Kucks v CSR Limited
[1996] IRCA 166
IRCA
1996-04-19
cited 42×
Justice Madgwick
Leading authority
Treatment by later cases (67)
5 positive
62 neutral
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Applicant: Kucks
Respondent: CSR Limited
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Concept tags · 5
Cases cited in this decision · 6
Cited
[1993] HCA 46
— Scott v Sun Alliance Australia Ltd
"…ce. However terms like "ordinary rate of pay" and "standard hours" have well-known meanings in the sphere of industrial relations in this country, as is shown by what was said, admittedly in a different context, in...…"
Cited
(1993) 178 CLR 1
(not in corpus)
"…s like "ordinary rate of pay" and "standard hours" have well-known meanings in the sphere of industrial relations in this country, as is shown by what was said, admittedly in a different context, in Scott v Sun...…"
Cited
[1989] HCA 43
— Catlow v Accident Compensation Commission
"…, "ordinary time rate of pay" means the rate of pay for the standard or ordinary hours of work in contrast to the overtime or penalty rate of pay for hours of work other than the standard or ordinary hours [Catlow v....…"
Cited
(1989) 167 CLR 543
(not in corpus)
"…rate of pay" means the rate of pay for the standard or ordinary hours of work in contrast to the overtime or penalty rate of pay for hours of work other than the standard or ordinary hours [Catlow v. Accident...…"
Cited
[1974] HCA 50
(not in corpus)
"…or ordinary hours [Catlow v. Accident Compensation Commission [1989] HCA 43 ; (1989) 167 CLR 543 , at pp 555-556, 560)] In some contexts, "ordinary time" may mean "regular, normal, customary, usual" time [See Kezich...…"
Cited
(1974) 131 CLR 362
(not in corpus)
"…s [Catlow v. Accident Compensation Commission [1989] HCA 43 ; (1989) 167 CLR 543 , at pp 555-556, 560)] In some contexts, "ordinary time" may mean "regular, normal, customary, usual" time [See Kezich v. Leighton...…"
Subsequent treatment · 67
Positive treatment· 5
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¶48
Cited
Archived text (4093 words)
Kucks v CSR Limited [1996] IRCA 166 (19 April 1996)
DECISION NO: 141/96
CATCHWORDS
INDUSTRIAL LAW - AWARD INTERPRETATION - meaning of "ordinary rate of
pay"
INDUSTRIAL LAW - TERMINATION
OF EMPLOYMENT - REDUNDANCY - whether
long service leave entitlement include shift allowance
Industrial Relations Act 1988
(Cth):
s.179
, s.413
CSR Staff (Consolidated) Award 1992
Scott v Sun Alliance Australia Pty Ltd
[1993] HCA 46
;
(1993) 178 CLR 1
Catlow v Accident Compensation Commission
[1989] HCA 43
;
(1989) 167 CLR 543
Kezich v Leighton Contractors Pty Ltd
[1974] HCA 50
;
(1974) 131 CLR 362
TREVOR KUCKS v CSR LIMITED
QI201 of 1994
CORAM: MADGWICK J
PLACE: BRISBANE
DATE: 19 APRIL 1996
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS
COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
No. QI201 of 1994
BETWEEN TREVOR KUCKS
Applicant
AND CSR LIMITED
Respondent
CORAM: MADGWICK J
PLACE: BRISBANE
DATE: 19 APRIL 1996
MINUTES OF ORDER
1. The application is dismissed.
2. Judgment for the
respondent.
IN THE INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COURT OF AUSTRALIA
QUEENSLAND DISTRICT REGISTRY
No. QI201 of 1994
BETWEEN TREVOR KUCKS
Applicant
AND CSR LIMITED
Respondent
CORAM: MADGWICK J
PLACE: BRISBANE
DATE: 19 APRIL 1996
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
MADGWICK J:
The applicant sues, under
s179
of the
Industrial
Relations Act 1988
(Cth) for the recovery of an alleged underpayment
of an amount due to him, pursuant to the CSR Staff (Consolidated)
Award 1992 ("the
Award"), upon the termination of his services. He
claims a shade under $14,500, for underpayment of his untaken long
service leave
entitlement.
A long-term shift worker is retrenched
There is no dispute about the factual setting. Mr Kucks was
employed at the respondent's
New Farm refinery on 3rd March 1958
and worked continuously there for 36 years until his retrenchment on
29th April 1994. He had
been promoted to a position known as Shift
Superintendent and thereby to the salaried staff of the respondent
on 1st November 1987.
At all relevant times, his contract of
employment was governed by the Award, its predecessors and related
agreements.
As from August
1992 the respondent introduced at the New Farm
refinery a 38-hour, seven-day continuous shiftwork roster based on
12-hour shifts.
Mr Kucks worked in accordance with that roster until
his retrenchment. He was paid shift allowance of 40% of his
ordinary salary
for time worked on that roster. It is agreed that
that occurred pursuant to Clause 13(g) of the Award which is in
the following terms:
Employees working a seven-day continuous roster shall be paid an
allowance in lieu of afternoon and night shift allowances, weekend
penalty rates and payment for any rostered overtime shift included
in the cycle. This allowance shall be determined at each location
by the Company and the Association. Provided that employees working
a 7 day continuous roster which operates over a 4 week, 38 hours
per week, roster cycle shall be paid a shift allowance of 40% of
ordinary salary for time worked. (emphasis added)
When payment was
made to him, upon the termination of his services,
for untaken long service leave, Mr Kucks was paid for the relevant
period his
"salary" (within the meaning of Clause 4 of the Award),
but not the shift allowance of 40%. It is that non-payment which
is said
to constitute an underpayment, having regard to the terms
of the Award. Thus the case concerns the interpretation of the
Award, in
particular, the words "ordinary rate of pay" contained in
Clause 18(h).
The Award
Cl.18 of the Award is in the following terms:
"18. LONG SERVICE LEAVE
Entitlement to Leave
(a) Employees shall be entitled to long service leave in respect of
continuous service
with the Company.
Period of Leave
(b) (i) The amount of long service leave shall be as follows:
...
(3) In the case of an employee
who has completed at least twenty
years service, leave shall be calculated at the rate of 1.4 weeks
per each year of service.
(ii)
Such leave shall be granted and taken and, except as provided
elsewhere in this Clause, payment in lieu thereof shall not be made
or accepted.
(iii) Where termination of employment occurs after one year's
continuous service due to:
- resignation or retirement
at age 52 or more; or
- death or incapacity at any age;
long service leave will be calculated on the basis of 1.4 weeks
per year
of service.
...
(c) ...
(ii) The following absences shall not break the continuity of
service ...
(1) Absences following any termination
of the employment by the
Company on any ground other than slackness of trade, if the
employee is re-employed by the company within
period not exceeding
two months from the date of such termination.
(2) Absence following any termination of the employment by the
Company on the ground of slackness of trade if the employee is
re-employed by the Company within a period not exceeding six months
from the date of such termination.
...
Time of Taking Leave
(e) Long service leave shall be granted and taken at such time as
may
be agreed between the Company and the employee having regard to
the needs of the establishment where the employee is working.
Payment
on Termination for Leave not Taken
(f) Where the employment of an employee is terminated other than by
death and the employee has
an entitlement to long service leave,
the employee shall be deemed to have entered upon and taken the
leave from the date of such
termination and the Company shall
forthwith pay to the employee in full ordinary pay for such leave.
...
Payment of Period of Leave
(h) Each employee shall be paid for each week of leave the
employees ordinary rate of pay applicable at the date of taking the
period
of leave. Such rate of pay shall be for the standard hours
prescribed by the award.
For the purposes of this Clause, rate of pay
shall not include:
Overtime, commissions, bonuses, allowances or the like.
No deductions shall be made from the rate of pay for board
and/or
lodging or the like which is not provided and taken during the
period of leave.
Method of Payment
(i) Payment shall be made
in one of the following ways:
(i) in full before the employee goes on leave, or
(ii) at the same time as the employee's salary would
have been
paid if the employee had remained at work.
(iii) ...
Public Holidays and Annual Leave During Period of Leave
(j) Any long
service leave shall be inclusive of any public
holidays specified in the award occurring during the period when the
leave is taken,
but shall not be inclusive of any annual leave.
...
Leave to be in Satisfaction of all Rights
(l) The entitlement to long service
leave provided for in this
Clause shall be in substitution for and satisfaction of any other
long service leave, or benefit in the
nature of long service leave,
to which the employee may be entitled in respect of the service
referred to in subclause (a) hereof."
(emphasis added)
Other portions of the Award which may be relevant are set out in
Schedule 1 of these Reasons (again, where emphasis
is shown, I have
added it):
Legal principles
It is trite that narrow or pedantic approaches to the interpretation
of an award are
misplaced. The search is for the meaning intended
by the framer(s) of the document, bearing in mind that such
framer(s) were likely
of a practical bent of mind: they may well
have been more concerned with expressing an intention in ways likely
to have been understood
in the context of the relevant industry and
industrial relations environment than with legal niceties or jargon.
Thus, for example,
it is justifiable to read the award to give
effect to its evident purposes, having regard to such context,
despite mere inconsistencies
or infelicities of expression which might
tend to some other reading. And meanings which avoid inconvenience
or injustice may reasonably
be strained for. For reasons such as
these, expressions which have been held in the case of other
instruments to have been used to
mean particular things may sensibly
and properly be held to mean something else in the documen!
t at h
and.
But the task remains
one of interpreting a document produced by
another or others. A court is not free to give effect to some
anteriorly derived notion
of what would be fair or just, regardless
of what has been written into the award. Deciding what an existing
award means is a process
quite different from deciding, as an
arbitral body does, what might fairly be put into an award. So,
for example, ordinary or well-understood
words are in general to be
accorded their ordinary or usual meaning.
Considerations relevant to this award
It will be seen from annexure
"A" that the key expressions in the
award, rearranged in order of occurrence, are these:
from clause 18:
... from the date of [an
employee's] termination ... the Company
shall forthwith pay to the employee in full ordinary pay for
[untaken long service] leave.
...Each employee shall be paid for
each week of leave the employees ordinary rate of pay applicable at
the date of taking the period
of leave ...For the purposes of this
Clause, rate of pay shall not include: ...[o]vertime, commissions,
bonuses, allowances or the
like ...Such rate of pay shall be for
the standard hours prescribed by the award.
from clause 13:
Employees working a seven-day continuous
roster shall be paid an
allowance in lieu of afternoon and night shift allowances, weekend
penalty rates and payment for any rostered
overtime shift included
in the cycle. ... Provided that employees working a 7 day
continuous roster which operates over a 4 week,
38 hours per week,
roster cycle shall be paid a shift allowance of 40% of ordinary
salary for time worked.
The essential question,
therefore, is whether the phrase "allowances
or the like" in cl.18(h) includes what is referred to in cl.13(g)
as "shift allowance".
I conclude that it does.
The estimable Macquarie Dictionary, (2nd edn.) gives the relevant
meaning of "allowance" as "an addition
on account of some
extenuating or qualifying circumstance". That meaning for the word,
as used in each of the subclauses referred
to, seems to me to be
apt.
To my mind, not only is there nothing in the award to indicate
the necessity for a departure from the
plain meaning of the word
"allowance", but ample reason to confirm that such was what was
intended.
That shift allowances should
not be included is consonant with the
notions also expressed in cl.18 that employees should receive their
"ordinary rate of pay applicable"
and that such "rate of pay
[should] be for the standard hours prescribed by the award".
The genesis of the main argument for the
applicant is that, prima
facie, "ordinary" means "usual", and usually Mr Kucks' rate of pay
included his shift allowance. However
terms like "ordinary rate of
pay" and "standard hours" have well-known meanings in the sphere of
industrial relations in this country,
as is shown by what was said,
admittedly in a different context, in Scott v Sun Alliance Australia
Ltd
[1993] HCA 46
;
(1993) 178 CLR 1.
That case involved the interpretation of a
Tasmanian workers compensation statute which provided for compensation
for incapacity
to work at the
"ordinary time rate of pay of the worker for...work...engaged in
immediately before the period of incapacity"
Immediately
before the worker was injured he had worked a 16 hour
week. The relevant award provided for an ordinary week of 38 hours.
It was
held by the High Court that "ordinary time rate of pay"
referred to a rate fixed by an industrial award and not to the
hours agreed
by an individual employment contract. The Court said
(at 5):
The expression "ordinary time rate of pay" is well known in the
industrial
relations field in Australia and New Zealand. It and
similar terms have long been used in legislation. [See for example,
Annual Holidays Act 1944
(N.S.W.),
s.2(1)
; Workers' Compensation Act
1956 (N.Z.), s.15(1) (now repealed);
Accident Compensation Act 1985
(Vic.), s.95(1) (now repealed)] Unless the context otherwise requires,
"ordinary time rate of pay" means the rate of pay for the
standard
or ordinary hours of work in contrast to the overtime or penalty
rate of pay for hours of work other than the standard or
ordinary
hours [Catlow v. Accident Compensation Commission
[1989] HCA 43
;
(1989) 167 CLR 543
,
at pp 555-556, 560)]
In some contexts, "ordinary time" may mean "regular, normal,
customary, usual" time [See Kezich v. Leighton
Contractors Pty. Ltd.
[1974] HCA 50
;
(1974) 131 CLR 362
, at p 365.] Thus in Kezich v. Leighton
Contractors Pty. Ltd. [...] this Court held that the words "the
ordinary hours he would have
worked, if he were not incapacitated
for work as a result of the injury" in cl.2 of the Schedule to
the Workers' Compensation Act
1912 (W.A.) referred to the hours
during which it was usual for the employee to work. In that case,
Gibbs J considered that it was
not legitimate to construe the
statute by reference to the meaning which the words bore in
industrial awards and agreements ((10)
ibid, at p.364.). However, in
this case, unlike Kezich, the relevant expression "ordinary time rate
of pay" has an established and
special meaning in the context of
employment and industrial relations. Accordingly, it is that meaning
which the words must bear
in s.69(1)(a) in their application to
employment go!
verned
by an industrial award or agreement. In such an award or agreement,
the
expression "ordinary time" cannot mean the customary or usual
hours of work. That being so, no justification exists for
interpreting
the expression in its application to an individual
employment contract as meaning the customary or usual hours of work.
In s.69(1)(a)(ii),
"ordinary time" means the fixed standard hours as
opposed to overtime or usual or customary time. However, just as
individual employment
contracts usually fail to distinguish between
"ordinary time rates" of pay and other rates of pay, so do the
majority of them fail
to distinguish between the fixed standard
hours and other working time. Consequently, s.69(1)(a)(ii) would seem
to have little scope
for operation in relation to private employment
contracts. By itself, this factor could not be decisive, but it is
strong confirmation
of the construction which flows from the presence
of s.69(3) in the Act.
(emphasis added)
There can be no doubt that "standard hours"
prescribed by this
award referred to a 38-hour week.
In Australia, the term "ordinary pay" has, according to the
Macquarie Dictionary,
2nd edn, entered the language, as meaning:
"ordinary pay .... remuneration for an employee's normal weekly
number of hours fixed
under the terms of his employment but
excluding any amount payable to him for shift work, overtime, or
other penalty."
That meaning
of ordinary is even more apt in the context of the
present award.
It seems clear that the term "allowances or the like" as used in
cl.18(h) must include allowances prescribed by the award as well as
any other which might be paid by the employer. There is nothing
in
the concept of the cl.13 shift allowances as compared with other
award allowances that would require or indicate that they were
not
to be within the ambit of that term. The award provides expressly
for very few "allowances": only for weekend work (cl.12); as
a
possibility for overtime remuneration (cl.14.d.ii), and for meals when
working overtime (cl.14.i). Other award payments which might
be
comprehended by the phrase are hard to find: the 20% loading for
casuals would not be included because such employees do not receive
long service entitlements (cl.9).
When the framer(s) of the award wished to indicate that full, usual
pay should be paid, they had
no difficulty in making their meaning
plain. For example, in cl.16, in relation to annual leave, it was
provided:
(a) ... annual
leave shall be granted on full pay ...
...
Loading on annual leave
(i) An employee shall receive a loading of 20% on pay for annual
leave subject to a limit of $1000 .... Unless otherwise agreed
...the payment will be ... calculated on the salary then applying.
Except that seven day continuous workers, in place of the annual
leave loading ... shall be paid for their annual leave at the
average
rate paid as if working, including the shift provisions
prescribed in subclause 13(h).
And under cl.17 employees are entitled to
sick leave "on full pay".
So far as the award's own provisions are concerned, no anomaly
appears. The position of a regular shiftworker
in relation to the
rate of payment for long service leave is, for example, no harder
than that of a regular overtime worker compensated
for the overtime
in the ways contemplated by cl.14(d)(ii) and cl 14(e), the latter
being the default mode as it were in the computer
age of
compensation. Insofar as the award distinguishes between long service
leave and annual and sick leave in the quantum of payment,
this
can readily be accounted for by the different purposes, likely
extent and cost, and industrial history of the different kinds
of
leave.
It might be felt rather hard on a longtime permanent shiftworker
like Mr. Kucks that his long service leave or, upon retrenchment,
his pay in lieu, should not include his everyday 40% shift
allowance. Nevertheless, it is a long jump from there to the
conclusion
that, having regard to all of the award's provisions, the
framer(s) of it were not content enough with that outcome, even if
the
words used in the award would permit such a conclusion to be
arrived at in an interpretive process. Such a conclusion would
require
a weighing of the award's overall benefits to all employees
and some comparison of those benefits with industrial standards. Such
a task was essayed here by neither counsel, no doubt for the
excellent reason that that is the job of an award-maker rather than
an award-interpreter. In any case, in my view, the words of the
award in their ordinary and "industrial context" meaning that there
is no room for effect to be given to any such conclusion. As it
happen!
s, at
my request, counsel did investigate whether, among
the plethora of
instruments across Australia that grant long service leave - State
and Commonwealth Acts, Federal arbitrators and
consent awards, State
agreement, and so on there was any standard as to inclusion of
shift allowances for permanent shift workers
in the rate of pay for
long service leave purposes. Counsel agreed that the picture was one
of diversity, rather than uniformity.
Conclusion
For these reasons, the claim must fail.
SCHEDULE 1
"4. RATES OF SALARY
...
(b) The award rate of annual salary for
adult employees shall be
... in accordance with the following 5 level structure:
...
5. DEFINITIONS
"Employee" shall mean a salaried
employee of the Company employed at
a yearly rate of pay in the Company ...
6. PAYMENT OF SALARIES
(a) Salaries shall be paid monthly
or at such other regular
intervals as may be agreed ...
8. PART-TIME EMPLOYEES
(a) Unless otherwise agreed between [the parties]
...
(ii) part-time employees shall be paid in accordance with the annual
salary provided for in Clause 4 of this award reduced on
a
pro-rata basis;
(iii) the provisions of this award with respect to holidays, annual
leave, sick leave, long service leave and maternity
leave shall
apply to part-time employees on a pro-rata basis;
...
9. CASUAL EMPLOYEES
(a) Unless otherwise agreed between [the parties]
...
(ii) the ordinary time rate of pay for a casual employee shall be
calculated by adding 20% to the appropriate annual salary rate
shown
in Clause 4 of this award and dividing the result by 52 (weeks)
and then by 38 (hours);
...
11. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT
Either
the employee or the company may terminate the contract of
employment by giving the appropriate notice, or the appropriate
salary
in lieu of notice may be paid or forfeited as the case may
be.
...
12. HOURS
(a) That ordinary hours of work will not exceed an
average of 38
per week provided that:
...
(iv) An employee working ordinary hours on either Saturday or Sunday
but not both days
will be paid an allowance of $54.41 per day
worked on either Saturday or Sunday.
(v) An employee working ordinary hours on both Saturday
and Sunday
will be paid an allowance of $106.11 per day...
...
13. SHIFT WORK
The following conditions shall apply to shift work:
...
(c) Employees working afternoon or night shift over a five day
roster shall be paid the following shift allowances, calculated
as a
percentage of the ordinary rate of salary for the appropriate job
classification:
Afternoon shift 17%
Night shift, rotating
20%
Night shift, non-rotating 30%
...
(g) Employees working a seven-day continuous roster shall be paid an
allowance in lieu of afternoon
and night shift allowances, weekend
penalty rates and payment for any rostered overtime shift included
in the cycle. ...Provided
that employees working a 7 day continuous
roster which operates over a 4 week, 38 hours per week, roster
cycle shall be paid a shift
allowance of 40% of ordinary salary
for time worked.
(h) Shift allowances prescribed by this clause will not be payable
where the
time worked attracts an overtime payment in accordance
with this award.
14. OVERTIME
(a) Employees may be expected to work reasonable
hours in excess of
ordinary working hours.
(b) An employee who is requested to work in excess of the hours
prescribed in Clauses
12 or 13 shall be paid in accordance with
this Clause.
...
(d) Compensation for overtime worked will be additional pay for
specific
hours worked or, alternatively and subject to agreement
between the employee and the Company, compensation may take the form
of:
(i) equivalent ordinary time off in lieu;
(ii) an allowance that realistically reflects the expected amount of
overtime to be worked;
(iii) an annual rate of salary set in recognition of the hours of
work involved.
(e) Except as provided for in subclause (d) above
pay for specific
hours worked outside ordinary working hours shall be as follows:
Mon to Fri - Time and a half for the first two
hours
and
Double time thereafter.
Saturdays - Time and a half for the first two hours
and
Double time thereafter.
Sundays - Double
time.
If rostered
on seven day
continuous
shift work - Double time for all time worked in excess of ordinary
working hours.
...
15.
HOLIDAYS
(a) The following public holidays, as they may be observed in a
particular State or such other days as may be observed in
lieu of
any of them, shall be granted by the Company without deduction of
pay: ...
(b) All time worked by the direction of the Company
on any of the
above holidays shall be paid at the rate of double time and one
half the ordinary rate of pay...
...
16. ANNUAL LEAVE
(a) Employees shall be entitled to four weeks leave of absence
annually. Such annual leave shall be granted on full pay ...
...
(h)
In addition to the leave prescribed above, seven day continuous
shift employees shall be allowed one week's leave including
non-working
days.
...
Loading on annual leave
(i) An employee shall receive a loading of 20% on pay for annual
leave subject to a limit of $1000
in... . Unless otherwise agreed
...the payment will be made in ... calculated on the salary then
applying.
Except that seven day
continuous workers, in place of the annual
leave loading ... shall be paid for their annual leave at the
average rate paid as if
working, including the shift provisions
prescribed in subclause 13(h).
17. SICK LEAVE
(a) All employees shall, subject to the production
of a medical
certificate or any other evidence satisfactory to the Company, be
entitled to sick leave on full pay in accordance with
the
provisions of this clause.
..."
I certify that this and the preceding 13 pages are a true copy of
the Reasons for Judgment of
His Honour Justice Madgwick.
Associate:
Dated: 19 April 1996
APPEARANCES
Counsel for the Applicant: J A Logan
Solicitor for the
Applicant: C A Sciacca & Associates
Counsel for the Respondent: J Murdoch
Agent for the Respondent: John Scoble of Change Leaders
Pty Ltd
Date of hearing: 8 November 1995
??
14 Note: Settlement and entry of orders is dealt with by Order 36
of the Industrial
Relations Court Rules.