case.

An intention to coerce another person to agree to the making of an agreement under Div 2 may constitute a breach of s170NC(1) even where the agreement the subject of the coercive intent is not, as a matter of law, capable of certification. The accuracy of the actor's understanding of the legal nature of the agreement is not an element of the intent required by s170NC.

When an adjournment is sought in an application to suspend industrial action, the tribunal must consider whether an adjournment is necessary to give the respondent reasonable opportunity to present their case, together with other matters including the circumstances and seriousness of the industrial action, urgency of the application, legislative policy, and matters of prejudice.

The Full Bench did not intend expressions such as 'exceptional circumstances' and 'significant harm' to establish criteria or tests in substitution for or in addition to those found in the language of s424(1) itself, but rather only to characterise the legislative intention.

An applicant for an order under s.424 is not required to demonstrate exceptional circumstances, only that the statutory criteria for endangerment are met. The fact that circumstances are atypical and out of the ordinary does not require applicant to prove 'exceptional circumstances' in a strict sense.

The expressions 'exceptional circumstances' and 'significant harm' were used only to characterise legislative intention, not to establish tests in substitution for the language of s.424(1) itself; the criterion in s.424(1)(c) are likely to be exceptional in nature, but this does not mean expressions not found in the statute should be determinative.

The s.424 mechanisms should not be triggered by mere inconvenience; they are not intended to prevent legitimate protected industrial action in bargaining.

Each distinct protected industrial action must be considered separately when determining whether conditions for suspension under s.426 are satisfied, as different actions may have different impacts and require different suspension periods.

Orders made under s 418 must be confined within the statutory limits for the exercise of the power and must relate to the industrial action which triggers the statutory obligation, not general prohibition of all industrial action.

Where the FWC must assess whether industrial action is protected industrial action, it must for the purpose of its own assessment make some attempt to identify the existing or potential industrial action, then form a view whether that action is protected, and any order must be directed at the industrial action identified.

Section 418(3) does not expand the scope of an order that must be made under s 418(1); rather it addresses the form in which the industrial action may be identified in the order, permitting identification without particularity where the industrial action is prospective and its form insufficiently apparent to permit particular description.

A precursor to s.418 required sufficient particularity regarding the persons involved in industrial action. However, the current s.418 provisions do not preclude making a stop order of a general nature relative to nominated employees where extensive steps have been taken to enable those employees to be represented and present evidence.