1 Fair Work Act 2009 s.185 - Application for approval of a single-enterprise agreement Programmed Electrical Technologies Ltd (AG2025/4530) COMMISSIONER ROGERS ADELAIDE, 18 JUNE 2026 Application for approval of a single-enterprise agreement – whether employees genuinely agreed – misrepresentations – Statement of Principles on Genuine Agreement – no genuine agreement – Application dismissed [1] Programmed Electrical Technologies Ltd (Programmed) applied for approval of an enterprise agreement known as the Programmed Electrical Technologies Limited South Australia Employee Agreement 2025 (the Agreement) pursuant to s.185 of the Fair Work Act 2009 (the Act). [2] The Agreement, if approved, will replace the Programmed Electrical Technologies Limited South Australia Employee Agreement 2022 (the Previous Agreement), once the Previous Agreement passes its nominal expiry date of 14 August 2026. [3] It is uncontroversial that the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia (CEPU) were a bargaining representative for the Agreement in accordance with s.176 of the Act. [4] A number of concerns were raised by the CEPU in their Form F18, most of which the CEPU says are capable of being resolved with undertakings. However, the CEPU raised concerns about representations made to employees that are said to leave the Commission unable to be satisfied that the Agreement was genuinely agreed to. [5] Hearings were held on 19 February 2026, 12 March 2026, 31 March 2026 and 8 April 2026 to hear from the parties in respect of the disputed facts regarding the concerns relating to genuine agreement. [6] For the reasons set out below, I find that I am unable to be satisfied that the Agreement has been genuinely agreed to and accordingly, the requirements in s.186(2) of the Act have not been met. Genuine agreement [7] Before an employer requests employees to approve a proposed enterprise agreement by voting for it, the employer must take all reasonable steps to ensure that the terms of the [2026] FWC 2229 DECISION [2026] FWC 2229 2 agreement, and the effect of those terms, are explained to the employees employed at the time who will be covered by the agreement.1 [8] The Commission must be satisfied that these requirements have been met in order to find that the Agreement has been genuinely agreed to.2 [9] Additionally, for an agreement to be approved, the Commission must be satisfied that the agreement has been genuinely agreed to by the employees who will be covered by it,3 taking into account the Statement of Principles.4 [10] Paragraph 10 of the Statement of Principles relevantly provides that genuine agreement under the Act: ….will generally not be satisfied if the employer makes an incorrect representation or misleads employees (by words, action or otherwise) about a significant term of the proposed enterprise agreement or its effect. [11] The concerns of the CEPU that formed the subject of the Hearings all related to the explanation and representations made to employees to be covered by the Agreement. As a result of those representations, the CEPU says that Commission cannot be satisfied that employees have genuinely agreed. [12] I now consider the CEPU’s four concerns relating to whether the Agreement was genuinely agreed. [13] The CEPU submitted that the test in determining genuine agreement where it concerns an assertion of a misrepresentation being made is contained in National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Southern Cross University5 and Australian, Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Yarra Valley Water Corporation.6 [14] This approach can be summarised as follows: • Were there misleading representations? Noting that a representation may be misleading because of an omission and • Were the misrepresentations material? Or in effect, could the representations reasonably be expected to have the effect of deceiving those employees into voting for something which, if they had known the true position, they would not have voted for.7 [15] Programmed acknowledged the general principles in National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Southern Cross University8 ‘that misrepresentations can be material when they are misleading on the face value and capable of affecting the voting intention.’9 Programmed however submitted that the test has not been met in this instance as ‘this is not the case on the evidence assessed as a whole.’10 [16] I agree that the matter for the Commission to determine in the present matter is whether the statements made were misleading and if they were, did they objectively, based on the evidence infect the vote. [2026] FWC 2229 3 Evidence [17] The following witnesses gave evidence on behalf of Programmed: • Mr Rob Cannata, General Manager; • Ms Annie Davies, Senior HR Advisor; • Mr Jesse Richardson, Individual Bargaining Representative; • Mr James Powley, Individual Bargaining Representative and • Mr Teegan Steel, Individual Bargaining Representative. [18] Mr Alex Capper, Organiser, gave evidence on behalf of the CEPU. [19] Each of the Individual Bargaining Representatives confirmed in their evidence that they were nominated by themselves. Each of them can therefore be understood to represent themselves in bargaining. [20] Overall, there were inconsistencies across the evidence provided by the witnesses throughout the Hearings. Mr Steel’s and Ms Davies’ evidence was inconsistent, as it conflicted with their written statements and at times was inconsistent with evidence from the other witnesses and their own earlier oral evidence. [21] Mr Powley, Mr Capper and Mr Cannata recalled events clearly and gave consistent evidence that followed logical sequences of events. [22] For these reasons, where there is a direct conflict between the evidence given, I have preferred the evidence of Mr Powley, Mr Capper and Mr Cannata. In-Principle Agreement [23] It is not in dispute that Programmed referred to the Agreement as the ‘In-Principle Agreement’ in its communications to employees both prior to and at the commencement of the access period.11 That communication did not specify who the ‘In-Principle Agreement’ was reached with. [24] In the context of communicating to employees about a proposed agreement going to a vote, the CEPU said that labelling it as an ‘In-Principle Agreement’ inferred that: • ‘employee representatives have endorsed and recommend voting in favour of agreement; • the agreement is in the opinion of the employee representatives a ‘good deal’ perhaps the ‘best deal practical’; • employee representatives have had input into and are, at least, satisfied with the terms of the agreement; • all employee representative claims have been considered, discussed and determined; • the offer represents a compromise taking into account all claims; • if the agreement were voted down the offer is unlikely to improve and • if the agreement is voted down bargaining may conclude without an agreement.’12 [25] The CEPU contends that this representation was misleading because the CEPU as a bargaining representative did not agree to it. [2026] FWC 2229 4 [26] Programmed submitted that the there was an in-principle agreement so the statement was not misleading.13 They also contend that Mr Capper did not clearly object to the Agreement, which can be understood to constitute agreement.14 A further position put by Programmed is that the individual bargaining representatives agreed to the Agreement, creating an in-principle agreement.15 [27] It is therefore necessary to determine whether an in-principle agreement was reached. What is an in-principle agreement? [28] The evidence led by Programmed established that even amongst the bargaining representatives present at all the meetings, differing views were held as to what ‘In-Principle Agreement’ meant. [29] Under cross-examination all accepted that it inferred that there was agreement on the main terms of the Agreement but there was significant confusion and inconsistencies with whether the agreement was by a majority of bargaining representatives, a majority of employees who the bargaining representatives consulted, or all bargaining representatives. [30] Communications about the ‘In-Principle Agreement’ did not specify that it was reached with the majority of bargaining representatives, or only the individual bargaining representatives. [31] In the absence of specifying who the ‘In-Principle Agreement’ was reached with in the context of bargaining, it’s reasonable that a person would understand it to mean a consensus was reached by all bargaining representatives. [32] Accordingly, I find that Programmed’s communications would be reasonably understood by employees who have not been present for the negotiations that there was in- principle agreement between those at the bargaining table, or in other words, all of the bargaining representatives. Was an in-principle agreement reached? [33] The last bargaining meeting held between Programmed and the employee bargaining representatives was on 7 November 2025. This is reflected by the meeting minutes and was consistent evidence across all witnesses. [34] Based on the evidence before the Commission, I find that Mr Capper, on behalf of the CEPU as an employee bargaining representative, did not agree to the proposed agreement. [35] This was supported by the oral evidence of Mr Cannata who stated about Mr Capper, ‘He was pretty much dismissive of everything we put forward, and he pretty much ran a ‘no’ campaign from the start...’16 [36] In response to whether Mr Capper agreed to the Agreement, Mr Richardson said, ‘No, I don’t believe he would have agreed in principle to it.’17 Similarly, when asked whether Mr Capper agreed to the Agreement, Mr Steel stated, ‘I don’t think he really agreed to much, to be honest.’18 [2026] FWC 2229 5 [37] Mr Capper’s evidence was that he ‘did not ever agree ‘in principle’ or at all, to the terms of the Proposed Agreement, or that it should be put to a vote. No one on behalf of the CEPU did so either.’19 [38] The meeting minutes of the bargaining meetings are consistent with the oral evidence of Mr Cannata, Mr Richardson, Mr Steel and Mr Capper. [39] Ms Davies gave evidence that, ‘during the entire process, Mr Capper did not engage or give feedback during any of our bargaining representative meetings or during the initial access period’20 and ‘Mr Capper didn’t engage and say whether he was or wasn’t happy or comfortable with any of those claims and proposals we’d put forward’21 but generally that it was not clear if Mr Capper agreed or not. [40] I have preferred the evidence of these witnesses over that given by Ms Davies regarding whether Mr Capper agreed in principle to the terms of the Agreement where it conflicts, due to the inconsistencies with her evidence on the subject.22 [41] That agreement was put to a vote on 28 November 2025 but was unsuccessful.23 [42] The bargaining representatives did not meet again after the unsuccessful vote,24 but a memo was issued by Programmed on 4 December 2025 which communicated the unsuccessful result, advised of a ‘Enterprise Agreement Revised In-Principle Agreement’ and conveyed that the access period for that agreement was 4 December 2025 to 10 December 2025, with information sessions at 8:30am 4 December 2025.25 [43] Mr Steel suggested that Programmed and the individual bargaining representatives may have had discussions that resulted in them agreeing in principle to the Agreement on 2 December 2025.26 [44] However, that evidence is inconsistent with his email to Mr Cannata of 2 December 2025 and Mr Cannata’s reply.27 Mr Steel was vague and unable to give any details about these discussions beyond them occurring.28 This evidence did not align with that of Ms Davies and Mr Cannata. [45] Mr Steel’s recollection of events was not clear, with him having difficulty recalling the sequence of events, the details of the conversation and timing of the discussion. For this reason, I have preferred the evidence of Ms Davies and Mr Cannata in respect of this issue. [46] Ms Davies says that feedback was requested from employees by Programmed after the first vote was unsuccessful. Based on that feedback, Programmed determined to increase the final pay to a 4.5% increase and put the Agreement out for a vote.29 She accepted that this correspondence and information was not sent to Mr Capper. [47] Mr Cannata could not recall whether he had a conversation with Mr Steel on 2 December 202530 but was clear that if he did, ‘I wasn’t bargaining’.31 He gave evidence that he knew the increase to 4.5% in the final year was what employees wanted because that was what the representatives asked for in the 7 November 2025 meeting and the feedback from employees he spoke to after the unsuccessful vote.32 [2026] FWC 2229 6 [48] Correspondence sent by Mr Cannata to Mr Capper on 4 December 202533 supports the factual basis put by both Ms Davies and Mr Cannata – that based on feedback from employees requested after the last vote, Programmed unilaterally made changes to the Agreement they thought would be supported and put that to a vote without seeking or obtaining the agreement of the bargaining representatives. [49] Mr Capper gave evidence that there ‘was no negotiation between the defeat of the earlier agreement and the commencement of the access period for the Proposed Agreement.’34 [50] The Agreement was put out to a second vote very shortly after the initial vote and was communicated as an ‘In-Principle Agreement’ despite there not being agreement from all of the bargaining representatives. [51] Given the evidence, I find that that the Agreement that was ultimately put to a vote and had a majority vote in favour of it was not agreed in-principle by the bargaining representatives. [52] Accordingly, I find that no in-principle agreement between the bargaining representatives was reached. [53] It follows that communicating to employees that it was an ‘In-Principle Agreement’ was incorrect and misleading. [54] The applicable test then, is whether the evidence taken as a whole, when considered objectively, leads to a conclusion that the misleading statement could reasonably be expected to have the effect of deceiving those employees into voting for something which, if they had known the true position, they would not have voted for.35 [55] The misrepresentation itself was not merely procedural, it was material. As I have found, it suggested to employees that each of the employee bargaining representatives who were entrusted to negotiate the Agreement, had agreed to the deal. [56] The communication to employees containing the misrepresentation was sent on the same day that the access period commenced, which occurred some 3 business days after the agreement was voted down. [57] Mr Capper’s uncontested evidence was that he was ‘only able to speak to a relatively small number of employees’36 during the access period to advise them of the true position, that the Agreement was not agreed in-principle, prior to the ballot being held. [58] The Agreement was voted up with 17 of the 25 employees who voted, voting in favour of the Agreement. Accordingly, there was a difference of 5 votes as to whether the Agreement would be made. [59] In these circumstances, I find that the misleading statement of the Agreement being an ‘In-Principle Agreement’ could reasonably be expected to have the effect of deceiving those employees into voting for something which, if they had known the true position, they would not have voted for. [60] I have considered that this misrepresentation was made at both the first vote which was unsuccessful and the second vote which was successful. It is not possible to determine with [2026] FWC 2229 7 certainty whether the people who voted ‘yes’ both times did so due to the misrepresentation about the ‘In-Principle Agreement’ and similarly there is no way of knowing why those who changed their vote did so. [61] Given the facts in this matter and the narrow margin of the vote, I find that the misrepresentation could objectively and reasonably understood to have infected the vote such that it is not possible for the Commission to be satisfied that the Agreement was genuinely agreed to by a majority of voters. [62] Accordingly, I am unable to be satisfied that employees genuinely agreed to the Agreement. Operative Date [63] The explanation of terms document provided by Programmed to employees stated ‘the EA shall commence operation the day after expiry of the existing EA if approved by the Fair Work Commission and shall remain for 4 years from the date of certification.’37 [64] However, clause 6 of the Agreement that was voted on states that the Agreement will ‘operate from the date of signing the Programmed Electrical Technologies Limited South Australia Employee Agreement 2025 if approved by the Fair Work Commission (‘FWC’) and will remain in force for a period of four (4) years from date of certification.’ [65] Additionally, in its memo issued on 4 December 2025, Programmed provided that there will be ‘A 2025 wage increase of 9.81% effective from the 1st full pay period after signing of the agreement.’38 [66] The evidence was clear and consistent from Ms Davies and Mr Cannata, as the employer bargaining representative, that the explanation given to employees about when the Agreement as a whole would come into effect or operation was following approval by the Commission.39 [67] Programmed's witnesses gave evidence of their understanding being that the Agreement, if approved, would come into effect 7 days from approval by the Commission and that this was explained in a memo sent to employees following the successful vote.40 [68] The CEPU contend that this was misleading as the current agreement has a nominal expiry date of 14 August 2026. [69] Due to the operation of s.58 of the Act, the Agreement if approved by the Commission will not apply to employees until the Previous Agreement passes its nominal expiry date. This means that employees don’t have an entitlement to any of those benefits or increases until 14 August 2026. [70] The more significant changes to the Agreement are: • Increases to wage rates; • Increases to allowances; • Overtime rates on Saturdays increased to double time; • Changes to the Inclement Weather clause;41 • Increase to the Income protection benefit; and [2026] FWC 2229 8 • Introduction of a redundancy fund. [71] It was submitted by Programmed and supported by evidence that upon employees voting in favour of the Agreement, the pay rates were increased.42 [72] I find based on the evidence before me that the wage rate increase did occur upon the successful vote by employees. However, there is no evidence that any of the other provisions would come into effect prior to 14 August 2026. [73] Accordingly, the explanation that was given to employees was factually incorrect and misleads employees into thinking they will become entitled to increased benefits and pay much sooner than they will. [74] An enterprise agreement is a legally binding document that contains the wages and conditions of the employees to which it applies. The timing of when those wages and conditions will become a legally enforceable entitlement is of significant importance. [75] This misrepresentation could be reasonably expected to have infected the outcome of the vote given that it relates to timing of all of the more beneficial entitlements applying. Again, in circumstances where there are 5 votes between a successful or unsuccessful vote, I find that this is likely to have had a misleading impact on the vote. [76] If this issue were the only concern, I consider that it may be capable of being addressed with an undertaking that required the more beneficial entitlements in the Agreement being provided to employees 7 days after the Agreement was approved by the Commission. However, given my finding in respect of the first concern, an undertaking would be futile. Percentage Increase [77] Programmed employees who would be covered by the Agreement were paid an allowance in addition to the pay rates set out in the Previous Agreement at the time of the Agreement being made. [78] When a majority of employees voted in favour of the Agreement, the allowance was removed at the same time as the 9.81% increase was applied to the 2022 rates from the Previous Agreement. [79] The CEPU says that this was a misrepresentation because Programmed communicated that there would be a wage increase, but did not advise employees that the allowance would be withdrawn, as ‘There is nothing in the material that would suggest to an employee voting for the agreement the allowance would be withdrawn or folded up into the agreement.’ 43 [80] Programmed contend that both the wage increase and allowance withdrawal were explained during bargaining meetings.44 Further, given that ‘the evidence provided supports that employees received written explanatory documents and had the ability to compare current rates and conditions, proposed changes and how wage movements would occur,’45 there was no misrepresentation. [81] The representation that was made to employees was that a ‘2025 wage increase of 9.81% effective from the first full pay period after signing of the agreement’ would occur.46 Factually, [2026] FWC 2229 9 the statement is correct, as employees did receive a 9.81% increase to the applicable agreement rates at the time that the Agreement was made. [82] This statement was accompanied by the explanation of terms document and summary of change document (collectively, the Change Documents) as well as a copy of the Agreement. The two Change Documents refer to the wages table at Appendix A, or Schedule 1 of the Agreement and that table clearly sets out the new hourly and weekly wages that employees are entitled to. [83] I accept that the CEPU would have preferred the explanation to have been given in another way, but I do not consider the statement to be misleading upon consideration of all the circumstances. [84] There was uncontested evidence from Mr Richardson and Mr Cannata that Programmed explained to employees that with gaining the increase under the new agreement they would lose the allowance.47 [85] Additionally, Mr Canata said he explained the wages increase and removal of the over award payment or higher duties allowance in bargaining meetings.48 When asked during examination-in-chief whether he received any questions from employees about the allowance being removed, Mr Cannata indicated that he did not as this change ‘was expected’.49 [86] I find based on the evidence before me that the explanation given was sufficient, taking into account the Statement of Principles. Non-monetary benefits [87] The memo accompanying the documents provided for the access period on 4 December 2025 stated: Included in the agreement, are non-monetary benefits that are afforded to you as part of this Enterprise Agreement or as an Employee of Programmed. These will continue but are not limited to; • Flexible Salary Packaging • Training and Development Opportunities • Paid Parental Leave • Paid Domestic & Family Violence Leave50 [88] The CEPU contend that this was misleading as it implied that employees were entitled to Paid Parental Leave and Flexible Salary Packaging as a result of the Agreement. [89] It is accepted by the parties that the Agreement does not provide for these employee entitlements, but rather those are offered to employees of Programmed through policies and procedures. [90] Programmed submitted ‘Where certain matters were proposed to sit outside the Agreement—such as parental leave and flexible salary packaging—this was explained as reflecting existing company benefits rather than entitlements arising under the Agreement. This distinction was consistently communicated and documented.’51 [2026] FWC 2229 10 [91] Programmed failed to lead any evidence showing that its employees were notified that some of the non-monetary benefits fall outside of the Agreement either on 4 December 2025 or during the access period. No supporting documentation has been provided which shows that the policies were provided to employees during the access period along with the memo. [92] I accept that during the earlier stages of the negotiations Programmed made it clear to the individual bargaining representatives that these benefits would remain in the policies rather than the enterprise agreement.52 But there is no evidence given that provided enough detail that the Commission could be satisfied that this was communicated to employees either by Programmed or the individual bargaining representatives during the later stages of the negotiations. In giving their evidence about the non-monetary benefits remaining in the policy, the individual bargaining representatives did not identify who they spoke to or detail at which stage this information was conveyed.53 [93] The timing of the representations to employees is of particular importance in light of the close proximity of the two voting periods. [94] A reasonable person would understand from the inclusion of ‘Included in the agreement...’ at the start of the sentence that those items were included in the Agreement. Based on the evidence before the Commission, this was the most recent representation given to employees with respect to the non-monetary benefits before the voting occurred. [95] Detailed analysis of the sentence in its entirety along with reading the Agreement in its entirety may clarify that some of those entitlements are benefits that are provided through a policy as an employee rather than in the enterprise agreement. [96] However, I do not consider that such a detailed analysis should be required, or would likely have been undertaken by employees. It relies on an employee realising what is absent from the Agreement after reading the document in its entirety, rather than reading the explanation in conjunction with a clause, or clauses, in the Agreement. [97] In the absence of supporting documents demonstrating the separate entitlements under company policy compared to the agreement. it would be reasonable for an employee reading the memo to understand from the wording that each of those benefits are an entitlement included in the Agreement. [98] Accordingly, while employees may have initially understood that non-monetary benefits would not be included in the Agreement, following the memo being issued on 4 December 2025 it would be reasonable to understand that these benefits are now included. [99] The significance of the entitlements sitting in a policy rather than the Agreement are that Programmed are able to remove or alter (either by a reduction or increase) the entitlements. [100] Therefore, based on the evidence before the Commission, I find that the representation given to employees in this respect was misleading. [101] Employee entitlements are significant aspects of an agreement. In light of this, I am satisfied that the misrepresentation about non-monetary benefits could reasonably expected to have infected the outcome of the vote. [2026] FWC 2229 11 Conclusion [102] The onus to satisfy the Commission that the Agreement was genuinely agreed to lies with the Programmed as the Applicant. [103] Based on my findings above, Programmed have failed to satisfy the Commission that the Agreement was genuinely agreed to, which means that s.188 of the Act cannot be met. [104] Subsequently, s.186(2)(a) is not met and the Agreement cannot be approved. The application is dismissed. COMMISSIONER Printed by authority of the Commonwealth Government Printer <PR811064> Appearances: R. Ower and A. Davies on behalf of the Applicant. J. Fox on behalf of the Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia. Hearings’ details: Adelaide (via Microsoft Teams) 2026 19 February. Adelaide (via Microsoft Teams) 2026 12 March. Adelaide (Hybrid) 2026 31 March. Adelaide (via Microsoft Teams) 2026 [2026] FWC 2229 12 8 April. 1 The Act, s.180(5)(a). 2 Ibid, s.188(4A). 3 Ibid, s.186(2)(a). 4 Ibid, s.188(1); Fair Work (Statement of Principles on Genuine Agreement) Instrument 2023 (‘Statement of Principles’). 5 [2023] FWCFB 200. 6 [2013] FWCFB 7453 at [28]. 7 National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Southern Cross University [2023] FWCFB 200; Australian, Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Yarra Valley Water Corporation [2013] FWCFB 7453 at [28]; Audio Recording of Hearing on 8 April 2026 at 10:56-12:30. 8 [2023] FWCFB 200. 9 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 4:45-4:57. 10 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 4:58-5:00. 11 Digital Hearing Book (DHB) at pp. 269 and 541; Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 1:32:02- 1:32:22; 1:56:43-1:56:53; Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 15:33-15:39; 36:59-37:12; 1:04:01- 1:04:21; 2:12:23-2:12:43; 2:14:42-2:14:48. 12 DHB at pp. 521-522. 13 Audio Recording of Hearing on 19 February 2026 at 32:54-34:23. 14 Ibid; DHB at pp. 158-159. 15 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 1:56:28- 1:58:06; 2:13:07-2:13:46. 16 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 24:46-24:53. 17 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 1:36:30-1:36:32. 18 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 1:52:52-1:52:57 19 DHB at p. 524. 20 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 1:31:20-1:31:31. 21 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 1:57:58-1:58:06. 22 See DHB at pp. 157-159. 23 DHB at p. 541. 24Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 38:08-38:16; 1:05:46-1:06:15; 1:28:57-1:29:09; DHB at p. 527. 25 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 1:21:03-1:21:11. 26 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 2:11:50-2:12:40. 27 DHB at pp. 265-268. 28 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 1:48:53-2:45:03. 29 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 1:20:19-1:20:48. 30 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 7:42-8:17. 31 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 54:57. 32 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 9:34-10:41. 33 DHB at p. 527. 34 DHB at p. 525. 35 National Tertiary Education Industry Union v Southern Cross University [2023] FWCFB 200 at [37]; Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union v Yarra Valley Water Corporation [2013] FWCFB 7453 at [28]. 36 DHB at p. 525. 37 DHB at p. 32. 38 DHB at p. 542. 39 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 32:38-33:13; 1:54:28-1:54:46. 40 Ibid. 41 DHB at pp. 61-62. [2026] FWC 2229 13 42 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 30:54-31:25. 43 DHB at p. 535. 44 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 13:10-14:04. 45 Audio Recording of Hearing on 8 April 2026 at 7:46-7:55. 46 DHB at p. 542. 47 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 1:18:19-1:21:24; Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 13:16-14:04. 48 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 13:16-14:04; 55:19-56:01. 49 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 13:59-14:04. 50 DHB at p. 542. 51 DHB at p. 158. 52 DHB at pp. 395- 397; Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 2:36:46-2:37:02; Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 2) at 1:09:07-1:10:28. 53 Audio Recording of Hearing on 31 March 2026 (Part 1) at 14:24-14:48; 2:37:18-2:37:44;.DHB at pp. 162; 165 and 169.