Western Australian Industrial Relations Commission—Karratha”. By the time of hearing these grounds had changed somewhat but this is dealt with sub- sequently. The applicant maintained there was jurisdiction for the Commission to deal with the claim. The parties agree that a workplace agreement between them was registered by the Commissioner of Workplace Agreements in 1996 and that the contract of employment it bound ended in February 1997. The dispute as to juris- diction for the Commission to deal with the applicant’s claim of denied contractual benefits is not founded on whether a workplace agreement between these parties was registered but the effect of a specific provision within it and the effect on the standing of the agreement as a result of the contract of employment ending. Before going to these arguments, I note section 26A(a) of the IR Act precludes the Commission in the course of an exer- cise of the jurisdiction conferred in section 23 from receiving in evidence or informing itself of any workplace agreement or any provision of a workplace agreement registered by the Commissioner of Workplace Agreements. But as the hearing here is limited to the question of whether or not jurisdiction exists, then the preclusion in section 26A(a), concerned as it is with the exercise of power in the event of jurisdiction, does not apply. The registered workplace agreement was accepted into evidence for the purpose of considering the question of jurisdiction. It appears registration occurred on 20 November 1997 with the term of the agreement to expire on 14 October 1998. The agreement contains a provision headed “Training and Qualifi- cations”; this, it seems, goes to the substance of the applicant’s claim and thereby was not canvassed in the hearing. The pro- vision referred to in the respondent’s answers as filed was WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 78 W.A.I.G. 754 however. Both the applicant and the respondent made submis- sions on it in relation to the question of jurisdiction. In full it is as follows. DISPUTE RESOLUTION Any disputes relating to the meaning, effect or conditions of this agreement, including any provisions implied, will in the first instance be endeavoured to be resolved inhouse i.e discussed between the management and the employee. Management are to provide a written decision on the matter and a copy is to be handed to the employee. ARBITRATION In the event that a mutual agreement cannot be achieved between the parties, either party can seek to have the matter arbitrated by an individual person. The nominated arbitrator is either— Regional Industrial Inspector—Department of Pro- ductivity and Labour Relations—Karratha OR Industrial Registrar—Western Australian Industrial Commission—Karratha Either party can refer a question or dispute for arbitration to the abovementioned and both parties agree to accept the decision of the arbitrator as final and binding for the purpose of this agreement. Rights of appeal may be addressed through the formal Processes of Western Australian Industrial Commission. Any costs associated with the arbitration process, (nominated arbitrators), will be borne by each respec- tive party. DISPUTE RESOLUTION Any costs associated with rights of subsequent appeal will be apportioned at the rate of 50% of costs of the success- ful party, to be incurred by the unsuccessful party to the appealed action, or in the event of a withdrawal, to the party withdrawing the action. In the event of an equal or balanced decision, each party, will bear their own respective costs. The argument put by the respondent at the hearing differed from its answers as filed in that where, effectively, it was claimed then that the dispute resolution procedure precluded any role for the Commission, it now says that the provision for recourse to the Commission is ultra vires. The respond- ent’s submissions in support of this were succinct. It says that there is in existence a workplace agreement registered under the WPA Act, with that legislation, per section 4, overriding the IR Act. Thus it is said there is no jurisdiction for the Com- mission arising under section 23 of the IR Act, an exclusion confirmed by section 7C of that legislation. The respondent further says that while the employment has ended it is quite clear that this fact does not affect the standing of the regis- tered workplace agreement and any accrued rights arising under it. The respondent says that while the WPA Act is silent on the effect of determination of employment covered by a regis- tered workplace agreement other than by the effluxion of the term of the agreement per section 19, to conclude other than the respondent says as to ongoing rights would make a mock- ery of section 50 of the WPA Act which provides a right to apply to the Industrial Magistrate for enforcement in claims of a breach of contract. The respondent acknowledges the pro- visions in the registered workplace agreement for rights of appeal to the Western Australian Industrial Relations Com- mission but says these could have no effect because, being contrary to the WPA Act, it is ultra vires. The applicant, however, says there is jurisdiction for the Commission to deal with this claim notwithstanding that a workplace agreement between the parties was registered un- der the WPA Act. Much of the applicant’s argument went to questions about the dispute resolution provisions and the ter- mination of employment in relation to the standing of the registered workplace agreement. Before dealing with these it is noted that by sections 16 and 21 of the WPA Act it is a requirement that any workplace agree- ment which is sought to be registered, “must provide for resolution of certain disputes”. Section 21(1) and (2) are as follows. 21. (1) A workplace agreement must set out provi- sions for dealing with any question or dispute that arises between the parties about the mean- ing or effect of the agreement, including any provisions implied in the agreement by the Minimum Conditions of Employment Act 1993. (2) The provisions referred to in subsection (1) must — (a) confer a right on any party to refer to arbitration a dispute of the kind de- scribed in that subsection; (b) specify the means for appointing a per- son or persons to conduct an arbitration referred to in paragraph (a), and for making any new appointment that may be required; and (c) contain an undertaking by the parties to accept the arbitrated decision as fi- nal and binding for the purposes of the agreement, but subject to section 64 (3). Section 64(3) refers to the Supreme Court and its powers with respect to arbitration pursuant to Part V of the Commer- cial Arbitration Act 1985 being powers to be applied under the WPA Act with respect to any arbitrators or arbitrations under a provisions described in section 21. The applicant’s submissions on the dispute resolution pro- cedure in the registered workplace agreement and the question of jurisdiction can be summarised as follows. The substantive issue sought to be determined by the applicant was raised with the respondent prior to the termination of the contract when he clearly had a right to access the dispute resolution proce- dure and the employer had an obligation to follow that procedure. The respondent, by failing to fulfil its obligations under the dispute resolution procedure, is now seeking to deny the jurisdiction for the Commission which the parties had agreed, and expressed it terms, was to be available; albeit the applicant acknowledges sections 7F and 7G of the IR Act with respect to this. The applicant went on to question the validity of the dis- pute resolution provision on the following bases. He says the legislative requirement for nomination of a “person” or “persons” as arbitrator was not met in that the agree- ment specifies the office of Regional Industrial Inspector—Department of Productivity and Labour Rela- tions—Karratha or the office of Industrial Registrar—Western Australian Industrial Relations Com- mission—Karratha as the nominated arbitrator/s. He says it is a matter of law that for a nominated arbitrator to have standing in a matter of this kind that the named “person” must have consented to that nomination: that is, absent that consent the nomination can have no force. The appli- cant went on to say it seems there was no consent given here. He also says there is no ability under the IR Act for an office holder such as a Deputy Registrar, the office be- ing established under the IR Act, to function as an arbitrator pursuant to a registered workplace agreement. And fur- ther, the applicant says there is no ability under the IR Act for an office holder such as an Industrial Inspector (who has standing for the purpose of taking enforcement proceed- ings) to function as an arbitrator. The applicant also submits that despite the obligation on both parties to accept any arbitrated decision under the provi- sion, there is then reference to the “rights of appeal” through “the formal Processes of Western Australian Industrial Com- mission”. This, says the applicant, clearly contravenes both the IR Act and the WPA Act and as such is ultra vires. Thus, according to the applicant, the dispute resolution procedure in the workplace agreement is fundamentally flawed and should not have been registered. But, he says, the fact that it was registered must mean that the applicant is entitled to the rights expressed therein, including access to the Commission or if the registration is invalid, it cannot preclude access to the Commission. The applicant also raised matters going go the termination of the contract of employment between the parties in February 1997 and the question of jurisdiction. Section 19(4) of the WPA WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL GAZETTE 755 78 W.A.I.G. Act is referred to in this respect. That subsection is as follows— (4) On the expiry of a workplace agreement this Act no longer applies to any contract of employment that it governed and that contract then becomes subject to relevant award provisions (if any) unless it becomes subject to — (a) another workplace agreement; or (b) some other arrangement between the parties provided for in the expired workplace agree- ment. The applicant says if the termination of employment means that the registered workplace agreement no longer has force or has expired, then any outstanding benefits due under its terms must be an “industrial matter” for the purposes of the Commission’s jurisdiction. The applicant says further that there is an imperative with respect to this in that if it is argued (as the respondent did) that he has an avenue for redress under section 50 of the WPA Act to the Industrial Magistrate with respect to his claim of a de- nied benefit, this has been effectively disposed of by the requirement in section 54 of the same Act that any person who brings such a claim for enforcement must include in the claim a certificate which states either that there is no provision in the workplace agreement for resolution of the dispute or, if there is, that the claimant has complied with them as far as possible. That is, the registered workplace agreement provides for ac- cess to the Commission which, if not allowed, would result in a bar to the applicant proceeding in the Industrial Magistrate’s court because he would not be able to produce the requisite certificate. And the applicant says that as the substantive claim only arose as a dispute on termination of the contract of employ- ment, by its failure to respond to the applicant’s earlier query on the matter or to afford him recourse to the dispute resolu- tion process, the respondent has conceded, effectively, that the termination of employment ended its obligations under the registered workplace agreement. Accordingly says the appli- cant, the respondent has no grounds for now denying the Commission has jurisdiction. Having considered all the submissions, the relevant terms of the registered workplace agreement and the relevant legis- lation I have concluded as follows. The jurisdiction of the Commission is founded in section 23 of the IR Act. It provides that, subject to the Act, the Commis- sion “has cognisance of and authority to enquire into and deal with any industrial matter”. That section goes on to provide for express exclusions from the jurisdiction. For this matter, though, the relevant exclusion provisions are contained in Part 1A of the IR Act. Section 7A of this Part provides that without limiting the other provisions in it, the IR Act has effect sub- ject, however, to the WPA Act. Section 7C(1)(a) and (b) of this Part precludes any matter that is part of the relationship between an employer and employee party to a registered workplace agreement being an industrial matter or capable of being agreed to be an industrial matter of capable of being determined under section 24(1) of the IR Act from being an industrial matter. Section 7C(3) extends the preclusion in sub- section (1) where a registered workplace agreement has expired and where there is a replacement agreement registered or an arrangement between the parties is provided for in the expired workplace agreement “except to the extent that the employer and any employee agree that any matter is to be treated as an industrial matter between them.” But in this case the term of the registered workplace agree- ment has not expired. The contract of employment it governed has ended. The termination of a contract of employment is the subject of section 14 of the WPA Act. It effectively expresses in subsection (1) that the end of a contract of employment results in a registered workplace agreement having no appli- cation (albeit still registered) unless there has been recourse to the enabling provision in subsection (2) subject to subsection (3) which provides that the ending of the contract of employ- ment does not end any rights or obligations in the registered workplace agreement to take effect after termination of the employment. There is no express reference to rights and obli- gations which have arisen under the contract of employment prior to its termination but there is nothing to be read into this in my view. An existing right such as a benefit arising out of service (e.g. an annual leave entitlement) is not disposed of by virtue of an end to the employment contract. It is noted that in this respect the applicant says that as he raised the issue the subject of his substantive claim with the employer prior to termination, then his right to access the dis- pute settlement provision as expressed in the registered workplace agreement was activated. And, in the absence of the employer accepting its responsibilities with respect to the dispute resolution provision to date, the applicant has a right per the registered workplace agreement to now access the Commission for determination of the dispute. But, and not- withstanding the other significant elements of the dispute resolution provisions which could give rise to questions as to its validity, it is quite clear that that part of the provision which purports to confer a right of access to the Commission on the parties to the registered workplace agreement is ultra vires. That is, the agreement between the parties to the registered workplace agreement in this respect is contrary to the law and thereby is void. It makes no difference whether or not the term of the registered workplace agreement has expired or the con- tract of employment it governed is ended. The applicant, relying on the obligations in the WPA Act for the Commissioner of Workplace Agreements to be satisfied before registration that the document sought to be registered contains, among other things, dispute resolution provisions, says that in this case the registration should not have occurred and must collapse. Whatever the merit of this argument, how- ever, the validity or otherwise of a registration of a workplace agreement is not a matter for which the Commission can de- termine. So far as the applicant’s argument is that the inability of the applicant to have the dispute resolution provisions apply with respect to his substantive claim because first, the prescribed provision in the registered workplace agreement amounts to an unlawful provision incapable of constituting a right and, second and in the alternative, the unwillingness of the em- ployer to follow it, acting as a bar to the applicant taking his claim to the Industrial Magistrate’s court, I make the follow- ing observations. While the matter of any certificate required in a particular case is one for the Industrial Magistrate, it seems to me that where it is established as fact that a dispute resolu- tion provision which has not been followed for either of the reasons advanced by the applicant, it is unlikely that the WPA Act could be read so narrowly on the matter of provision of a certificate so as to constitute a bar to having a claim for a contractual benefit determined. But, in any event, such a pro- spective outcome can not be said to give rise to a jurisdiction for the Commission in this case. Having particular regard for the provisions of the legislation governing the Commission and in relation to this registered workplace agreement, I have concluded there is no jurisdic- tion to enquire into and deal with the claim raised by the applicant. An order to that effect will now issue.