WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION. No. 445 of 1986. Between Ronald Thomas Bellamy, Applicant and the Chairman, Public Service Board, Respondent. Before Commissioner S.A. Kennedy. The 14th day of July 1986. Mr R.T. Bellamy, the applicant, in person. Mr R.E. Cock (of Counsel) appeared on behalf of the respondent. Reasons for Decision. THE COMMISSIONER: This is a claim for unfair dismissal brought under section 29 (b) (i) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979. The applicant, Mr Ronald Bellamy, was employed by the Public Service in February 1984 as a clerk in a temporary position. On 21 May 1986 Mr Bellamy was advised by his employer that his term of employment had been extended to 30 May 1986 and would end on that day. Mr Bellamy claims that the failure of the employer to re-engage him and the circumstances pertaining to this decision constitutes unfair dismissal. The respondent's counterclaim is that there was no dismissal, and the circumstances warranted the decision not to extend the applicant's employment beyond the term ending on 30 May 1986. In the event the question of merit in the application was not canvassed in either the pre-hearing conference convened by the Commission under section 32 of the Act or the subsequent hearing. Submissions were confined to the question of jurisdiction. Mr R.E. Cock, appearing for the Public Service Board, put the argument that the Commission as constituted had no jurisdiction to hear and determine the application. The core of his submission was that the applicant had no recourse under section 29 of the Act by virtue of the "exclusive jurisdiction" of the Public Service Arbitrator and the Appeals Boards over industrial matters concerning government officers. Mr Cock supported this contention by reference to provisions in both the Industrial Relations Act 1979 and the Public Service Act 1978 and by detail on the history of Public Service arbitration in this state. He further submitted that to allow an application claiming unfair dismissal to proceed under section 29 would mean an alternative avenue of appeal for government officers which was contrary to the meaning and the intent of the Industrial Relations Act 1979. For his part Mr Bellamy based his submission that the application should proceed under section 29 on two main grounds. One was that as a temporary employee he was not a government officer within the meaning of the Act but was an "employee" for the purposes of an applica- tion under section 29. The other was that as an individual he was precluded from making an application claiming unfair dismissal under the provisions of Part IIA, Division 2 of the Act. Accordingly, he submitted, his only avenue for redress was under section 29 (b) (i) of the Act. Put simply the questions to be answered are: — did the terms of the applicant's employment by the respondent make him a government officer within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1979? — does the applicant have any recourse under section 29 (b) (i) of the Act? The question of whether Mr Bellamy v/as a govern- ment officer at the relevant time is readily settled by reference to the Industrial Relations Act 1979. Section 80C (2) of Part IIA — Division 2 of the Act directs that the Division be read in conjunction with the Public Service Act 1978. Section 5 (1) of that Act states inter alia that "officer" means a permanent officer, a temporary officer, or any other officer employed in a Department under and subject to this Act; and further that "temporary officer" means a person holding a current appointment to perform duties as an officer in the Public Service in a temporary capacity and subject to this Act. Section 80C (1) (a) of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 inter alia defines "Government officer" to mean "every public servant". I am satisfied that the nature and terms of the applicant's employment meant that he was a "govern- ment officer" within the meaning of the Industrial Relations Act 1979. 66 W.A.I.G. WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE. Whether the applicant as a government officer had recourse to section 29 necessitates an examination of the whole Industrial Relations Act 1979 and, in particular, the provisions specific to government officers. Section 801 (1) (e) of the Act is relevant. It provides inter alia that the Public Service Appeal Board has the jurisdiction to hear and determine any appeal ... by any government officer . . . from a decision, determination or recommendation of his employer that he be dismissed; Further, section 80J (b) provides that appeals under section 801 may be instituted by the government officer concerned. Plainly as a government officer claiming unfair dismissal, Mr Bellamy had, at the time he lodged this application under section 29 of the Act, access to the appeal provisions set down in Part IIA — Division 2 of the Act. The question then becomes did Mr Bellamy also have recourse under section 29 of the Act. This is a situation where a general provision and a specific provision applies to the same subject matter within an Act. I am satisfied that this is a case where the long established approach — see the rationale set down by Barton ACJ in Maybury v. Plowman (1913) 16 CLR at 473-4 of the maxim generalia specialibus non derogant should apply: the general provision gives way to the specific. Further, section 80E (1) of the Act states Subject to Division 3 of Part II, an Arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction to enquire into and deal with any industrial matter relating to a Government officer, a group of Government officers or Govern- ment officers generally. It follows that as a government officer Mr Bellamy's only avenues on questions concerning his employment are under Part IIA — Division 2 of the Act. This remains the case notwithstanding the fact that Mr Bellamy is now out of the prescribed time for the institution of an appeal under section 801 of the Act. That by itself does not open up the avenue of a section 29 application to him. The exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Service Arbitrator in industrial matters con- cerning government officers remains. And the breadth and generality of the powers conferred on the Arbitrator under Part IIA — Division 2 of the Act, and particularly 80C, warrants the view that government officers are not disadvantaged compared with employees who have recourse to the general provisions of the Act. Having regard to the submissions of the parties and in the light of an examination of the relevant legislation and authorities, it is clear that the Commission as constituted has no jurisdiction in this matter. The application is dismissed. BEFORE THE