APPLICATION FOR AN ENTERPRISE ORDER PURSUANT TO SECTION 42I WESTERN AUSTRALIAN INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS COMMISSION CITATION : 2026 WAIRC 00208 CORAM :Senior Commissioner R Cosentino HEARD : On the papers, Last SUBMISSIONS RECEIVED on 8 April 2026 DELIVERED : Thursday, 9 April 2026 FILE NO. : APPL 33 OF 2025 BETWEEN : The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union of Workers Applicant AND CITY OF CANNING First Respondent WESTERN AUSTRALIAN MUNICIPAL, ADMINISTRATIVE, CLERICAL AND SERVICES UNION OF EMPLOYEES Second Respondent LOCAL GOVERNMENT, RACING AND CEMETERIES EMPLOYEES UNION (WA) Third Respondent CatchWords : Industrial Law (WA) - Application for stay or adjournment of proceedings pending finalisation of matter before the Commission in Court Session - Whether substantial identity of interest between two proceedings - Where utility of proceedings is temporal - Where effect of other proceedings is uncertain - Whether grant of adjournment is in public interest - balancing right of applicant to prosecute case - Application for adjourment dismissed Legislation : Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) Result : Application dismissed Representation: : (on the papers) Counsel: Applicant Mr R Cardinal on behalf of The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union of Workers First Respondent Mr C Beetham of counsel on behalf of the City of Canning Second Respondent Mr C Fogliani of counsel on behalf of Western Australian Municipal, Administrative, Clerical and Services Union Of Employees Third Respondent Mr K Trainer on behalf of the Local Government, Racing and Cemeteries Employees Union (WA) Solicitors: First Respondent Minter Ellison Second Respondent Fogliani Lawyers Case(s) referred to in reasons: City of Canning v Western Australian Municipal, Clerical and Services Union (WASU) & Ors [2026] WAIRC 00005; (2026) 106 WAIG 58 City of Canning v Western Australian Municipal, Clerical and Services Union (WASU) & Ors [2026] WAIRC 00010 City of Canning v Western Australian Municipal, Clerical and Services Union (WASU) & Ors [2025] WAIRC 00265; (2025) 105 WAIG 797 Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v DFD Rhodes Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 77(S) ; (2020) 386 ALR 632 Hanssen Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (Western Australian Branch) [2004] WAIRC 10828; (2004) 84 WAIG 694 L & W Developments Pty Ltd v Della [2003] NSWCA 140 Re Sterling Pharmaceuticals Pty Limited v the Boots Company (Australia) Pty Limited [1992] FCA 72; (1992) 34 FCR 287 The Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees, West Australian Branch v Public Transport Authority, Minister for Commerce, The Rail Car Driver Group [2011] WAIRC 00157; (2011) 91 WAIG 694 === REASONS FOR DECISION === ¶1 On 1 August 2025, I granted an application by the first respondent, the City of Canning, to adjourn these proceedings pending the determination of other proceedings, AG 9 of 2025. AG 9 of 2025 was the City’s application to register an industrial agreement under s 41 of the Industrial Relations Act 1979 (WA) (IR Act). The Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union of Workers (CFMEUW) was an intervenor in AG 9 of 2025. The relief CFMEUW sought in AG 9 of 2025 included the variation of the industrial agreement to add the CFMEUW as a party to it. ¶2 In these proceedings, the CFMEUW seeks an enterprise order under s 42I of the IR Act in terms which are broadly the same as the terms and conditions of the industrial agreement which was the subject of AG 9 of 2025. ¶3 On 1 August 2025, I stayed these proceedings on the basis that there was a possibility that the outcome of AG 9 of 2025 would resolve the core industrial dispute, if not issues common to both proceedings, or render these proceedings entirely moot or unnecessary. I had regard to the fact that AG 9 of 2025 had been commenced first and was significantly advanced at the point that the City made its application. ¶4 On 7 January 2026, Commissioner Kucera delivered reasons for decision in AG 9 of 20 25 and subsequently made orders registering the industrial agreement which was the subject of that application without adding the CFMEUW as party to the industrial agreement: City of Canning v Western Australian Municipal, Clerical and Services Union (WASU) & Ors [2026] WAIRC 00005 (AG 9 of 2025 Reasons); (2026) 106 WAIG 58 & City of Canning v Western Australian Municipal, Clerical and Services Union (WASU) & Ors [2026] WAIRC 00010. The determination of AG 9 of 2025 did not resolve these proceedings. The adjournment of these proceedings ended as of 7 January 2026. ¶5 On 20 March 2026, the City made a second application to adjourn or stay these proceedings. This time, the application is for the proceedings to be adjourned pending the outcome of other proceedings before the Commission in Court Session: CICS 9 of 2023. In CICS 9 of 2023, WASU seeks orders under s 72A of the IR Act that the CFMEUW does not have the right to represent any person employed by local government enterprises in their outside workforces. The City is not a party to CICS 9 of 2023. ¶6 CICS 9 of 2023 was heard by the Commission in Court Session on multiple dates in 2024 and 2025.The last hearing day was 19 November 2025. The Commission in Court Session has reserved its decision. ¶7 The City says that these proceedings should be adjourned until the outcome of CICS 9 of 2023 is known because, if WASU obtains the orders it seeks in CICS 9 of 2023, then the City’s employees will in effect be ineligible to be members of the CFMEUW and the CFMEUW would not have the right to represent those persons. Further, it would follow that the Commission would not be able to make an enterprise order as sought in these proceedings because the Commission would not be able to register any hypothetical agreement between the City and the CFMEUW as an industrial agreement because of the operation of s 41A(2) of the IR Act and the consequential operation of s 42I(1)(c) of the IR Act means an enterprise order could not be made either. ¶8 The City submits: 10 Given the fundamental impact that CICS 9 may have on the competence of the CFMEUW’s Application and the Commission’s power to grant the order the CFMEUW seeks, the Commission should await the outcome of CICS 9 before the CFMEUW’s Application advances any further. It is akin to the situation where, because a first instance decision may be affected by a pending appellate decision, the first instance decision is adjourned to await the outcome of the appeal. An example is Sang v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship and Multicultural Affairs [2023] FCA 1572 [10]-[12]. 11 If these proceedings were not adjourned, an enterprise order was made, and then CICS 9 was determined against the CFMEUW, a pandora’s box of difficult questions about the validity and enforceability of the enterprise order (both present and ab initio), and its interaction with any industrial agreements (see s 42J(3)), would be opened. That would almost certainly lead to further litigation between the CFMEUW and the City, which would be prejudicial to both and contrary to the objects of the IR Act. 12 Employees suffer no prejudice if the Application is adjourned. That is because the terms and conditions of employment sought by the CFMEUW in the Application already apply to the City’s employees by reason of the City of Canning Industrial Agreement 2025, which was registered earlier this year by the Commission. 13 Nor is the CFMEUW’s position prejudiced in the sense of it being detrimentally affected when compared to the status quo. The status quo is that the CFMEUW is not a party to the City’s industrial agreement. The adjournment will not change that. The only potential prejudice is that the hearing of the CFMEUW’s claim to be entitled to an enterprise order in terms which mirror the City’s existing industrial agreement will be deferred. 14 That the CFMEUW may, if it succeeds on its Application for an enterprise order, obtain further limited rights, is not a basis to assert prejudice arising from the adjournment. As mentioned, the status quo is those rights are not present – the adjournment does not change that position. The asserted prejudice also assumes that the CFMEUW will succeed in obtaining an enterprise order in terms which mirror the City’s industrial agreement and that proposition must, respectfully, at least be doubted given the existence of that industrial agreement and the Commission’s obligation only to make the order sought if it is “fair and reasonable” to do so: s 42I(1)(d). ¶9 WASU and the Local Government, Racing and Cemeteries Employees Union WA (LGRCEU) support the City’s application to adjourn these proceedings. Legal Principles ¶10 Section 27(1)(f) of the IR Act gives the Commission the power to adjourn proceedings. The exercise of the power is discretionary. The City as applicant bears the onus of satisfying the Commission that the discretion should be exercised. ¶11 In exercising the discretion, the starting point is the prima facie right of the CFMEUW to prosecute proceedings that it has regularly commenced: Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd v DFD Rhodes Pty Ltd [2020] WASCA 77(S) ; (2020) 386 ALR 632 [554], [643]. I must also take into account s 22B’s requirement that the Commission act with as much speed as the requirements of the IR Act and a proper consideration of the matter before it permits. ¶12 The relevant factors in determining whether to grant an adjournment which operates as a stay are set out in Hancock Prospecting Pty Ltd at [554] (citations omitted): (1) Relevant considerations to an application of this kind include: • Which proceeding was commenced first. • Whether the termination of one proceeding is likely to have a material effect on the other. • The public interest. • The undesirability of two courts competing to see which of them determines common facts first. • Consideration of circumstances relating to witnesses. • Whether work done on pleadings, particulars, discovery, interrogatories and preparation might be wasted. • The undesirability of substantial waste of time and effort if it becomes a common practice to bring actions in two courts involving substantially the same issues. • How far advanced the proceedings are in each court. • The law should strive against permitting multiplicity of proceedings in relation to similar issues. • Generally balancing the advantages and disadvantages to each party. (2) Prima facie, where a plaintiff has properly commenced proceedings in court, it is entitled to prosecute those proceedings. (3) There should be no prejudice to a plaintiff beyond that which the interests of justice are thought to justify. (4) It has been said that the plaintiff's prima facie right to prosecute properly commenced proceedings is only displaced in rare and compelling circumstances. This has been taken to require a convincing case, so that where the relevant factors are evenly balanced, the discretion should be exercised against the grant of a stay. Consideration Which proceeding was commenced first ¶13 Each of the City, WASU and LGRCEU submit that the fact that CICS 9 of 2023 was commenced before these proceedings is a factor that weighs in favour of a stay. In the circumstances of this case, this factor has little weight. ¶14 The core of the industrial dispute behind these proceedings centres on the City’s position that it would not agree to the CFMEUW being party to an industrial agreement unless and until CICS 9 of 2023 was determined in the CFMEUW’s favour. Indeed, the fact that WASU had instigated CICS 9 of 2023 was the real origin of the industrial dispute which has necessitated the CFMEUW’s present application. As Commissioner Kucera observed in AG 9 of 2025 Reasons at [23]-[25]: 23 Noting the COC has an interest in the 72A proceedings, particularly as it is a party to CICS 9 of 2023, the COC has formed the view, that the outcome of the 72A proceedings has the potential to decide the issues of: i. whether any of its employees, who are bound by the proposed agreement are eligible to be members of the CFMEUW, thereby determining whether the CFMEUW has the right to become a party to the proposed agreement; or ii. if the WASU and LGRCEU should have the exclusive rights to represent the industrial interests of the outside employees who work for the COC. 24 It is on this basis, the COC says, that it was not prepared to agree to the CFMEUW being a party to the proposed agreement, until after the 72A proceedings are determined. 25 For this reason, the COC throughout the negotiations for the proposed agreement, maintained that its position on the representation issue was dependent upon what happened in the 72A proceedings. ¶15 I note incidentally that Commissioner Kucera’s reference to the City being party to CICS 9 of 2023 is technically incorrect. ¶16 As the CFMEUW submits, CICS 9 of 2023 was commenced long ago and the parties have been alive for the potential for that matter to affect the CFMEUW’s future rights with respect to coverage from the outset. In these circumstances, CICS 9 of 2023’s precedence should not be both a cause of the industrial dispute and a reason for deferring the resolution of the industrial dispute. Whether the termination of one proceeding is likely to have a material effect on the other ¶17 Undeniably, if the Commission in Court Session makes an order under s 72A(2) against the CFMEUW in relation to the City’s employees before these proceedings are determined, this will have a material effect on these proceedings because either the Commission will not be able to make the enterprise order that the CFMEUW seeks, or it will not be able to make an enterprise order at all. ¶18 However, not only is it not certain that the Commission in Court Session will make such an order, it is not certain when the Commission in Court Session will make any order in CICS 9 of 2023. The ‘material effect’ of CICS 9 of 2023 which the City and other unions rely upon as the main plank of their support for an adjournment is dependent on WASU’s success in CICS 9 of 2023 in relation to the City of Canning, and the timing of the Commission in Court Session’s orders. An outcome in CICS 9 of 2023 that involves CFMEUW’s coverage rules being amended with respect to the City of Canning or local government more generally are amongst a myriad of potential outcomes of those proceedings. Other potential outcomes may not have any effect on this matter. ¶19 Under s 42K of the IR Act, an enterprise order operates for the term specified in the order. The enterprise order that the CFMEUW seeks in these proceedings would operate for a term commencing on the date when the Commission makes the order: Form 1 General Application filed on 27 June 2025, Annexure B, clause 1.4. ¶20 The utility that might be obtained from an enterprise order is these proceedings is temporal. As the CFMEUW submits, if these proceedings are delayed, the utility of this application may become null. ¶21 There is a possibility that these proceedings could be determined before the Commission in Court Session makes any order in which case, any resulting enterprise order will have effect from the date of its operation. ¶22 The CFMEUW has undertaken to consent to a variation of any prospective enterprise order with the City consistent with any variation to the CFMEUW’s eligibility to cover employees at the City following the outcome of CICS 9 of 2023. This undertaking ameliorates the City’s concern that the outcome of CICS 9 of 2023 might create uncertainty as to the validity or effect of an enterprise order made in these proceedings. The undesirability of two courts competing to see which of them determines common facts first ¶23 The City does not point to any particular common facts or issues between these proceedings and CICS 9 of 2023. However, WASU submits that ‘an issue that will arise in this matter is the scope of the CFMEUW’s eligibility rules.’ WASU refers in particular to the scope of the CFMEUW’s painters and engine drivers coverage rules. It submits that the decision in CICS 9 of 2023 is likely to ‘shed light’ on that issue. ¶24 WASU’s submission does not go so far as to say that there is any issue in CICS 9 of 2023 in relation to the eligibility of the City’s employees for membership of the CFMEUW. That is likely because the Commission in Court Session has not been invited to make a finding in relation to whether employees are presently eligible to be members of the CFMEUW, that is, eligible at the time an enterprise order might be made.. ¶25 Perhaps surprisingly, the CFMEUW’s application does not specify the basis upon which it says employees who will be bound by the proposed enterprise order are members of or eligible to be members of the CFMEUW. Its grounds for its application are mostly based on its involvement in bargaining with the City. The only references to eligibility is in paragraph [44] where the CFMEUW says ‘There are employees eligible to be members of the CFMEUW at the City’ and paragraph [46] which refers to members, ‘including tradespeople’. ¶26 In AG 9 of 2025, the CFMEUW’s witness, Nathan Fisher, described categories of employees who work at the City as including carpenters and painters, who Mr Fisher claimed the CFMEUW was entitled to represent: AG 9 of 2025 Reasons at [78]. ¶27 At this stage in these proceedings, no one has advanced a case as to which of the City’s current employees are or are not eligible for membership with the CFMEUW. WASU’s submission that an issue will arise is speculative. If an issue does arise, its metes and bounds are as yet, undefined. The parties might reasonably hope that the Commission in Court Session’s decision will shed light, but it will not be a spotlight. It might be a faint glimmer when it reaches the particular issues that arise in this matter. That is not sufficient to deny the CFMEUW the right to have the factual issues in this case determined in the ordinary course. ¶28 WASU further submits that there is an overlapping issue, and will be overlapping evidence, between these proceedings and CICS 9 of 2023 in relation to ‘the industrial behaviour of the CFMEUW in the local government industry in Western Australia.’ WASU says it intends to lead evidence in these proceedings relating to the CFMEUW indiscriminately enrolling persons into its membership despite those persons clearly not being eligible for membership. ¶29 WASU has not pointed to any basis upon which the Commission should entertain an exercise like the one it has contemplated in proceedings under s 42I. I am not aware of any previous case brought under s 42I where the Commission has been asked to have regard to a party’s industrial behaviour in an industry as relevant to the exercise of the Commission’s power to make an enterprise order. This is not a consideration expressed in s 26 of the IR Act, nor does it arise from the IR Act’s objects. I doubt the Commission is permitted to have regard to ‘industrial behaviour’ in light of the established approach to s 42I, and the nature of proceedings under s 42I as expressed, for example, by Commissioner Kenner (as he then was) in The Australian Rail, Tram and Bus Industry Union of Employees, West Australian Branch v Public Transport Authority, Minister for Commerce, The Rail Car Driver Group [2011] WAIRC 00157; (2011) 91 WAIG 694 at [269]-[271]. In proceedings under s 42I the Commission is to act according to equity, good conscience and the substantial merits of the case. Enterprise orders are made to resolve industrial disputes. The case is about the arbitrated future rights and obligations of the parties. ¶30 In Hanssen Pty Ltd v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (Western Australian Branch) [2004] WAIRC 10828; (2004) 84 WAIG 694, the appellant’s second ground of appeal concerned the prescription of s 42I(1)(c) and (d) of the IR Act and the manner by which the discretion is to be exercised. The Full Bench dealt with that ground but noted at [114] that the ground was raised in circumstances where Hanssen had not contested any of the terms of the proposed enterprise order, but rather had opposed the making of an enterprise order on the basis of enmity between it and the applicant union, and the applicant union’s alleged unsatisfactory conduct. The Commissioner at first instance made no express findings about the applicant union’s conduct, on which the making of an enterprise order turned, instead considering only whether the terms of the proposed enterprise order were fair and reasonable and whether an enterprise order ought to be made. The Full Bench was satisfied that ‘no step was omitted’ in the Commissioner’s approach: Hanssen Pty Ltd [113]-[114]. ¶31 I do not accept WASU’s submission that these proceedings will involve issues or evidence about the CFMEUW’s conduct in enrolling members and I do not accept that this is an issue in these proceedings which overlaps with CICS 9 of 2023. ¶32 In these proceedings, WASU’s and LGRCEU’s practical interests are secondary or indirect. The outcome of these proceedings will determine substantive rights and obligations for the CFMEUW, the City and the City’s outside workforce employees. However, no substantive relief is sought against WASU and the LGRCEU. They are named as respondents to these proceedings in order that they can be named as a party to any enterprise order which might be made, which in turn would confer rights on them to enforce the order, or be party to a variation to it. ¶33 These unions’ opposition to the application is therefore not about advancing the interests of their members or employees who may be covered by the proposed enterprise order. Their opposition is about constraining the CFMEUW’s influence at the City, and perhaps also in local government more generally. This motivation should not mean that these proceedings become a vehicle for those unions to continue a wide and generalised demarcation dispute with the CFMEUW. ¶34 Ultimately, I am not persuaded that there is a substantial identity of issues between these proceedings and CICS 9 of 2023 to trigger the application of this factor. Public interest ¶35 WASU submits that it would not be in the public interest for the issues in relation to the CFMEUW’s coverage to be agitated before me, where the same issue is before the Commission in Court Session. It says that it is contrary to the public interest for me to make rulings on the issues in these proceedings when I am also one of the three members of the Commission in Court Session in CICS 9 of 2023. ¶36 As detailed under the previous heading, it is not apparent at this stage that the issues in CICS 9 of the 2023 and these proceedings are common, or that I will be required to make findings in these proceedings which will also arise for the Commission in Court Session’s determination. ¶37 This position might change as the issues in these proceedings are fleshed out. If and when that position becomes apparent, adjourning the proceedings may be one possible course to preserve public interest. But it is not the only course open. ¶38 Another public interest argument WASU raises is that the CFMEUW was only able to commence these proceedings because of the delays it had caused in AG 9 of 2025. WASU says ‘In these proceedings, the CFMEUW is the beneficiary of the delays it caused to the City, the LGRCEU, the WASU, and the City’s workforce through its unsuccessful arguments in AG 9 of 2025. But for the delays, the CFMEUW would not have been able to make this application.’ ¶39 WASU does not suggest that the CFMEUW’s conduct as a litigant in AG 9 of 2025 delayed resolution of AG 9 of 2025. Rather, I understand WASU’s argument to be that the CFMEUW’s mere involvement in AG 9 of 2025 and its opposition to the application in AG 9 of 2025 caused delay in the ultimate registration of the industrial agreement the subject of AG 9 of 2025. ¶40 I do not see how this raises a public interest reason for adjourning these proceedings. The CFMEUW was granted leave to intervene in AG 9 of 2025 on the basis that it had a sufficient interest in those proceedings arising from the effects of registration of the industrial agreement on the CFMEUW’s ability to represent the industrial interests of any City employees who are members of or eligible to be members of the CFMEUW, and because of the CFMEUW’s involvement in bargaining for the industrial agreement: City of Canning v Western Australian Municipal, Clerical and Services Union (WASU) & Ors [2025] WAIRC 00265; (2025) 105 WAIG 797 [144]. WASU did not suggest the issues the CFMEUW raised in AG 9 of 2025 were baseless or without merit. To accept WASU’s argument that adjourning these proceedings is warranted by the public interest in these circumstances is akin to penalising the CFMEUW for exercising its right to participate in proceedings before the Commission. ¶41 A slightly different submission is made by the LGRCEU. It points to the CFMEUW’s delay in issuing a Notice to Initiate Bargaining as a reason to grant the application. It notes that bargaining had reached a conclusion on all issues other than the CFMEUW’s party status by December 2024 and suggests that the CFMEUW ought to have acted at that point to lay the groundwork for this application. Instead, it waited until 4 June 2025 to issue a Notice to Initiate Bargaining. ¶42 However, the LGRCEU did not articulate why this meant that the application for an adjournment should be granted. The suggestion that is implicit is that the proceedings ought to be adjourned to punish the CFMEUW for tardiness. Circumstances relating to witnesses ¶43 No one has suggested this factor is relevant to the present case. Whether work done on pleadings, particulars, discovery, interrogatories and preparation might be wasted ¶44 There is a possibility that determination of CICS 9 of 2023 will resolve these proceedings, so that adjourning these proceedings pending that determination will prevent wasted work. This factor favours the grant of an adjournment. ¶45 I give this factor more limited weight than it might carry in other cases because the City is not party to CICS 9 of 2023, and so has not ‘been vexed’ by having to prepare for two sets of proceedings. The undesirability of substantial waste of time and effort if it becomes a common practice to bring actions in two courts involving substantially the same issues. ¶46 These proceedings do not involve substantially the same issues as CICS 9 of 2023. The City is not party to the CICS 9 of 2023. CICS 9 of 2023 is not a proceeding brought to resolve an industrial dispute concerning bargaining for an industrial agreement at the City of Canning. This factor is not relevant in the present case. How far advanced the proceedings are in each court. ¶47 These proceedings are still in their early stages relative to CICS 9 of 2023. However, the City has delayed in bringing this application. CICS 9 of 2023 was on foot when the City made its first application to adjourn or stay these proceedings. It had the opportunity to make its case based on the grounds it currently advances at the time it first applied. The City’s own conduct has caused some extent of wasted time and effort. The law should strive against permitting multiplicity of proceedings in relation to similar issues ¶48 Again, I am not currently persuaded that these proceedings involve similar issues or sufficiently similar issues to regard this factor as relevant in this case. Generally balancing the advantages and disadvantages to each party ¶49 The advantage of adjourning these proceedings is that it might save the parties and the Commission from work which could be wasted, depending on how CICS 9 of 2023 is determined. That saving is a possibility not a certainty. ¶50 The disadvantage of adjourning these proceedings is that it will practically deprive the CFMEUW the opportunity to prosecute its case for an enterprise order regardless of the outcome of CICS 9 of 2023. The enterprise order which the CFMEUW is seeking would have a proposed nominal expiry date of 30 June 2027: Form 1 Annexure A clause 1.4. The period of operation of the enterprise order is a factor relevant to the question of whether an enterprise order ought to be made. Delaying these proceedings practically undermines the merit of the application and deprives the Commission of the ability to determine the application in accordance with the substantial merits of the case. ¶51 There is a real risk that granting an adjournment in the terms sought by the City would mean that the case cannot be determined before the proposed 30 June 2027 nominal expiry date. All delays in these proceedings diminish the utility of the relief that the CFMEUW is seeking. ¶52 In these circumstances, the grant of the adjournment sought may result in injustice which cannot otherwise be remedied. This factor militates strongly against granting an adjournment. Conclusion and Disposition ¶53 Weighing the relevant considerations, I am not persuaded that the interests of justice justify preventing the CFMEUW from prosecuting this case pending a decision in CICS 9 of 2023. Possible outcomes of CICS 9 of 2023 include that the CFMEUW will be constrained in or prevented from representing employees at the City of Canning in future. Whether and which possibility eventuates is uncertain. The industrial dispute that is at the centre of these proceedings is a present dispute concerning bargaining for an industrial instrument which, if the CFMEUW is successful, would operate in the meantime. ¶54 The impact of delay in these proceedings from granting an adjournment will be substantial. It could entirely deprive the CFMEUW of relief, regardless of the outcome of CICS 9 of 2023 and regardless of the merits of the present application. ¶55 Accordingly, I decline to adjourn these proceedings and dismiss the City’s application.